Posts Tagged Bier
Griffin v Varouxakis: (obiter) rejection of jurisdiction on the basis of indirect damage, ditto discussion of Brussels I’s insurance title.
In  EWHC 3259 (Comm) Griffin v Varouxakis, Males J gives an obiter masterclass in the (ir)relevance of indirect damage for the establishment of jurisdiction.
Objections to jurisdiction where formally dismissed on the basis that they were made late according to the relevant CPR rules. Yet Males J went on to discuss at length and obiter whether, if such objection had been made timely, it would have been successful. He suggest it would partially have been successful, for those parts of the claim based on indirect damage, and directed against a Greece domiciled defendant.
(Of immediate note is the contrast with Four Seasons v Brownlie: here indirect damage was not immediately dismissed as a jurisdictional trigger however in that case jurisdiction was to be assessed on the basis of residual English rules; Brussels I did not apply).
Claimant insurance company (“Griffin”) contends that as a result of the defendant’s conduct it has lost the right to claim general average contributions which were payable and would have been paid in London, so that the damage it has suffered was suffered in the London jurisdiction. The defendant disputes this analysis, contending that the damage in question was suffered either in the place where the underlying contract was broken or alternatively in Guernsey where Griffin is domiciled and where it would ultimately have received any general average payments. Alternatively he contends that Griffin’s claim is a “matter relating to insurance” within the meaning of Section 3 of Chapter II of the Regulation so that, in accordance with Article 14, he can only be sued in the courts of Greece where he is domiciled.
The Court reviews relevant case-law on Article 7(2) and applies it to two separate claims (particulars of which are in para 28 and para 29): for one of them only, direct damage would have been suffered in England; for the other, in Oman.
Finally at 92 ff and equally obiter Males J concludes that the litigation is not a “matter relating to insurance” within the meaning of Section 3 of Chapter II of the Recast Brussels Regulation. At 96: ‘Not all claims brought by a claimant who happens to be an insurer comprise matters relating to insurance.’ at 98: ‘neither of Griffin’s claims are matters relating to insurance. The fact that Griffin is an insurer forms part of the background to the claim and explains why the harm which Griffin has suffered is the loss of an ability to enforce a subrogated right (although insurers are not the only people who sometimes have the benefit of rights of subrogation), but that is all. In all other respects the nexus between the claim in tort and the policy is tenuous. Determination of the claim requires no consideration of the terms of the policy, which was scarcely looked at during the hearing.’ This latter suggestion goes along the Granarolo etc. judgments on the distinction between contract and tort.
(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2 Heading 188.8.131.52, Chapter 4, Heading 4.4 .
IM Skaugen v MAN. Relevance and location of indirect damage in case of misrepresentation, and forum non conveniens in Singapore.
I shall be posting perhaps tomorrow on yesterday’s CJEU judgment in Löber v Barclays (prospectus liability – see my review of Bobek AG’s Opinion here), but as a warming-up for comparative purposes, a note on  SGHC 123 IM Skaugen v MAN. I have not been able to locate copy of the judgment (I am hoping one of my Singaporean followers might be able to send me one) so I am relying entirely on the excellent post by Adeline Chong – indeed in general I am happy largely to refer to Adeline’s post, she has complete analysis.
The case concerns fraudulent misrepresentation of the fuel consumption of an engine model sold and installed into ships owned by claimants (Volkswagen echo alert). Defendants are German and Norwegian incorporated companies: leave to serve out of jurisdiction needs to be granted. Interesting comparative issues are in particular jurisdiction when only indirect damage (specifically: increased fuel consumption and servicing costs with downstream owners who had purchased the ships from the first owners) occurs there; and the relevance of European lis alibi pendens rules for forum non conveniens purposes.
On the former, Singaporean CPR rules would seem to be prima facie clearer on damage not having to be direct for it to establish jurisdiction; a noted difference with EU law and one which also exercised the UK Supreme Court in Brownlie. Note the consideration of locus delicti and the use of lex fori for same (a good example in my view of the kind of difficulties that will arise if when the Hague Judgments project bears fruit).
On forum non conveniens, Spiliada was the main reference. Of interest here is firstly the consideration of transfer to the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC); and the case-specific consideration of availability of forum: the Norwegian courts had been seized but not the German ones; Germany had been identified by the Singaporean High Court as locus delict: not Norway; yet under the Lugano Convention lis alibi pendens rule, the German courts are now no longer available.
Sometimes I post a little late. Rarely outrageously overdue. Yet Four Seasons Holdings Inc v Brownlie  UKSC 80 needs to be reported on the blog for it is rather important, firstly, with respect to the topical interest in pursuing holding companies for actions (or lack of them) committed by affiliated companies. And secondly, for jurisdiction in tort, to what degree jurisdiction on the basis of injury sustained abroad, can qualify as lasting damage in the UK. Findings on the latter issue were obiter therefore they need to be treated with caution.
All five judges issued a judgment, with a 3 to 2 majority eventually holding (again: obiter) that jurisdiction in tort in England against non-England based defendants, can go ahead on the basis of indirect damage – albeit in such cases it might still falter on forum non conveniens grounds.
Sumption J, outvoted on the indirect damage issue, wrote the most lengthy judgment.
I tweeted the ruling mid December. Students of international law will of course appreciate the personal background to the case, particularly if you have ever had the chance to be taught by prof Sir Ian Brownlie – Philippe Sands’ obituary is here.
Sir Ian died in a car accident while on holiday with his family in Egypt. His wife was also injured. She brought proceedings seeking: (i) damages for her own personal injuries, (ii) damages under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 as Sir Ian’s executrix, and (iii) damages for her bereavement and loss of dependency under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976.
The First Defendant, Four Seasons Holdings Inc (“Holdings”), is the holding company of the Four Seasons hotel group. It is incorporated in British Columbia. The Second Defendant, Nova Park SAE (“Nova Park”) is an Egyptian company which was identified by Lady Brownlie’s solicitors as the owner of the hotel building. The case falls outside the Brussels I Recast Regulation therefore. However reference to Brussels and particularly of course to Rome II is made in the various judgments, for even though the English Courts do not decide jurisdiction on the basis of Brussels, they do have to apply Rome I or II if the suit qualifies as one in contract cq tort.
The Court of Appeal [ EWCA Civ 665] had held that the jurisdictional gateways were not satisfied. There was no contract with Four Seasons Holdings, and given that Holdings was not the owner, there could be no claim in tort for vicarious liability.
David Hart QC has excellent (much more swift) analysis here and I am happy largely to refer. A few points of additional interest.
On the issue of suing holding companies, Sumption J writing at 14 ff dismisses service out of jurisdiction for there is no reasonable possibility of a claim succeeding: at 15:
‘there is no realistic prospect that Lady Brownlie will establish that she contracted with Holdings, or that Holdings will be held vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver of the excursion vehicle.’ That is because (at 14) it is entirely clear ‘that Holdings is a nontrading holding company. It neither owns nor operates the Cairo hotel, which has at all material times been owned by Nova Park, a company with no corporate relationship to any Four Seasons company. A Dutch subsidiary of Holdings called Four Seasons Cairo (Nile Plaza) BV entered into an agreement with Nova Park to operate the hotel on behalf of Nova Park, although at the material times the actual operator was an Egyptian subsidiary of Holdings, FS Cairo (Nile Plaza) LLC, which assumed the contractual obligations of the operator by assignment. Other subsidiaries of Holdings supplied advice and specific services such as sales, marketing, central reservations and procurement, and licensed the use by Nova Park of the Four Seasons Trade Mark’.
Judgment in Brownlie preceded the current cases referred to it on the subject of CSR and jurisdiction (see my previous postings on that, most recently Unilever). Yet it is clear that plaintiffs have to show much more than a corporate bloodline between mother companies and affiliated undertakings, for suits to have any chance of success.
The case could have ended here for all five judges agree on this point. Yet aware of the relevance of direction, discussion was continued obiter on the topic of suing in tort. Firstly it was clear that if a claim in tort could be brought in the English courts, it would be subject to Egyptian law per Article 4(1) Rome II. In the Court of Appeal, Arden LJ had taken analogy with that Article (and the whole Regulation)’s rejection of indirect damage as relevant for deciding lex causae. And of course Rome II’s stance on this point is influenced by the CJEU’s case-law going in the same direction, but then for jurisdiction, in Marinari and the like. Sumption J cites Canadian authority (Stephen Pittel has reference to it here) and is critical of too much emphasis put on a connection between jurisdiction and applicable law, for determining jurisdiction.
Big big pat on his back; readers of the blog know (see eg here) I am not at all enthused by too much analogy between jurisdiction and applicable law).
Sumption at 22
It is undoubtedly convenient for the country of the forum to correspond with that of the proper law. It is also true that both jurisdiction and choice of law can broadly be said to depend on how closely the dispute is connected with a particular country. But there is no necessary connection between the two. The Practice Direction contemplates a wide variety of connecting factors, of which the proper law is only one and that one is relevant only to contractual liabilities. For the purpose of identifying the proper law, “damage” is limited to direct damage because article 4 of Rome II says so in terms. It does this because there can be only one proper law, and the formulation of a common rule for all EU member states necessarily requires a more or less mechanical technique for identifying it. By comparison, indirect damage may be suffered in more than one country and jurisdiction in both English and EU law may subsist in more than one country.
Lady Hale is even more to the point at 49: ‘Applicable law and jurisdiction are two different matters. There is no necessary coincidence between the country with jurisdiction and the country whose law is applicable.‘
Yet for the case at hand ultimately Sumption J does curtail the relevance of indirect damage: at 23:
There is, however, a more fundamental reason for concluding that in the present context “damage” means direct damage. It concerns the nature of the duty broken in a personal injury action and the character of the damage recoverable for the breach. There is a fundamental difference between the damage done to an interest protected by the law, and facts which are merely evidence of the financial value of that damage. Except in limited and carefully circumscribed cases, the law of tort does not protect pecuniary interests as such. It is in general concerned with non-pecuniary interests, such as bodily integrity, physical property and reputation which are inherently entitled to its protection.
At 29 ff follows Sumption’s engagement with relevant CJEU authority, leading him eventually to reject indirect damage as a basis for jurisdiction. That same authority is also discussed by Lady Hale and more succinctly by the others, however they prefer to take the English law on this point in a different direction, particularly taking the CPR (the relevant English civil procedure rules) use of the word ‘damage’ at face value, meaning including indirect damage: residual English PIL therefore not determined by CJEU authority.
As noted in my introduction, even if jurisdiction can be established on the basis of indirect damage in England, forum non conveniens may still scupper jurisdiction eventually.
(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2 Heading 184.108.40.206, Chapter 4, Heading 4.4 .
JSC BTA Bank v Khrapunov. UK Supreme Court confirms the conspiracy itself, not its implementation, as locus delicti commissi under Lugano. Does not entertain locus damni.
The UK Supreme Court held in  UKSC 19 JSC BTA Bank v Khrapunov late March. Defendant is based in Switzerland, hence triggering the Lugano Convention. Addleshaw Goddard have the history of the case and I am happy to refer for those facts. Suffice to say that at the core is a claim in tort of conspiracy, alleging that Mr Khrapunov and his father in-law Mr Ablyazov conspired to injure the Bank by preventing it from enforcing its judgments against Mr Ablyazov’s assets.
First let’s have a look at was not discussed at the SC: domicile and locus damni. As for the former, domicile once held but now fleed from was correctly rejected by Teare J as establishing domicile under Lugano (or indeed Brussels). The argument that jurisdiction should, nevertheless, be taken still to be domiciled in England because defendant was in breach of an obligation under the worldwide freezing order prohibiting him from leaving the jurisdiction, was likewise rejected. An interesting proposition though.
Now, for the location of the locus damni. At 29 the SC refers to the Bank’s argument at the High Court and Court of Appeal stage. The Bank’s argument was that the damage occurred in England. This was based on the contention that its worldwide freezing order and its judgments against Mr Ablyazov were located here and had been reduced in value by the alleged conduct in relation to assets in other jurisdictions. The High Court and Court of Appeal considered that the element of damage proximate to the harmful event was the Bank’s inability or reduced ability to execute against those assets in the places where they were located. Another fine example of the difficult implications of Bier and not one which the CJEU has hitherto had the occasion to review. (But current case will not reach it).
As for locus delicti commissi, the Bank submit that the event giving rise to the damage was the conspiracy itself, which was hatched in England. At the High Court Teare J rejected this submission, because he considered that the cause of the damage was not the conspiracy but its implementation: a suggestion I like in the context of competition law, as readers of the blog will be aware. Teare J was not followed by the Court of Appeal though, which identified the place where the conspiratorial agreement was made as the place of the event which gives rise to and is at the origin of the damage.
The SC refers to CJEU authority to conclude with CDC and at 41 it reiterates the CA’s core reasoning: ‘As Sales LJ explained (at para 76), in entering into the agreement Mr Khrapunov would have encouraged and procured the commission of unlawful acts by agreeing to help Mr Ablyazov to carry the scheme into effect. Thereafter, Mr Khrapunov’s alleged dealing with assets the subject of the freezing and receivership orders would have been undertaken pursuant to and in implementation of that agreement, whether or not he was acting on instructions from Mr Ablyazov.’
The Supreme Court concludes that the making of the agreement in England should be regarded as the harmful event which set the tort in motion.
The judgment keeps open many issues, however. For starters, to have a sole birthplace of conspiratorial agreement is handy in the case at issue however it is likely not often to be so clearly the case (as Dan and Tom point out, particularly not in a digital context). Moreover, for those instances where Mr Khrapunov were not to be acting on instructions from Mr Ablyazov, questions of ultra vires so to speak and hence of a separate tort would arise.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 220.127.116.11
The CJEU today held in Case C-572/14 Austro Mechana. I reported earlier on the AG’s Opinion (which was issued not too long ago). That post also refers readers to Tobias Lutzi‘s analysis. He points quite correctly (indeed entirely correctly) to the issue of dovetail between (now) Article 7(1) and 7(2). Given the interplay between Handte and Kalfelis, is an obligation between parties which is not contractual, necessarily one in tort? I.e. do these two dovetail? Following Kalfelis itself, the answer must be no: an action falls under Art. 7(2) if it ‘seeks to establish the liability of a defendant’ and is ‘not related to a “contract” within the meaning of Article 5(1)’ (para 56). Therefore one must seek to establish the liability of the defendant, and not just review whether the claim is contractual or not.
In the case of collection of copyright levies for private use (where consent of the copyright holder is not sought and a compensatory levy is imposed by national law instead, in accordance with relevant instructions in EU copyright law), one would intuitively say that no ‘liability’ is established against the distributor of copyrighted materials to whom effectively collection of a State-imposed duty is outsourced.
In the present case, the action brought by Austro-Mechana seeks to obtain compensation for the harm arising from non-payment by Amazon of the remuneration provided for in Austrian law. That failure to collect , the Court holds (at 44) constitutes a harmful event within the meaning of Article 7(2). At 50: ‘Austro-Mechana’s claim seeks to establish the liability of the defendant, since that claim is based on an infringement by Amazon of the provisions of the UrhG imposing that obligation on it, and that that infringement is an unlawful act causing harm to Austro-Mechana.’
The Court therefore does not dismiss the first criterion of the Kalfelis formula (‘establishing liability’). Yet it surely stretches it. The Court’s initial formulation of a two-pronged condition of application, therefore has not disappeared. However if the criterion of establishing liability is too readily accepted, the relevance of the initial formulation is certainly fading.
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 18.104.22.168.
And the winner is….National law. Saugmandsgaard ØE AG in Austro-Mechana on Tort and reproduction rights.
Determining whether a legal relationship is one in tort, for the purposes of (now) Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Recast Regulation, is in principle subject to autonomous interpretation. National law ought not to feature (emphasised ia in Melzer). In the Brussels I Regulation, Article 5(3) features alongside Article 5(1)’s jurisdictional rule for contract. (In the Recast Regulation, Artt 7(1 and (2)). Sometimes, as in Brogsitter, both are present between two contractual parties and one needs to be separated from the other. In Kalfelis, the CJEU defined ‘tort’ as ‘all actions which seek to establish the liability of a defendant and which are not related to a “contract” within the meaning of Article 5(1).‘
Tobias Lutzi’s review is very useful in reminding us of the need to distinguish the two tracts of the Kalfelis definition. Just focusing on Brogsitter might lead one into thinking that Article 5(1) and 5(3) [7(1) /7(2)] ‘dovetail’: i.e. if it is not the one, it is the other (with tort being the subordinate category). That is however clearly not the case: that it may have looked like this in Brogsitter is due to liability being present in any case: the issue was there where contractual liability stops and liability in tort takes over.
Article 5(3) therefore requires an ‘action which seeks to establish the liability of a defendant’ which leads the Advocate General here into lengthy review of the Austrian implementation of EU law on copyright levies. With respect, I do not think that is what is either called for or justified. Article 5(3) requires an autonomous, EU interpretation. Too much interference of national law spoils that broth – a point also made in Melzer. Moreover the application of the jurisdictional categories is just that: it determines jurisdiction only. Once that settled, the national courts regain their authority to requalify and indeed may still decide that there is no liability in tort (or contract, as the case may be) at all, but rather one in contract (or tort, as the case may be) or indeed none at all.
I feel Sharpston AG’s centre of gravity etc. modus operandi, suggested by her re distinguishing between Rome I and II in Ergo but (probably) not accepted by the Court, would have come in handy at the jurisdictional level in Austro Mechana, too.
The CJEU’s judgment here is one to look out for.
European private international law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 22.214.171.124
Pike & Doyle (Mumbai terror) at the High Court: forum non conveniens and the need for distinguishing Rome II and Brussels I
In Pike & Doyle v the Indian Hotels Company Limited, the High Court withheld its jurisdiction in the case of two (surviving but injured) victims of the Mumbai terror attacks. The UK Human Rights Blog has a posting on the forum non conveniens side of the case. I would like to point to some interesting observations in the judgment on the impact of the interpretation of the special jurisdictional rule for tort under the Jurisdiction Regulation (Brussels I).
The First Claimant suffers continuing pain and loss of amenity and substantial economic losses caused by his injuries. The Second Claimant sustained loss of earnings in England and Wales and has a continuing loss in the form of counselling. On that basis both Claimants have therefore suffered indirect or secondary damage as a result of the Defendants’ alleged negligence in Mumbai. The Claimants’ submission is that this is sufficient to found jurisdiction. The Defendants challenge this.
In support of their claim, defendant relied essentially on the impact which EU law suo arguendo has on the interpretation of the relevant English rules of procedure: as summarised by Stewart J (at 12):
The Defendants’ submission is as follows:
(i) Before 1 January 1987 RSC order 11 rule 1(1)(h) required a plaintiff to establish that the action was “founded on a Tort committed within the jurisdiction”. The test was “where in substance did the cause of action arise?” (Distillers Co Ltd v Thompson [reference omitted]).
(ii) On 1 January 1987 the rule changed such that the new RSC order 11 rule 1(1)(f) became “the claim is founded on a Tort and the damage was sustained, or resulted from an act committed, within the jurisdiction.” The change was made to give effect to Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention and the decision of the European Court in Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier B.V. v Mines Potasse d’Alsace S.A. [reference omitted]
[references to further precedent omitted]
(iii) The European Rules do not allow indirect secondary damage to found jurisdiction.
Dumez France v Hessische Landesbank [reference omitted]). Marinari v Lloyds Bank plc [reference omitted]). [references to further precedent omitted]
(iv) This is all accepted and is in line with the original Bier case where the European Court held that where an act occurred in one Member State and the damage occurred in another, the Claimant could sue the Defendant in the Courts of either state. (…)
(v) Given the above, the Court should apply normal principles of interpretation to the rule namely: delegated legislation is construed in the same way as an Act, the starting point is to ascertain the legislative intention and the person seeking to understand that intention must do so in the light of the enactment and its purpose. The interpretation must be an informed one [references omitted]
(vi) Therefore since the pre 1987 law would not have allowed indirect secondary damage to found jurisdiction and since the purpose of the change was to align the RSC (subsequently CPR) with the European rules which do not allow such a founding of jurisdiction, the rules should be interpreted consistently with the European cases.
Stewart J disagreed and precedent did before him. Absent the European context – for defendant is not domiciled in the EU and the Brussels I-Regulation does not otherwise apply, there is no reason to assume that the relevant English rules cannot be applied taking into account indirect damage as a jurisdictional basis for the English courts: Tugendhat J had already held so with reference to the preparatory works of the relevant change to the Rules of Procedure. He effectively found that Parliament did not fully assimilate the rules relating to non party states with those relating to states which are a party; it effectively wanted their to be a wedge between the application of the jurisdictional rule for tort in and outside the Brussels-I context.
Neither, Stewart J held, can Rome II come to the defendants’ rescue. This was an attempt by defendants to recycle the limitation to Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation. No reference to this was made in the judgment however a prima facie forceful recital in the Rome II Regulation is recital 7: The substantive scope and the provisions of this Regulation should be consistent with Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I) and the instruments dealing with the law applicable to contractual obligations.
Since Rome II harmonises applicable law for tort even if the national court withholds jurisdiction on the basis of its residuary jurisdictional rules (such as here, given that Brussels I does not apply), this bridge between the various Regulations might resurrect the relevance of the Dumez France and Marinari limitations to the judgment in Bier.
Stewart J however was not swayed and referred to Sir Robert Nelson in Stilyanou:
- Brussels 1 relates to a different subject matter, namely jurisdiction, and has to be construed as a separate regulation, albeit consistently with the other regulations forming part of the compatible set of measures.
- Rome II does not abolish the discretion which has to be exercised under the CPR in relation to non Member States.
- Article 2 on its face is wide enough to include any damage direct or indirect which the regulation as a whole covers. Article 4(1) expressly excludes indirect damage which would otherwise be included by virtue of Article 2. There is no reason why “damage” under the CPR should be interpreted as in a specific Article such as Article 4 which defines the applicable law, rather than interpreted as a general article such as Article 2 which applies to the regulation as a whole (apart from Article 4).
- Inconsistencies in the meaning of damage may exist as the tests are different under Brussels 1, Rome II and CPR. The latter includes the exercise of the discretion and hence consideration of forum conveniens to ensure the proper place for the trial is selected, whereas Brussels 1 and Rome II do not.
- Rome II does not concern jurisdiction and does not override CPR 9(a). Where Brussels I does not apply, the issue of jurisdiction will be governed by a country’s own rules ie. in England and Wales the CPR
Neither Stewart J nor Sir Robert refer to recital 7 Rome II however their arguments in my view are supported post their findings by the ECJ judgment in Kainz.
A very interesting case for many aspects of conflicts law.