Posts Tagged Basel
Arica Victims v Boliden Mineral (Sweden). Lex causae and export of toxic waste. Relevant for the business and human rights /CSR debate.
I reported earlier on the decision at first instance in Arica Victims v Boliden Mineral. The Court of Appeal has now reversed the finding of Chilean law as lex causae, opting instead for Swedish law. Lindahl has good review here and I rely on it quite heavily for I do no speak Swedish.
Boliden Mineral exported toxic waste to Chile in the ’80s, prior to either Basel or EU or OECD restraints (or indeed bans) kicking in. A first issue for consideration was determination of lex causae. Rome II does not apply ratione temporis (it only applies to tortious events occurring after its date of entry into force) – residual Swedish private international law applies. My understanding at first instance was that the applicable law rule referred to lex loci damni, Chile. The Court of Appeal has gone for lex loci delicti commissi: whether this was by use of an exception or whether the court at first instance had simply misunderstood Swedish PIL, I do not know.
Having opted for lex loci delicti commissi, the Court of Appeal then considered where this was. Readers of the blog will know that this is relevant for CSR /business and human /environmental rights discussions. Lindahl’s Linda Hallberg and Tor Pöpke summarise the court’s approach:
In order to determine which country’s law applied to the case, the court examined a sequence of events that had influenced, to varying degrees, what had led to the alleged damage. According to the court, the decisive factor in the choice of law were acts and omissions that could be attributed to the Swedish mining company, as the case concerned this company’s liability for damages.
Instead of determining the principal location of the causative events using quantitative criteria, the court considered it to be where the qualitatively important elements had their centre of gravity. Further, in contrast with the district court’s conclusion, it held that the Swedish mining company’s alleged negligence had its centre in Sweden and therefore Swedish tort law should be applied in this case (the law of the place in which a delict is committed).
Unlike more ‘modern’ CSR cases the fact do not concern mother /daughter company relations yet the considerations of locus delicti commissi are nonetheless interesting.
The Court of first instance had employed Chilean’s longer statute of limitation. The Court of Appeal tried to stretch Sweden’s shorter one of 10 years (the case concerns a potentially tortious act which occurred more than 30 years ago): any subsequent damage that had been caused by the mining company’s failure to act during the period after the toxic waste had been shipped to Chile would advance the starting point for the limitation period. However this was at the latest 1999 and the 2013 action therefore had been taken too late.
On 25 June last the Supreme Court rejected further consideration, the Court of Appeal’s finding therefore stands.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 4, Heading 4.6.3, Chapter 8.
‘Reading’ Arica Victims v Boliden Mineral (I have a copy of the case, but not yet a link to ECLI or other database; however there’s a good uncommented summary of the judgment here] leaves me frustrated simply for my lack of understanding of Swedish. Luckily Matilda Hellstorm at Lindahl has good review here (including a hyperlink to her earlier posting which alerted me to the case in 2017).
Boliden Mineral exported toxic waste to Chile in the ’80s, prior to either Basel or EU or OECD restraints (or indeed bans) kicking in. A first issue for consideration was determination of lex causae. Rome II does not apply ratione temporis (it only applies to tortious events occurring after its date of entry into force) – residual Swedish private international law applies, which determined lex causae as lex loci damni. The Court found this to include statute of limitation. This would have been 10 years under Swedish law, and a more generous (in Matilda’s report undefined) period under Chilean law. Statute of limitation therefore following lex causae – not lex fori.
Despite this being good for claimants, the case nevertheless failed. The Swedish court found against liability (for the reasons listed in Matilda’s report). (With a small exception seemingly relating to negligence in seeing waste being uncovered). Proof of causality seems to have been the biggest factor in not finding liability.
Leave to appeal has been applied for.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 8.
Fairphone posted a blog piece on their recent trip to Ghana – thanks to Raluca Radu, a former student of mine, for keeping me updated. The piece and accompanying photos make very sober reading, highlighting the realities of WEEE export to this part of the world. Not that one is not aware of it. However it is very worthwhile to keep being reminded! Fairphone’s project in Ghana, though, is also novel in highlighting the challenge of toxic waste produced in Africa, not just imported there. Finally, the posting (and comments) underline the challenges of all three pillars of sustainable development. Plenty of challenges therefore however it is great to see people trying!
Many thanks to Gideon Kracov for pointing this out to me: the proposed Responsible Electronics Recycling Act (a private member’s Bill) would install an EU-type regime on the export of electric and electronic waste outside of the US. The US have signed but not ratified the Basel Convention : RERA would amount to implementation of the Convention in practice. The Bill also recognises the relevance of recovering the many rare earth materials contained in WEEE.
Here’s the blurb (the official summary of the Bill, in fact):
Introduced in House (07/23/2013)
Responsible Electronics Recycling Act – Amends the Solid Waste Disposal Act to: (1) prohibit the export of restricted electronic waste to countries that are not members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the European Union (EU), or Liechtenstein; (2) require the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to develop and promulgate procedures for identifying certain electronic equipment as well as additional restricted toxic materials contained in such equipment which poses a potential hazard to human health or the environment; and (3) establish criminal penalties for knowingly exporting restricted electronic waste in violation of this Act. Allows certain exceptions to such export ban.
Defines “restricted electronic waste” to include electronic equipment (excluding parts of a motor vehicle), such as computers, televisions, printers, copiers, video game systems, telephones, and similar used electronic products, that contain cathode ray tubes, batteries, switches, and other parts containing lead, cadmium, mercury, organic solvents, hexavalent chromium, beryllium, or other toxic ingredients.
Requires persons who handle restricted electronic wastes to permit appropriate EPA and state officials access to such wastes upon request.
Directs the Secretary of Energy to establish a competitive research application program to provide grants for research in the recovering and recycling of critical minerals and rare earth elements found in electronic devices.