Eastern Pacific Chartering v Pola Maritime. How an application for lis pendens awakens the Brussels Convention (as between the UK and Gibraltar).

Eastern Pacific Chartering Inc v Pola Maritime Ltd [2021] EWHC 1707 (Comm) is a highly unusual case which shows that dormant Conventions can be awoken from their slumber.  I merely dabble in EU external relations law, I am no expert in it. The application of that law in the context of private international law is an issue I have tasked one or two students with – let’s just say they find it challenging.

On the specific issue at hand, parties agree that consequential to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (Gibraltar) Order 1997, matters of jurisdiction between the E&W Courts and the Supreme Court of Gibraltar are governed by the Brussels Convention 1968 and that this remains the case notwithstanding Brexit. That core issue of external relations law pre and post Brexit is therefore not sub judice. One imagines that had it been, it could have led to extensive to and fro, among others within the context of the UK having revoked the 1968 Convention per the jurisdiction and Judgments Exit Regulations SI 2019/479, and of the Withdrawal Agreement.

In July 2020, claimant had a ship arrested in Gibraltar, with the purpose to serve as security for claims under a charterparty between both, claims that were to be brought in London, consistently with an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the charterparty. Roberston DJ classifies that action as one for provisional measures under Article 24 Convention (35 of the Brussels Ia Regulation).  The legality of that arrest (which ended upon claimant releasing it) continues to be disputed (ia viz the actual ownership of the ship).

Claimant (not domiciled in a 1968 Convention Contracting State) now sues  in E&W (pursuant to the choice of court) Defendant (domiciled at Cyprus) for outstanding monies. In current proceedings it applies to dismiss and strike out that part of the Defendant’s counterclaim at the E&W courts which seeks to advance claims in tort based on the alleged wrongful Gibraltar arrest.  In essence claimant submits that the High Court court has no jurisdiction to try the Defendant’s tort claims and should decline jurisdiction in favour of the Supreme Court of Gibraltar.

After a swipe [18 ff] at both parties having engaged, without court approval, experts on Gibraltarian law (which, she holds, bear no relevance for the jurisdictional issues anyways), Roberston DJ proceeds to discuss the lis pendens issue.

Defendant’s primary case is that, on the facts of this case, Article 17 Convention (A25 BIa) applies to confer jurisdiction, because the exclusive jurisdiction clause is broad enough to cover the tort claims. The Defendant’s fallback position is that, if that is wrong, the Court nevertheless has jurisdiction in respect of its counterclaims, not on the basis of A5(3) Convention (the Claimant (defendant on the counterclaim) not being domiciled in a Convention State) either because that necessarily follows from the Claimant’s decision to litigate its own claims here, or because Claimant has taken steps since service of the Defence and Counterclaim which waived any right to object to jurisdiction in respect of the counterclaims.

The discussion revolves around the contractual and statutory interpretation of the action radius of choice of court. This also involves the classic issue of tort claims between contractual parties (compare Wikingerhof) with the judge opting for the one stop shop approach (distinguishing ia Ryanair Ltd v Esso Italiana Srl [2015] 1 All ER (Comm) 152): 42: ‘there is a clear causal connection [between the contractual and tort claims, GAVC], which seems to be sufficient for the purposes of a clause worded “in connection with“.’ In conclusion: [52]: ‘whether damages are recoverable for an allegedly wrongful arrest made in seeking security for claims under the charter, ..is a claim “in connection with” the charter’ hence the E&W courts have jurisdiction. [39]: this ‘allows a single accounting, as regards the overall financial position of the parties as a result of the legal relationship created between them by the charter, and their dispute about what rights and obligations properly flow from that legal relationship.’

Obiter jurisdiction on the alternative grounds, under English residual rules, is also accepted (with the interesting note of the absence, in the Convention, of a gateway for counterclaims, in contrast with Brussels I and Brussels Ia).

Coming then to lis pendens under Article 21 Convention, this is dismissed. [70] The arrest claim plainly does not involve either the same cause of action or the same object as the Defendant’s tort claims seeking to recover damages for wrongful arrest, which are advanced solely by way of counterclaim in E&W. The factual and legal foundation for that counterclaim needs, on any view, to travel substantially beyond the matters the Claimant relies on for its own cause of action and the object of the counterclaim is to recover damages.

Neither [73] is an acknowledgment of service in the Gibraltar arrest proceedings does not amount to a submission to that jurisdiction which would preclude the Defendant from raising its distinct tort claims in E&W.

A stay on ‘related proceedings’ (Article 22 Convention) is also rejected for the reasons listed at [83]. Core reference here is Research in Motion v Visto [2007] EWHC 900 (Ch).

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Chapter 1 Heading 1.7, Chapter 2 para 2.375, 2.469.

LugaNON. My brief thoughts on the European Commission’s refusal to support the UK’s accession to Lugano 2007, and a clarification of the procedure and required majorities.

Update 9 July 2021 Thank you Ekaterina Pannebakker for flagging the momentarily definitive ‘no’: the EU’s official confirmation of non-consent.

Update 8 June 2021 for the Dutch regret of the EC’s approach yet de facto acceptance of the EC position, see  here – with thanks to Taco Van Der Valk for signalling. The Dutch Government also emphasises the fact that the issue is open-ended: it can be revisited in a later stage of EU-UK relations.

This post is my tuppenny worth on the European Commission’s Assessment on the application of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to accede to the 2007 Lugano Convention. These are my considered but of course not my exhaustive initial thoughts. For excellent review of the legal status quo, see Andrew Dickinson’s ‘Realignment of the Planets – Brexit and European Private International Law’ in IPRax 2021/3.

The background. 

In June 2020, Michel Barnier reportedly commented ‘Do we really want the UK to remain a centre for commercial litigation for the EU, when we could attract these services here?’. This illustrated what has been clear now for quite a while: legal services contribute directly to GPD, mostly as a result of law firms’ turnover and, more recently,  via the financial performance of third-party financing. More importantly, they have an impact on the reputation of a country. Courts’ know-how, speed and general performance are a particularly relevant factor here. Therefore the legal sector acts as one factor in attracting foreign direct investment, as the rise of  international commercial courts shows.

The quote also illustrates however that the European Commission and the Member States were keenly aware of the impact of Brexit on judicial co-operation. Throughout the process, this included early EU flags that, should judicial co-operation fail to be included in the EU-UK Trade and Co-operation Agreement – TCA, it should not be assumed that the EU would support UK Lugano membership. Scholarship, too, warned of the inferiority of Lugano viz Brussels IA, and the particular weakness of Lugano States only having to take  ‘due account’ (Article 1 Protocol 2 Lugano 2007) of CJEU case-law on Lugano.

As readers will be aware, the TCA as eventually negotiated includes precious little on judicial co-operation in civil and commercial matters. A Hard Brexit in this area, therefore. Amidst the many issues that needed to be discussed in the TCA, judicial co-operation did not make the grade. This was not a big surprise. As Peter Bert signalled from the start, judicial co-operation barely featured in the negotiation mandate on the EU side, and on the UK side the Government kept largely schtum about the issue.

The lack of provision in the TCA put back into the spotlights the UK’s April 2020 application to join Lugano. Of note is as I have signalled before, that the UK could accede to Lugano, bypassing EU approval , if it were to become a fully fledged EFTA Member State (A70(1)a Lugano). That of course is not the route the UK has followed in its disentanglement from the EU. Under A72 Lugano therefore accession requires consent from the current Lugano States, consent which they ‘endeavour to give’ at the latest within one year after the invitation to do so by the Depository (i.e., Switserland). 

The flip-flop? 

It is reporting in the Financial Times which subsequently put things into a bit of a spin, whether as a result of misinformation or lobbying, I cannot say. On the day of an important meeting of the relevant Working Party, the FT first reported the EC would support Lugano Membership – contrary to what the vast majority of observers had assumed. By the afternoon a U-turn in reporting was made, suggesting additionally that a split had emerged among the Member States. That split is simply not there, or not to a sufficient degree (see below re the voting procedure).

The morning’s reporting of white smoke made the lack of EC support look like a surprise or indeed a disappointment. Clearly it could not have been the former: most of us had assumed the EC would not support the application.

That leaves the feeling of disappointment. Quite aside from one’s view on Brexit as a whole, for legal practice clearly a continuing umbilical cord between the UK and the Brussels Regime in its widest form (BIa, Rome I and II etc etc) would have been most preferable. Lugano would have been a second best. I remind readers that Lugano not only lacks a unified solid judicial oversight. It also lags behind Brussels Ia in important aspects (Lugano 2007 instead mirrors Brussels I, Regulation 44/2001).

The reasoning.

In its Communication to the EP and the Member States, as Peter Bert reports, the EC’s core reasoning is

“For the European Union, the Lugano Convention is a flanking measure of the internal market and relates to the EU-EFTA/EEA context. In relation to all other third countries the consistent policy of the European Union is to promote cooperation within the framework of the multilateral Hague Conventions. The United Kingdom is a third country without a special link to the internal market. Therefore, there is no reason for the European Union to depart from its general approach in relation to the United Kingdom. Consequently, the Hague Conventions should provide the framework for future cooperation between the European Union and the United Kingdom in the field of civil judicial cooperation.”

The Commission specifically refers to the example of Poland as the direction of travel (closer integration with the EU), and to Lugano being a flanking measure of the Internal Market. The 1968 Brussels Convention quite clearly shows the DNA and the narrative of market integration. The development of the EU judicial area in the meantime has moved along in the direction of the EU citisen, rather than merely corporations, as consumers of EU judicial co-operation. Yet without Lugano States being part of the much wider judicial co-operation agenda of the EU proper, it is not absurd to suggest that Lugano 2007’s narrative is more closely aligned with market  integration than it is with ever deeper integration.

At the time of Poland‘s accession to Lugano, this was indeed clearly also linked to its impending membership of the EU, as also noted by David Lock QC, relevant UK Minister at the time. For current candidates, one could think e.g. of Georgia, and the Balkan countries, as stronger candidates for Lugano membership than the UK. Clearly, however, they may bump into opposition by the non-EU Lugano States.

The victims.

The general narrative, to which I subscribe, is that it is not Business to Business contracts, and the litigation by big business cases that will be much hit by this hard Brexit in judicial co-operation. They will turn to arbitration, they will agree exclusive choice of court (covered by the 2005 Hague Convention), and if need be they will simply absorb being litigated in, or having to litigate in the EU. Likewise, many UK judgments in standard business cases will find little difficulty, if some delay, in enforcement in the EU.

Rather: SMEs (lest they too enter into exclusive choice of court agreements per Hague 2005; and they will be less likely to be able to absorb the cost of parallel litigation), consumers and employees, travellers (including in direct action versus the insurer), and claimants in corporate due diligence cases will find it much harder to have a smooth judicial process between the UK and the EU. Consumers domiciled in the EU will still be able to sue UK corporations in the EU, provided they meet the Pammer Alpenhof criteria under the relevant Section of Brussels Ia; and employees carrying out their duties here, likewise will be able to sue a UK employer in the EU. Yet with the distinct possibility of parallel UK proceedings, and subsequent difficulties in having a European judgment enforced, there will be many a freezing effect on proactive judicial action by these protected groups. Clearly and mutatis mutandis, the same categories in the UK will see a major judicial protection avenue fall away, as non-EU cq non-Lugano domiciled consumers, employees and small insureds do not enjoy the protection of the relevant Sections in BIa cq Lugano.

A distinct category of claimants that will be hit, are those which recently have enjoyed the reigning in of forum non conveniens in business and human rights cases particularly under Lugano (where Owosu’s rejection of forum non rules) and even under Brussels Ia (where A33-34 does create some obstacles). Without Lugano, forum non in these cases will once again come to the fore, although recent Court of Appeal and Supreme Court authority on duty of care may alter that fear. 

The voting procedure and future options.

Greg Callus suggests a number of future options here. I have made the following admittedly lame football comparison: If BIa is the Champions League, then Lugano is the Premier League and the Hague Judgments Convention the Ruritanian Boy Scouts football conference. That is because the 2019 Convention does not impact on forum non theories of the signatory States; is a long, long way off entry into force (albeit as noted the EC signals it might speed up the accession process); has such a huge amount of exceptions, reservations and open questions, counsel will drive an entire tank company through it; and, like all Hague instruments, lacks a harmonising court with authority over interpretation.

The Lugano Convention encourages consent within a year of notification. Absence of an answer in other words simply continues a status of lack of consent.

An important final word on the voting procedure: it is NOT the case that the final word on the current initiative lies with the Member States under qualified majority – QMV voting. An EU yes to Switserland, the depository, requires a Council Decision with QMV. However that requires a COM proposal for such decision. This, the European Commission clearly is not willing to put forward. Article 241 TFEU enables Council to request the EC to put forward a proposal for decision. Yet to amend that proposal (which would have to be the case here, seeing as the EC will not propose consent), unanimity is required.

In conclusion

I return to my Barnier quote above: ‘Do we really want the UK to remain a centre for commercial litigation for the EU, when we could attract these services here?’ Free movement of judgments simply is too big a cherry to have the UK pick it in the absence of a more overall framework for judicial co-operation in civil and commercial matters. I fear the fall-out for the categories listed above, might not be enough to make the EC and indeed enough Member States deviate from the Brexit negotiation mandate, which continues to cast a long shadow over this particular initiative.

Geert.

EU private international law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 1.7.

Swiss court’s refusal of recognition under Lugano 2007 shows the difficult road ahead for UK judgments.

There is much to be said about the refusal of the courts at Zurich at the end of February, to recognise a September 2020 High Court judgment under the 2007 Lugano Convention. Rodrigo Rodriguez says it all here and I am happy to refer. The guillotine fashion in which the courts rejected application of Lugano 2007 even for a procedure that was initiated before Brexit date 1 January 2021 leaves much to be discussed. As does the question whether the demise of Lugano 2007 might not resurrect Lugano 1988 (Rodrigo points ia to the dualist nature of the UK in his discussion of same).

Whether correct or not in the specific case at issue, the judgment does show the clear bumpy ride ahead for UK judgments across the continent, following the Hard Brexit in judicial co-operation.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed., 2021, Chapter 1, Heading 1.7.

 

Lipton v BA City Flyer. EU flight delay law following Brexit.

Update 27 July 2021 see the most interesting Q by Jack Williams whether the  CA is not getting its retained EU law mixed up with acquired EU law and therefore whether the judgment might have been per incuriam.

A short flag of the Court of Appeals finding yesterday in Lipton & Anor v BA City Flyer Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 454 in which Coulson LJ, in discussing whether the airline had given proof of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying flight delay, gives a perfectly clear overview of the provisions in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement – TCA and relevant statutory provisions in the UK itself. In the case itself, the impact of these rules on passengers’ claims under the Flight Delay Regulation was at issue.

Geert.

Gategroup: A seminal and questionable judgment on gatekeeping viz restructuring ‘Plans’ under the Lugano Convention, Insolvency Regulation.

Update 7 May 2021 in follow-up judgment [[2021] EWHC 775 (Ch)], the judge calls the case one of ‘good forum shopping’ per Codere, points to expert evidence on Swiss Law (by professor Rodrigo Rodriguez, seemingly supporting the suggestion Lugano’s insolvency exception applies [24]; Rodrigo did point to an issue with third party effect, which led to an amendment of the Plan) and Luxembourg law (by Philippe Hoss), both essentially confirming enforceability in Switserland and Luxembourg.

Zacaroli J this morning held in Gategroup Guarantee Ltd, Re [2021] EWHC 304 (Ch) on whether ‘part 26A’ English restructuring ‘Plans’ (see my review of ia Deep Ocean) are within the scope of the Lugano Convention’s insolvency exception (Lugano rather than Brussels Ia was engaged).

He held they are (hence: excluded from Lugano), leading to neutralisation of an exclusive choice of court agreement in the relevant bonds, and making the courts of England and Wales have jurisdiction despite this choice of court.

Oddly Kaupthing was not referred to. Neither was Enasarco.

The judge relied unconvincingly in my view on the dovetail discussion (most recently discussed by me viz Alpine Bau) under the Brussels IA Recast and the EU Insolvency Regulation (‘EIA’)- neither of course applicable to the UK anymore, as indeed is the case for the Lugano Convention.

All in all this is a case in which the  reasoning has a potentially long term impact. The claim form in this case was issued on 30 December 2020. As such, by reason of Regulation 92(1), (2)(d) and (3) of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, the Lugano Convention continues to apply.

The Plan Company was incorporated on 8 December 2020 as a wholly owned subsidiary of gategroup Holding AG (the ‘Parent’, a company incorporated in Switzerland. At [55] , if Lugano applies to applications under Part 26A, then the Plan Company accepts that by reason of A23(1) Lugano and the exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the courts of Zurich in the Bonds, this court has no jurisdiction. That acceptance is made notwithstanding that the Deed Poll contains a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the courts of England. The Plan Company acknowledges that since the purpose of the Plan is to effect amendments to the terms of the Bonds, the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the Bonds is engaged.

The usual modus operandi of assuming application of Brussels Ia arguendo (see viz schemes of arrangement most recently KCA Deutag and viz Plans Deep Ocean and Virgin) did not fly here for as noted the Plan Company accepts that the exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the Zurich courts is a complete bar to this court assuming jurisdiction if the Lugano Convention applies (in the preceding cases the point need not be decided, since jurisdiction under BIa could be established arguendo as in none of them was there adversarial argument on the point).

At 70 Justice Zacaroli introduces effectively an amicus curiae by Kirkland & Ellis, opposing the view that the insolvency exception applies.

At 73 ff a first point is considered: Part 26A Plans have not been notified under the EIA Annex. This refers to the so-called dovetailing between Brussels Ia, Lugano and the EIR. The suggestion is that if a procedure is not listed in Annex A EIR, it is conclusively not an insolvency proceeding and “that is the end of the matter” because the dovetailing principle leads inexorably to the conclusion that it falls within the Recast (‘and thus within the Lugano Convention’  [73]). At 82 the judge incidentally is under the impression that the older, heavier procedure of amendment by (EP and Council) Regulation applies – which it no longer does since the EIR 2015.

I have since long submitted that there is no such dovetail. It is also clear that there cannot be identity of interpretation between the Lugano Convention’s insolvency exception and the Brussels regime given that non-EU Lugano States are not part of the EIR. The judge confirms as much at 81 and at 91 ff  and, in a first approach, revisits the principles of modified universalism and the origin of the insolvency exception in particular in the Jenard report. He holds at 103 that the ratio behind the insolvency exception in the Rapport Jenard is the same as the ratio behind Plans, hence that the exception applies.

In a second (presumably subsidiary) approach, the judge queries whether proceedings under Part 26A comply with the abstract requirements for an ‘insolvency’ procedure under of A1(1) EIR and finds at 133 that they do. I am really not convinced by the relevance of that analysis. He includes at 134 ff an argument that the Dutch ‘WHOA’ (Wet homologatie onderhands akkoord) proceedings are to be included in Annex A. Again I am not convinced that serves much purpose. Member States populate the Annex and a Member State proposal for inclusion is not checked against A1(1) EIR.

Conclusion on the jurisdictional issue at 137: ‘proceedings under Part 26A are within the bankruptcy exclusion in the Lugano Convention. This court accordingly has jurisdiction notwithstanding the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the Bonds.’

A most relevant judgment, on which the issues are not at all clear. Expect appeal lest the restructuring timing has made this nugatory – settling these issues would most certainly be welcome.

Geert.

EU private international law, 3rd ed. 2021, paras 2.73 ff (2.81 ff in particular) and 5.35 ff.

Seven swans a-swimming. The Hard Brexit for judicial co-operation in civil matters.

Update 13 April 2021 see Matthias Lehmann’s reporting on yesterday’s rollercoaster news re the EC’s position viz the UK’s accession to Lugano.

Update 10 February 2021 see Steve Peers’ reporting on the UK’s formal confirmation of non-extension of the Brussels Convention and Rome 1980 Convention.

Update 5 January 2020 This CMS summary usefully points out that there is embryonic judicial co-operation on intellectual property rights (see p155 ff of the agreement, Section 2: Civil and administrative enforcement).

31 December 2020, the Seventh day of Christmas, delivered a hard Brexit in the area of judicial co-operation in civil matters – the core subject area of this blog. The moment the draft  Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and the UK broke, a few of us poured over the text to find any deal on the issue – in vain. Peter Bert has reporting and analysis here and here; Ralf Michaels summarised here (he also links to our Twitter reactions, which readers might find of use) and Marta Requejo Isidro links further to official documents here.

The UK’s application to join Lugano is still out there (the EU have an effective veto), however as things stand it seems unlikely the EU will agree.

Andrew Dickinson summarises the many things on the UK’s to do list here. As was clear to many of us, Sylvester 2020 was never going to be an end to, rather the start of interesting times in the sector.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 1.36 ff.

Napag Trading v Gedi. A right Italian tussle on libel over the internet, leads to jurisdictional dismissal on good arguable case grounds.

Napag Trading Ltd & Ors v Gedi Gruppo Editoriale SPA & Anor [2020] EWHC 3034 (QB) engages (and refers to) the issues I previously reported on in inter alia Bolagsupplysningen, Saïd v L’Express,

It is worthwhile to list both claimants and defendants.

On the claimants side, Napag Trading Limited (“the First Claimant”) is an English-domiciled company. Napag Italia Srl (“the Third Claimant”) is an Italian-domiciled subsidiary of the First Claimant. Sgr Francesco Mazzagatti (“the Second Claimant”), an Italian national with his main residence in Dubai, is the CEO and sole director of, and 95% shareholder in, the First Claimant. The First Claimant trades, and the Third Claimant has traded, in petroleum-based products.

On the defendants side, Gedi Gruppo Editoriale S.p.A. (“the First Defendant”) is the publisher amongst other things of L’Espresso which is a weekly Italian-language political and cultural magazine available both in print and online in England and Wales. Società Editoriale Il Fatto S.p.A. (“the Second Defendant”) is the publisher of Il Fatto Quotidiano (“Il Fatto”), a daily Italian-language newspaper published in England and Wales only on the internet.

An earlier Brexit-anticipatory forum non conveniens challenge was waived away by Jay J at 7: ‘Only the Second Defendant saw fit to raise a forum non conveniens challenge in advance of 1st January 2021 and the relevant EU regulation no longer applying. I would have been very reluctant to rule on this sort of application on an anticipatory basis.’

Identifying a centre of interest in England and Wales, leading to full jurisdiction there for damages, per CJEU e-Date and Bolagsupplysningen and also a precondition to apply for injunctive relief (see also Bolagsupplysningen: only courts with full jurisdiction may issue such relief) is of course a factual assessment.

The Second Claimant is an entrepreneur, born in Calabria but now living in Dubai. He founded the Third Claimant in 2012. Initially, it traded in oil and petroleum products from offices in Rome. The Third Claimant dealt in particular with the Italian oil company Eni S.p.A. (“Eni”), headquartered in Rome and in part state-owned, and Eni Trading & Shipping S.p.A. (“Ets”) which is based in Rome and has a branch in London. Second Claimant incorporated the First Claimant in April 2018. His evidence is that London was a better base from which to conduct and grow his business because he was encountering resistance from some banks and financial institutions who were diffident about working with an Italian company. More specifically, the strategy was to hive off the Third Claimant’s oil and gas business into the First Claimant, and the former would devote itself to trading in petrochemicals. Additionally, the idea was to invest in an “upstream” development in the UK Continental shelf, and the first discussions about this were in November 2018.

Justice Jay revisits the CJEU’s instructions re centre of interests for natural persons per e-Date. At 29:

First, other things being equal, and certainly in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a natural person’s “centre of interests” will match his or her habitual residence. Whether or not this may accurately be described as an evidential presumption does not I think matter (in my view, no legal presumption is generated); in any case, the CJEU – subject to my second point – is not purporting to assist national courts as to the rules of law that should govern the exercise of ascertainment. Secondly, general considerations of predictability and the need for clarity militate in favour of straightforward and readily accessible criteria rather than any microscopic examination of the detail.

At 32 follows an interesting discussion of para 43 of the CJEU Bolagsupplysningen judgment

“43. It is also appropriate to point out that, in circumstances where it is not clear from the evidence that the court must consider at the stage when it assesses whether it has jurisdiction that the economic activity of the relevant legal person is carried out mainly in a certain member state, so that the centre of interests of the legal person which is claiming to be the victim of an infringement of its personality rights cannot be identified, that person cannot benefit from the right to sue the alleged perpetrator of the infringement pursuant to article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012 for the entirety of the compensation on the basis of the place where the damage occurred.”

After a reference to what Justice Jay calls Bobek AG’s ‘masterly opinion’, in particular the burden of proof issues are discussed which Jay J justifiably holds are not within the scope of Brussels Ia (not at least in the sense of deciding the procedural moment at which proof must be furnished). I agree with his finding that the CJEU’s meaning of para 43 is simply that

in the event that the national court concluded that it could not identify the “centre of interests” because the evidence was unclear, article 7(2) of the RBR could not avail the claimant.

Conclusion of the factual consideration follows (probably obiter: see 150) at 161: first Claimant has the better of the argument that its “centre of interests” is in England and Wales.

Jay J then discusses at 35 ff that whether there actually is damage within E&W as a matter of domestic law to decide to good arguable case standard, that the case may go ahead. That discussion shows that  the actual concept of ‘damage’ within the meaning of Brussels Ia and indeed Rome II is not quite so established as might be hoped, and it is held at 141 that no serious damage has occurred within E&W for there to be jurisdiction.

The case is a good illustration of the hurdle which national rules of civil procedure continue to form despite jurisdictional harmonisation under EU private international law rules.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2.

Third ed. forthcoming February 2021.

 

Swissport Fuelling. Another Scheme of arrangement, with a slight twist.

Swissport Fuelling Ltd, Re [2020] EWHC 1499 (Ch) at 59 ff repeats the classic (see Lecta Paper for the status quo), unresolved issue of jurisdiction for schemes of arrangement under under BIa (hence also: Lugano 2007). The case is worth reporting for slightly unusually, the scheme company, UK incorporated, acts as guarantor rather than borrower. Borrowers are mainly incorporated in Luxembourg and Switserland. Under the Credit Agreement, the Borrowers do not have a right of contribution or indemnity against the guarantors, so a claim against them would not ricochet against the UK incorporated Company.

Recognition under New York law is discussed – not yet the issue of recognition under Luxembourgish and Swiss law. That, one imagines, will follow at the sanctioning hearing, which will ordinarly follow the meeting of the scheme creditors which Miles J orders in current judgment.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 2, Chapter 5.

 

PJSC v Starr. A glimpse of the complications of non-automatic recognition and enforcement.

A short note on Public Joint Stock Company (Rosgosstrakh) v Starr Syndicate Ltd & Ors [2020] EWHC 1557 (Comm) just to illustrate the complications for recognition and enforcement in the absence of a near-automated process such as under Brussels IA (the Hague Judgments Convention is meant to lubricate the process internationally). Claimant applies for summary judgment on its claim for recognition and enforcement of three judgments obtained in its favour in the Russian courts in 2015 and 2016.

Moulder J first discussed the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the Russian courts and she finds at 93 after consideration that the discussions to and fro, and the evidence of Russian experts for each of the parties, necessitates proper discussion with oral evidence of the contractual construction, under Russian law, of the relevant choice of court clauses. Of course under BIa and other regimes operating with a certain amount of mutual trust, second-guessing jurisdiction is not part of the assessment.

Next, the allegations of bias are also discussed, with at 126 ia reference to an interference by President Putin, and at 138 a solid set of reasoning for Moulder J to dismiss the potential for summary judgment on this point, too. Of course bias is an ordre public issue which even under BIa’s rules for recognition of judgments from other Member States, might justify refusal of recognition.

Geert.

 

 

 

Akkurate: Whether English discovery may act extraterritorially under the EU Insolvency Regulation, and a clear difference following Brexit.

Graham Woloff eaor Calzaturificio Zengarini eaor re Akkurate Ltd, [2020] EWHC 1433 (Ch) concerns the question whether the court has the power under section 236(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986 to require persons resident in the EU to produce books and papers and an account of their dealings with a company being compulsorily wound up in England and Wales (it is not disputed that Akkurate’s centre of main interests (“COMI”) was in England and Wales under the European Insolvency Regulation EIR).

EIR 2000 applies to this case, because the winding up of Akkurate was before 26 June 2017, however the issue is not materially different in the new Regulation. There are inconsistent first instance decisions which Vos C reviews ia at 27 ff and at 54 after consideration, he considers s236(3) does not have extraterritorial effect on the basis of what he considers to be the binding authority of Re Tucker (a bankrupt) [1990] Ch. 148. however that following the EIR 2000 (unchanged in EIR 2015) the European regime can and does extend the territoriality of purely domestic insolvency provisions. CJEU authority cited is in particular C-339/07 Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium (at 58 ff) – which I find may be a bit optimistic. Vos C also decides that he can and should apply his discretion to grant orders as formulated at 68.

Clearly, post Brexit, the situation will revert to Tucker. Which would make the English courts less attractive than their continental counterparts – although of course one would have to wait for CJEU authority to confirm the issue less equivocally.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 5,