Posts Tagged Brexit
A short note on Public Joint Stock Company (Rosgosstrakh) v Starr Syndicate Ltd & Ors  EWHC 1557 (Comm) just to illustrate the complications for recognition and enforcement in the absence of a near-automated process such as under Brussels IA (the Hague Judgments Convention is meant to lubricate the process internationally). Claimant applies for summary judgment on its claim for recognition and enforcement of three judgments obtained in its favour in the Russian courts in 2015 and 2016.
Moulder J first discussed the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the Russian courts and she finds at 93 after consideration that the discussions to and fro, and the evidence of Russian experts for each of the parties, necessitates proper discussion with oral evidence of the contractual construction, under Russian law, of the relevant choice of court clauses. Of course under BIa and other regimes operating with a certain amount of mutual trust, second-guessing jurisdiction is not part of the assessment.
Next, the allegations of bias are also discussed, with at 126 ia reference to an interference by President Putin, and at 138 a solid set of reasoning for Moulder J to dismiss the potential for summary judgment on this point, too. Of course bias is an ordre public issue which even under BIa’s rules for recognition of judgments from other Member States, might justify refusal of recognition.
Akkurate: Whether English discovery may act extraterritorially under the EU Insolvency Regulation, and a clear difference following Brexit.
Graham Woloff eaor Calzaturificio Zengarini eaor re Akkurate Ltd,  EWHC 1433 (Ch) concerns the question whether the court has the power under section 236(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986 to require persons resident in the EU to produce books and papers and an account of their dealings with a company being compulsorily wound up in England and Wales (it is not disputed that Akkurate’s centre of main interests (“COMI”) was in England and Wales under the European Insolvency Regulation EIR).
EIR 2000 applies to this case, because the winding up of Akkurate was before 26 June 2017, however the issue is not materially different in the new Regulation. There are inconsistent first instance decisions which Vos C reviews ia at 27 ff and at 54 after consideration, he considers s236(3) does not have extraterritorial effect on the basis of what he considers to be the binding authority of Re Tucker (a bankrupt)  Ch. 148. however that following the EIR 2000 (unchanged in EIR 2015) the European regime can and does extend the territoriality of purely domestic insolvency provisions. CJEU authority cited is in particular C-339/07 Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium (at 58 ff) – which I find may be a bit optimistic. Vos C also decides that he can and should apply his discretion to grant orders as formulated at 68.
Clearly, post Brexit, the situation will revert to Tucker. Which would make the English courts less attractive than their continental counterparts – although of course one would have to wait for CJEU authority to confirm the issue less equivocally.
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 5,
Mastermelt v Siegfried Evionnaz highlights the continuing torpedo under Lugano, as opposed to the Brussels regime. Suggests cautious application of the Privatbank authority on reflexivity.
In Mastermelt v Siegfried Evionnaz  EWHC 927 (QB), at issue is negative declaratory relief on contractual performance.
Claimant Mastermelt is an English company specialising in the reclamation of precious metals. The defendant, Siegfried Evionnaz SA (“Siegfried”), is a Swiss company. There is a dispute between the parties over the quality of Mastermelt’s performance. Siegfried’s standard terms and conditions of contract (“STC”) include a clause stating that the governing law is Swiss law and that the Swiss courts have exclusive jurisdiction.
Relevant pending proceedings, are: very shortly after Siegfried had informed Mastermelt that it was going to issue proceedings against Mastermelt in Switzerland, Mastermelt issued the present claim in England on 5 February 2019. It seeks negative declaratory relief against Siegfried. Proceedings were subsequently issued by Siegfried against Mastermelt in the Zurich Commercial Court on 23 July 2019. Meanwhile, on 24 May 2019, Siegfried applied to the High Court in London for a declaration that it had no jurisdiction to try Mastermelt’s claim and so the Claim Form and service should be set aside, alternatively stayed. Further, on 29 January 2020 Mastermelt applied to the Swiss court (1) for a stay of those proceedings pending the UK decision, or (2) for the Swiss proceedings to be limited at that stage to a consideration of the court’s own jurisdiction there and nothing else, or (3) an extension of time for service of a response to Siegfried’s claim. By an order of 4 February 2020, the Swiss court rejected all three applications. On 7 February Mastermelt filed an appeal to the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland which initially suspended enforcement of the Zurich Commercial Court’s decision pending the appeal. However, on 13 February Siegfried objected to any such suspension. The Supreme Court directed Mastermelt to file any response to that objection by 9 March. As far as the English courts know, that has been done but at the moment the Supreme Court has not given its decision on the suspension issue, let alone any substantive appeal, nor has there been any decision yet on the jurisdiction or otherwise of the Swiss court to hear the claim.
Siegfried argues, and has convinced the Swiss courts, that A27 Lugano needs to be applied ‘in harmony’ with A31(2) Brussels Ia: this now provides that regardless of which court was seised first, the court which was the subject of the putative exclusive jurisdiction clause, must decide the question of its jurisdiction first and the other proceedings must be stayed in the meantime. At 13 Waksman J refers to the Swiss court’s reasoning, where it takes an expansionist view of the Lugano Convention‘s protocol no2, that the Lugano States shall take ‘due account’ of each other’s courts decisions. The Swiss court suggests that in principle it should follow CJEU authority in Gasser (which introduced the torpedo mechanism by giving strict interpretation to the lis alibi pendens rule, even in case of choice of court) but that it has reasonable justification to deviate from Gasser given that the judgment has become ‘obsolete’ following A31(2) BIa.
Waksman J is first invited to accept the Swiss court’s reasoning as res iudicata, per CJEU C-456/11 Gothaer. (I did say at the time the CJEU may find its ruling in Gothaer would come back to haunt it). This he finds is a stretch of that authority but also not applicable given the limited findings of the Swiss court at any rate: ‘here the actual and only decision of the Swiss court thus far is simply to refuse to stay its own proceedings’.
He then discusses how A27 Lugano needs to be applied. A first reference is to the Court of Appeal’s most problematic view in Privatbank, to my mind, of applying Article 28 Lugano reflexively to third States. At 23-24 Waksman J distinguishes Privatbank (clearly he cannot hold it no relevant authority should he think so); then holds correctly that Gasser is not entirely obsolete following BIa; and finally at 30 that the harmonised regime per Lugano’s Protocol does not mean that one should now interpret Article 27 Lugano like 31.2 and (b) i Brussels Ia.
I agree most firmly. Note this has Brexit implications: one of the routes post Brexit, as readers know, is for the UK to become part of Lugano. In doing so it will surrender BIa’s forum non-light regime (Articles 33-34) in favour of Lugano which most definitely does not have a forum non-application – as well as, as is at issue here, re-arming the Italian torpedo. (Update 7 May 2020 Many thanks to Elijah Granet for pointing in the comments section to A6 of the Hague Choice of Court Convention which in future might serve towards disarming the torpedo to some degree: pursuant to Article 6 of that Convention, a court of a Contracting State other than the contractually chosen court must suspend or dismiss proceedings in that court to which an exclusive choice of court applies. There are exceptions however and in my view these could be used quite extensively: asymmetric choice of court, for instance, might well by some jurisdictions be classed as ordre public). (Update 28 May 2020 see also Aygun Mammadzada in the meantime here for similar and further comments re Lugano).
This leaves the issue of the putative choice of court agreement. England is the forum contractus per Article 5(1)a Lugano, hence will have jurisdiction less choice of court stands. Authority is well-known and recently applied in Pan Ocean, referred to here at 85. After much factual consideration it is accepted to a good arguable case standard that the parties contracted on the basis of the STC for the obligations concerned.
In conclusion therefore the action is stayed.
Handbook of) European Private International Law – 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2.
Lecta paper. Scheme of arrangements in the Brexit transition period, and the Brussels IA elephants in the room continue to be undisturbed.
Update 24 June 2020 see also Swissport Fuelling Ltd, Re  EWHC 1499 (Ch) at 59 ff for the further unresolved issue of jurisdiction under BIa.
In Lecta Paper  EWHC 382 (Ch), Trower J picks up where Zacarolii J left off in  EWHC 3615 (Ch) (which I briefly flagged in my post here and which is referred to in current judgment 12) and goes through the usual matrix for assessing the international impact of an English scheme of arrangement on the European continent.
Ultimate parent company is a Luxembourg company, with further controlling interests held by yet another Luxembourg and a Spanish company. A 10-11 Trower J flags a sensitive issue for credit and other financial arrangements: financial instruments subject to New York law, where amended to English law as governing law and the courts at England as non-exclusive jurisdiction. This was done in accordance with New York law, and approved by over 90% of the instruments’ holders. Yet again therefore a crucial question viz schemes of arrangement and the Brussels jurisdictional and applicable law regimes remains unaddressed, namely the event of opposition of a sizeable stake of creditors.
At 33 ff the issue of jurisdiction is discussed along the lines of Apcoa, Codere and NN2 Newco. Under residual private international law, the sufficient connection to England, engineered by the aforementioned change of governing law and jurisdiction in line with the law governing the instruments at the time (New York law, at 38), was held not to be unfair viz the creditors even in the case of the mother company with COMI in Luxembourg. At 44 ff Trower J returns to the issue of whether Brussels Ia can apply at all to the case, particularly via Article 4 juncto Article 8(1), holding for application of Article 25 in the end. However as in the authority he applies, there continue to be a lot of assumptions in this analysis which, failing substantial opposition by creditors, still have not been settled by either UK, CJEU or continental authority.
At 40 follows the equally standard reference to national experts testifying to the scheme’s recognition in the jurisdictions concerned: France, Italy, Spain, Luxembourg.
At 41 Trower J then briefly mentions Brexit (see my reference to similar cases here). Referring again to the national experts but also to his own insight, Justice Trower simply notes that
‘The Recast Judgments Regulation will continue to apply to the recognition of an English judgment in EU member states, notwithstanding the occurrence of Brexit, provided that the judgment has been given in proceedings which were instituted before 31 December 2020, being the end of the transition period. This follows from Article 67(2) of the Withdrawal Agreement. It follows that any sanction order made in this case should be recognised in EU member states, pursuant to the Recast Judgments Regulation, as will their own domestic law dealing with the recognition of judgments. It is also the case that the application of the Rome I Regulation ought to be unaffected by Brexit in any event. As I read the expert reports, they each confirm that that Regulation will continue to apply after the end of the transition period so that the law of the jurisdiction in respect of which they give evidence will recognise the governing law of the relevant contracts, in this case English law, as applying to the variation and discharge of rights under that contract.’
Note as I did above, the continuing Brussels IA cover assumptions, as well as the position post Brexit (whether under Lugano 2007 or not, remains to be seen).
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 2, Chapter 5.
Update II 8 April 2020 : just after my earlier update, Lecta Paper’s scheme of arrangement sanction hearing was published on BAILII: Trower J considers the end of the transition period at 40.
Update 8 April 2020 compare Crossley & Ors v Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft & Ors  EWFC 28 in which Waksman J succinctly holds at 12
‘On 31 January 2020, shortly after the conclusion of the trial, the UK withdrew from the EU. I asked the parties whether this would make any difference to any of the arguments made before me. I received written submissions on that topic on 4 and 9 March 2020. It is clear from those submissions that it is common ground that Brexit makes no difference here because EU Law (including the jurisdiction of the CJEU) will continue to have effect as if the UK was still a Member State until the end of the “transition period” which is 31 December 2020. This includes the general obligations which the UK owes qua Member State. Accordingly, for the purpose of this judgment, the position is as it was before 31 January 2020.’
(update ctd) and note VB v TR  EWFC 28 where Mostyn J at 6 refers to the (until the end of the transition period) exclusive EU external competence to recognise (on the basis of reciprocity) countries as being on the accession list for the Hague 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction – which Bermuda is not even if the UK itself had recognised it as being part of the Hague regime. At 12: ‘In my judgment the law needs to be changed as between the United Kingdom and its overseas territories to provide that the 1980 Hague Convention operates between them. It is an embarrassment that if a child were taken from Bermuda to United States of America the Convention would apply, but if the child is brought here it does not. Alternatively, the law needs to be changed so that the automatic recognition of orders within the United Kingdom under the Family Law Act 1986 is extended to orders made in the Overseas Territories and the Crown Dependencies.’
In Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole Council v KC et al  EWFC 20, Dancey J at 62 ff is the first UK judge to my knowledge to discuss the implications of the UK’s separation from the EU’s civil procedure /justice and home affairs agenda, particularly in the transition period. It includes a discussion of the UK’s Brexit (EU Exit) Regulations 2019/2003, reg 3, and the European Commission notice on transition provisions.
The care proceedings concern W, a girl aged 9, nearly 10. W’s parents, who were married, are Polish nationals and W was born there. Following the separation of the parents in Poland in April 2016, contested contact proceedings there resulted in an order providing that W live with the mother with contact to the father. The father’s parental responsibility was limited to decisions about medical treatment and education. Following the breakdown of the father’s contact with W, the mother brought her to the UK in June 2018 where they have remained since. That was done without the father’s agreement, although he was aware the mother planned to relocate and acquiesced once the move had taken place. The mother did not tell the father of her and W’s location within the UK.
The legal framework, therefore, is Brussels IIa, Regulation 2201/2003. Dancey J at 63 concedes that by reg 8 of 2019/2003, dealing with saving/transitional provisions, the UK’s revocation from Brussels IIa does not apply to proceedings before a court in a Member State seised before 31 December 2020. However he then refers to the EC Notice to Stakeholders: Withdrawal of the United Kingdom and EU Rules in the Field of Civil Justice and Private International Law: 18/1/2019, and suggests it means that EU rules on recognition and enforcement will not apply to a UK judgment, even if the judgment was given, or enforcement proceedings started, before 1 January 2021 unless the judgment has been exequatured (declared enforceable by the courts of the Member State where recognition or enforcement is required) before 1 January 2021. Support for his opinion is found I suspect mostly in Heading 2.2 of that Notice – although I should warn against the matter of factly nature of that notice without much justification given for the positions it takes. Update 29 03 2020 and as Xavier Lewis has pointed out to me, the notice was put out there in the eventuality of a no deal – Dancey J does not refer to the Withdrawal Agreement at all.
At 66 Dancey J suggests in practice the consequence should not be too dramatic in the case at issue for ‘one or other of the parents should apply promptly in Poland for a declaration recognising this judgment and the order that will follow (exequaturing the judgment).’ That absence of real delay in the case at issue may well be true (it is confirmed by a letter from the Polish consulate) however the implications are already clear and no surprise. Enforcement of UK judgments will be a lot less smooth post Brexit.
Two negatives a positive make? A brief report on anti anti-suit in (among others) continental courts.
A flag on anti anti-suit. Steve Ross reports here on the Paris Court of First Instance (Tribunal de Grande Instance) judgment in RG 19/59311 IPCom v Lenovo /Motorola granting a preliminary injunction. IPCOM GmbH & Co. KG is an intellectual property rights licensing and technology R&D company. Lenovo/Motorola a telecommunications company. As Steve writes, the French Court held that it had jurisdiction over the case with regard to a patent infringement claim and ordered Lenovo to withdraw the motion for an anti-suit injunction which that company had brought before the US District Court of the Northern District of California in so far as it concerns the French part of the patent.
Steve notes (I have not read the actual judgment) that ‘according to the French Court, the international French public order (ordre public) does not recognise the validity of an anti-suit injunction, except where its purpose is to enforce a contractual jurisdiction clause or an arbitral clause. Under all other circumstances, anti-suit injunction proceedings have the effect of indirectly disregarding the exclusive power of each sovereign state to freely determine the international jurisdictional competence of their courts.’
Peter Bert also reports last week a German anti anti-suit injunction at the Courts in Munchen, also for IPR cases.
For progress in the US anti-suit (one ‘anti’ only) application see order here.
Juve Patent report (as does Peter) that the High Court, too, has issued a (partial) anti anti-suit in the case however I have not been able to locate the judgment.
Note that continental courts (see in the French case) finding that anti-suit in general infringes ordre public is an important instruction viz future relationships with UK court orders post Brexit (should the UK not follow EU civil procedure).
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.1.
A short update on the innovation principle‘s continued (corporate-sponsored, let’s be frank) journey.
Thank you first of all prof Maria Lee for signalling the UK’s planned introduction of an ‘innovation test’, to be piloted as part of industrial strategy. Its goal is expressed as ‘We will create an outcome-focused, flexible regulatory system that enables innovation to thrive while protecting citizens and the environment.’ Not much more detail is given. Formulated as such, it does nothing that the current EU regulatory model does not already address – its true goal undoubtedly is a post-Brexit libertarian regulatory environment.
Further, Nina Holland observed with eagle eyes the link between Nafta 2.0 (USMCA) and innovation, in particular Article 12-A-4 ‘parties’ “recognize the importance of developing and implementing measures in a manner that achieves their respective level of protection without creating unnecessary economic barriers or impediments to technological innovation’ (like the UK initiative: meaningless for already addressed by current international trade agreements; the real intention actually is deregulation). American industry has been arguing that the US should ‘build on’ the new NAFTA when negotiating with the EU (should TTIP ever be resuscitated).
Canary Wharf Limited v European Medicines Agency. High Court holds Brexit is a seismic, but not a frustrating event. (Engages Rome I’s Article 12, and vires issues per lex loci corporationis).
Update 5 July 2019 EMA have dropped their appeal following settlement.
In  EWHC 335 (Ch) Canary Wharf Limited v European Medicines Agency Smith J earlier this week held that Brexit is a seismic, but not a frustrating event under English contract law (at 241). The Agency’s lease would not be discharged by frustration upon Brexit and neither does EMA’s move to Amsterdam constitute a frustrating event. The EMA is to honour its lease obligations.
At 186 brief mention is made of the usefulness of Article 12 Rome I (which lists the isused covered by the lex contractus): ‘Article 12 of the Rome I Regulation provides that the law applicable to a contract by virtue of the Regulation governs – among other things – the “performance” of the contract and “the various ways of extinguishing obligations”. Both are subject therefore to English law (a choice of law clause in the contract, and the premises being in England) whichever way one classifies the theory of frustration.
At 187 the discussion is however extended to the issue of supervening illegality under a foreign law that is not the applicable law. The capacity of a corporation to exercise specific rights is determined – at least in the first instance – by the constitution of the corporation, which is itself governed by the law of the place of incorporation: lex loci corporationis. This itself is discussed at 130 ff, leading to interesting views on the status of EU law in the UK post Brexit and, one infers, a finding that ‘EU law’ is the lex loci corporationis. EMA’s argument then is that under EU law it would be acting ultra vires to continue the lease outside the EU’s territory.
At 188: ‘The question, then, is whether – assuming that the EMA is right as regards the points it makes on vires – these are relevant for the purpose of frustration by way of supervening illegality. The question is whether the English law of frustration, which has regard to questions of legality where the performance of the contract would be unlawful according to the law of the place of performance, should also have regard to the law of incorporation, at least where this affects the capacity of a party to continue to perform obligations under a transaction lawfully entered into by it.’ Smith J after discussing precedent, at 189 holds that it cannot.
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 3.
In one of my many ponderings on research I would like to do but might never get an opportunity do (hence my repeated sharing of potential PhD topics) I came across an excellent post by Daniel Jowell QC on the application of EU competition law in the UK courts post-Brexit.
The usual disclaimer of course applies (let’s wait and see what happens in the future Treaty between the UK and the EU) yet one important consideration has wider appeal: how does one apply the classic conflicts suggestion that courts do not apply foreign public law, or if they do, do so with great caution?: both out of comity with the foreign State; and to protect one’s own ordre public.
Competition law is often seen as being of quasi-public nature. Daniel justifiably suggests that post Rome II (in which competition law is assigned a specific (if complicated) lex causae), the UK will revert to its standard rules which increase the possibility that UK courts might refuse to apply foreign competition law, including the EU’s, on public policy grounds.
One to remember.
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 4, Heading 4.6.2.
A concise note (I am currently tied up mostly in writing research grants. And and and… I hope to return to the blog in earnest later in the week) to signal prof Hess’ excellent short paper on Brexit and judicial co-operation. Prof Hess focuses on the possibility to use the Lugano Convention. (See here for a draft of Michiel Poesen’s overview). I agree that Lugano would not be a good route if one’s intention is to safeguard as much as possible co-ordination between the UK’s common law approach to private international law, and the EU’s. Neither evidently if one aims to facilitate smooth cross-border proceedings.
Prof Hess has an interesting side consideration on schemes of arrangements. (Including reference to Apcoa). Again I agree that the English courts’ approach to same is not entirely without question marks (particularly jurisdictional issues in the event of opposing creditors: see here). I do not though believe that they would justify hesitation at the recognition and enforcement stage in continental Europe – even after Brexit. At least: not in all Member States. For of course post Brexit, UK judgments become those of a ‘third country’, for which, subject to progress at The Hague, we have no unified approach.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 5.