I seem to be having my environment cap firmly on this week so I am happy to thank Le Monde for flagging the judgment of the French Constitutional Court 2019-823 of 31 January in which it sanctioned (against the wishes of applicants, the Union des industries de la protection des plantes, essentially Bayer, Syngenta, BASF) the Government’s ban on the manufacturing of and exportation of pesticides banned for use in France but hitherto available for export, mostly to Africa.
The case I would suggest is one that is also very suited to a business ethics class. Interestingly the Act also mentions that it applies to the degree it is not incompatible with WTO rules – the WTO is not addressed in the judgment.
Applicants’ case is grounded on the freedom of ‘enterprise’ or ‘commerce’, as expressed in the 1789 Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen – but also the Decret d’Allarde 1791. To the mix of objectives to be balanced, the Court adds the protection of public health (Constitutional recital, 1946) and the Environment Charter 2004, from which the court deduces that environmental protection, as common heritage of mankind, is a Constitutionally ringfenced objective.
At 6 the Court without much ado posits that the French Government in pursuing environmental policy, justifiably may take into account the extraterritorial environmental consequences of activities on French soil.
Having referred to the EU ban on the use of the substances at issue, based on scientific considerations discussed at length in the run-up to the EU law at issue, the Court at 9-10 refers to the principle that it should not overzealous in second-guessing the exercise by Parliament of its balancing exercise. At 11, it notes that the 3-year transitionary period gives corporations ample transitionary time in line with their freedom of commerce.
To the Court, it’s all very much self-evident. For environmental policy and extraterritoriality, its findings are quite relevant.
Anyone short of exam essay Qs, consider the planned Flemish ban (with room for local, event-related exceptions) on fireworks displays. Akin to the issues in Ivory Ban or pet collars, at the core of the legal analysis is the legality of use restrictions on goods lawfully marketed in other Member States (see also my brief review of Amsterdam’s booze bikes here).
The exhaustive effect or not of EU secondary law will have to be discussed, as will Article 34 TFEU (including consultation and commissioned research issues and of course proportionality), and indeed A1P1 (Article 1, first Protocol) ECHR.
(For a recent more locally relevant issue, see the Supreme Court’s (Raad van State) December 2019 annulment of an Antwerp highway code rule banning the use of quads and introducing a strict exemption policy).
Update 18 May 2020 confirmed today by the Court of Appeal in  EWCA Civ 649.
Hot on the heels of yesterday’s post on e-collars, a short note on yet another trade and animal welfare /biodiversity case. In  EWHC 2951 (Admin) Friends of Antique Cultural Treasures v Secretary of State for the environment, food and rural affairs, Justice Jay (‘Jay J’ even though correct might sound a bit too intimate) upheld the UK’s planned ban on ivory trade, stricter than anything in place elsewhere. As a general rule, the Act interdicts the sale of antique worked ivory, that is to say pre-1947 artefacts, unless one of limited exemptions is applicable.
The discussion engages CITES, pre-emption /exhaustion by harmonised EU law, the environmental guarantee of Article 193 TFEU (albeit not, oddly, the issue of notification to the EC), Article 34 TFEU, and A1P1 ECHR.
On uncertainty, Justice Jay refers to the precautionary principle: at 155: ‘we are in the realm of scientific and evidentiary uncertainty, and the need for a high level of protection. §3.1 of the Commission’s 2017 Guidance makes that explicit. Although the evidence bearing on the issues of indirect causation and demand in Far Eastern markets may be uncertain, statistically questionable, impressionistic and often anecdotal, I consider that these factors do not preclude the taking of bold and robust action in the light of the precautionary principle.’
Rosalind English has analysis here and refers even to Edmund de Waal’s novel The Hare with the Amber Eyes which has been on my reading list after my wife recommended it – this is a good reminder.
EU environmental law (with Leonie Reins), Edward Elgar, 2018, p.28 ff., and Chapter 17 (p.308 ff).
Update 27 April 2017: the CJEU held today, largely along the lines of the AG.
Anyone with an interest in mutual recognition, risk and trade, and the exhaustive effect of EU food law should consult the Opinion of Advocate General Bobek in Case C-672/15 Noria Distribution, which was released last week.
Noria Distribution SARL (‘Noria’) is being prosecuted for having sold in France food supplements containing vitamins and minerals in quantities exceeding maxima set under French law. Noria does not deny doing so. However, it argues in response that those maxima are not valid because they were set in breach of EU law. Noria adds that it produces and sells the same products lawfully in other Member States.
The Advocate General suggests EU law on the issue is not exhaustive. Member States can set their own limits. An issue under discussion in the national proceeding is the origin (national or international) of the science underpinning the limits. The AG justifiably advises that the origin of the data is irrelevant. EU law concern is not about the details of bibliographies. It is rather that restrictions be justified on the basis of solid science demonstrating real risk or at least the inability to exclude risk: whether this is the case is for the national court to determine. The precautionary principle can be invoked by the Member States in setting their limits.
The AG’s approach is very sensible. Without losing himself in lengthy discussion, he reminds the national courts and authorities of the benchmarks for risk management.
The last part of this title is a bit of a stretch, apologies: soundbite beats nuance. I reported earlier on the High Court’s referral to the CJEU in the Cosmetics Regulation case, C-592/14 . The Court held last week, 21 September. Much like in C-366/10, the emissions trading /aviation case, the Court was unimpressed with accusations of extraterritoriality (‘territory’ is not discussed in the judgment) and does not even flag WTO concerns (Bobek AG had, and simply suggested this is an issue that solely lies with the WTO itself to resolve).
Referring to the need to interpret the Regulation with a view to its object and purpose, the Court insists that in particular to avoid easy circumvention of the Regulation, data obtained from animal testing carried out outside the EU, cannot be employed for the marketing of cosmetics in the EU, even if those tests had to be performed so as to meet the regulatory requirements of third countries.
Of course in WTO jargon, this recalls the discussion of non-product incorporated production processes and -methods (n-PR PPMs) however the Court is more concerned with regulatory efficiency.
As I tweeted earlier, the French Constitutional Court has rejected the challenge to its moratorium on fracking. The precautionary principle was not quite addressed head on by the Court – it simply noted that in the current state of scientific insight, the ban was not disproportionate. The non-discrimination principle was also addressed: Schuepbach Energy had argued that in allowing geothermal projects and disallowing shale gas exploration, this principle was infringed. The Court disagreed: its review of the preparatory works of the Government Order showed that the government considered the two risks involved to be very different. Note the high degree of deference to the Government’s conclusions from scientific opinion. France is not by chance the state of origin of the ‘Bouche de la Loi’ theory!
Marjolein de Ridder and Sijbren de Jong report here on the geopolitical implications of shale. Legal arguments like the ones discussed in the French litigation have an important impact on that debate – or is it the other way around?
It has been reported that the challenge to the French moratorium on shale gas exploration, by US firm Schuepbach Energy, has been referred to the Constitutional Court. Schuepbach had initially challenged the freezing effect of the 2011 ban on the permits which the firm had been granted erlier in 2011, before the lower administrative court at Cergy Pontoise. This court referred for judicial review to the Conseil d’Etat, which now has passed the file on to the Constitutional Court.
I have difficulty getting hold of the official court documents. Reports suggest that the challenge is based on Articles 16 and 17 of the French Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, dealing cq with the separation of powers and the right to property.
The French challenge comes amidst the imminent publication of the report commissioned by the European Commission into the suitability, or not, of the current legal framework in the EU and the Member States for regulating shale gas. A little bird tells me (ok, it’s a PhD student of mine, Leonie Reins, who co-authored the report) that the report will be published just after the summer.
In a related, more technical but not therefore less effective manner, Poland’s roll-out of fracking licences arguably received considerable setback following the ECJ’s end of June ruling in Case C-569/10, Commission v Poland: the court held that Poland should have put the licences out to open tender, in accordance with Directive 94/22 on hydrocarbons exploration. The case does not concern fracking licences alone, and the impact on licences that have already been issued is uncertain (although surely these licences cannot be held to be entirely kosher and free of challenge by competitors or NGOs, following the judgment).
Watch this space. I need not tell you that fracking is very controversial in the EU. See in particular this tour d’horizon /overview of contentious issues by Kathleen Garnett over at EU perspectives.
It is being reported (this link in Dutch only however I suspect the international media will pick up on this soon) this morning that the city of Rotterdam has ‘banned’ the use of Roundup (Monsanto’s flagship herbicide). I was not able at this stage to get confirmation of what has actually been decided. My intuition however tells me what was had happened is not so much a ‘ban’ on the use of Round-up on Rotterdam territory. Rather, I imagine, a decision of the local council no longer to use Roundup in keeping pavements weed-free. A procurement or garden management decision, in other words.
The news caught my eye for I have an interest in the legality of local (or other) bans on the use of products which have otherwise been approved by EU (such as in this case: EU approval of glyphosate) or national authorities. See e.g. here (but with a need to update with the Mickelsson judgment). A true ban on Roundup would certainly raise the prospect of WTO and EU litigation…
Australia, Nigeria and South Korea (a bit of an unusual troika, truth to be told) have jointly proposed an amendment to the London Protocol [Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution
by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972 and 1996 Protocol Thereto]. The Amendment would severely and formally restrict the legality of geo-engineering among signatory States. As reported earlier, in 2008, Parties to the London Convention and Protocol adopted a resolution prohibiting ocean fertilization other than for legitimate scientific research. The proposed amendment would strengthen the nature of that prohibition.
Ocean fertilisation would be the only accepted form of geo-engineering which can continue to be researched, under monitoring and supervision of the Protocol. All other activities would remain subject to the general ban on dumping of wastes at sea. Evidently the Protocol does not capture all geo-engineering techniques, whence even if accepted, the amendment would fall short of a global regime for geo-engineering, thereby confirming the incremental process of regulating global environmental concerns.
I have searched high and low but have as yet not located a copy of the actual proposal: this post is based on the Australian government’s press release, on reporting in The Age, Environment and the geo-engineering blogspot.