Posts Tagged Article 6(1)
Disciplining abuse of anchor defendants in follow-up competition law cases exceedingly difficult. Borgarting Court of Appeal (Norway) applies CDC in Posten /Bring v Volvo.
After the French Cour de Cassation in MJI v Apple Sales, the Brussels Court of Appeal in FIFA/UEFA, and the Court at Amsterdam in Kemira, (as well as other courts undoubtedly, too; and I have highlighted more cases on the blog), Ørjan Salvesen Haukaas has now reported an application of CDC in a decision of December 2018 by a Norwegian Court of appeal, LB-2018-136341 Posten /Bring v Volvo. The court evidently applies Lugano (Article 6), not Brussels Ia, yet the provision is materially identical.
Norwegian and foreign companies in the Posten/Bring group (mail services) had sued companies in the Volvo group for alleged losses incurred when purchasing trucks from Volvo after certain companies in the Volvo group had been fined for participating in a price-fixing cartel. Posten/Bring also sued a Norwegian company in the Volvo group, which had not been fined for participating in the price-fixing cartel.
Borgarting Court of Appeal held that Norwegian courts have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6(1) Lugano even if the anchor defendant is sued merely to obtain Norwegian jurisdiction. The court solely had to determine whether the claims were so closely connected that there was a risk of irreconcilable judgments, in the absence of any suggested collusion between the anchor defendant and claimants per CDC.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law. 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.12, Heading 184.108.40.206.
PrivatBank v Kolomoisky and Boholiubov. The High court puts the spotlight on the abuse of the anchor mechanism, on reflexive effect of lis alibi pendens, and on Article 34’s new rule.
In  EWHC 3308 (Ch) PrivatBank v Kolomoisky and Boholiubov et al the High Court has set aside a worldwide freezing order (‘WFO’) granted earlier at the request of Ukraine’s PrivatBank, against Ihor Kolomoisky and Hennadiy Boholiubov – its two former main shareholders.
The case considers a high number of issues to which even a long blog post cannot do justice – I will consider these further in a paper in progress.
The issues to be determined, are
- First, whether the Bank has a good arguable case (as pleaded in the particulars of claim) that loss of US$1.91 billion plus interest was caused to it by the alleged fraud of the Defendants. For the purposes of these applications, all Defendants do not dispute that there is a good arguable case that US$248 million of loss was caused to the Bank by the pleaded fraud, but they deny any good arguable case of loss in excess of that amount.
- Second, whether the worldwide freezing orders should be set aside in whole or in part for non-disclosure or misrepresentation, or reduced to or reimposed in a lesser maximum sum than the current maximum sum of US$2.6 billion.
- Third, whether the Court has jurisdiction over the First and Second Defendants under Article 6.1 Lugano by reason of the claim against the English Defendants as “anchor defendants”. Although the claims as pleaded against the First and Second Defendants and the English Defendants are closely connected, the particular issue is whether the claim against the English Defendants was brought with the sole object of removing the First and Second Defendants from Swiss jurisdiction and so was an abuse of Article 6
- Fourth, if there is jurisdiction against the First and Second Defendants, whether the claims against them and the English Defendants should be stayed on grounds of lis pendens in Ukraine. This raises separate questions:
- a) Whether the Court has power to stay proceedings against the First and Second Defendants (where jurisdiction only exists (if at all) under the Lugano Convention) in favour of proceedings in a non-Convention state, namely Ukraine. The First and Second Defendants argue that Article 28 of the Convention, which empowers a Convention State to stay proceedings on grounds of lis pendens in another Convention State, should be applied by analogy (or ‘reflexively’ in favour of proceedings in a non-Convention State.
- b) Whether the Court should stay proceedings against the English Defendants (who are sued in accordance with Article 4 of the recast Brussels Regulation) in favour of proceedings in Ukraine. The issue here is as to the meaning, effect and application of Article 34 of the Regulation, which as from 10 January 2015 conferred a power on EU States in defined circumstances to stay proceedings in favour of proceedings in a non-Member State (“a third State”).
- Fifth, to the extent that the Court has power to stay on grounds of lis pendens in Ukraine, whether it should exercise that power given the nature of the proceedings in Ukraine, the degree of connection between the Bank’s claim and Ukraine and the risk of irreconcilable judgments if no stay is granted.
- Sixth, whether the Court should set aside the permission granted without notice to serve the claim form on the BVI Defendants out of the jurisdiction, or alternatively stay the proceedings against the BVI Defendants on grounds of forum non conveniens.
Fancourt J’s judgment implies in essence
First of all, very careful and complete consideration of the Lugano Convention’s anchor defendant mechanism.
(hence also implicating Brussels I Recast case-law, particularly Reisch Montage, Freeport and CDC), but also Sabbagh v Khoury, in which as I noted at the time the Court of Appeal struggles with the precise role for merits review in examining a potential abuse of the anchor defendant mechanism.
One assumes counsel for the defendants did an excellent job in deciphering precedent. This includes Ali Malek QC who is clearly a counsel of choice for international litigation, witness his involvement in other cases, too, this week: on which more soon on the blog.
Kolomoisky and Boholiubov may be sued in England and Wales, despite their Swiss domicile, only if the claims against them and the claims against the English Defendants are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together, to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings: that is the wording of Article 6.1 of the Lugano Convention, as it is of (now) Article 8(1) Brussels I Recast.
[Note parties, Mr Bogolyubov specifically, earlier in the year in  EWHC 160 (Ch) successfully had applied for a declaration that they were not domiciled in the UK; hence no Article 4 jurisdiction.
As I have pointed out on various occasions (use ‘fraud’ or ‘fraus’ as a search term in the blog’s search box), abuse is not a concept easily caught in statute and given the need for high predictability in the application of the Brussels and Lugano regimes, the CJEU is not finding it easy to provide much instruction.
Justice Fancourt excellently reviews the issues 85 ff and it is best to let those paras speak for their insightful selves. One readers have done so, they will see that at 93, his conclusion is ‘any artificial fulfilment (or apparent fulfilment) of the express requirements of Article 6.1 is impermissible, and this includes a case where the sole object of the claim against the anchor defendant is to remove the foreign defendant from the jurisdiction of domicile. Bringing a hopeless claim is one example of such abuse, but the abuse may be otherwise established by clear evidence. In principle, the fact that there is a good arguable case against the anchor defendant should not prevent a co-defendant from establishing abuse on some other ground, including that the “sole object” of the claim is to provide jurisdiction against a foreign domiciled co-defendant.‘
Onus of proof of abuse lies on the defendant, and it was met here: the English Defendants serving as anchor, are not considered legitimate targets in their own right. Five reasons for same are listed in para 99 ff: it is clear that a single criterion will not be enough to meet the burden of proof, rather a number if indications will contribute to an overall finding of abuse.
Having established that the Switzerland-based defendants ought to be sued there or indeed in the Ukraine, the Court turns to the English defendants’ attempt to have it apply Brussels I Recast’s new Article 34 rule on lis alibi pendens in favour of third States.
At 129, Justice Fancourt reviews the cases which might potentially be said to be ‘related’ to the English proceedings. At the heart of that analysis lies a defamation claim which (at 144) ‘Although the causes of action in the Ukrainian claim of the First Defendant and the claim of the Bank in the current proceedings are quite different, I am satisfied that there is considerable factual overlap between the allegations made against the Defendants in the Bank’s claim and the allegations published by the Ukrainian journal that the First Defendant seeks to challenge as unfounded and defamatory in the Ukrainian proceedings. The general subject-matter is one and the same: a fraudulent scheme to embezzle huge sums of money from the Bank, orchestrated by the First and Second Defendants and making use of a large number of shell companies, including the English and BVI Defendants, to circulate monies and conceal their whereabouts. Key issues that may have to be determined in each claim will be: whether there was a fraudulent scheme; who set it up and operated it; how did it work; what was its purpose; who benefited from the scheme, and how much money was unlawfully removed from the Bank.’
This analysis presumes, in my view correctly, that the term ‘related’ in the Article 34 rule, is to be interpreted in line with (now) Article 30 Brussels I Recast on related intra-EU actions.
At 145: ‘if the appeal in the defamation proceedings were to fail, or the claims be otherwise disposed of on a limited point of law, any stay granted under Article 34 (or by analogy with it) will be lifted.‘
Upon reflection, a stay of proceedings in favour of the Ukranaian case, is granted, for the reasons that
- (the ultimate condition for applying Article 34) a potential eventual judgment in Ukraine on the defamation case is likely to be recognised and enforced in England; this is the so-called [but not so by the High Court 🙂 ] Anerkennungsprognose;
- the claim has a high proximity to the Ukraine: the issues raised in common by the defamation claim and the current proceedings are almost exclusively concerned with events in Ukraine; the majority of witnesses will be Ukrainian, and Ukrainian law will apply to decide both sets of proceedings. By contrast, none of the harmful acts complained of occurred in England; the matters in issue have no connection with England at all, and the existence of three English defendants is of no materiality. The proximity of the claim to Ukraine therefore points strongly in favour of a stay.
- finally, at 158 ff: The Bank nevertheless argues that a stay would be contrary to the proper administration of justice – a core criterion to Article 34. ‘It contends that the current proceedings cry out for determination by a truly independent tribunal. But the Bank does not contend that the Ukrainian court is unable to resolve the issues or that it cannot obtain justice in Ukraine. There is no evidence on the basis of which this court can conclude that the Ukrainian courts would not provide justice to the parties. Similarly, there is no evidence before the court that would justify a conclusion that the Ukrainian judiciary is not independent. The Bank complains about how the First Defendant obtained an interim injunction against the Bank and Hogan Lovells on 15th December 2017, without proper process taking place; but this order was set aside in Ukraine on appeal, demonstrating that justice can be achieved by the Bank.’
Note that at 161 Justice Fancourt emphasises the relative character of the stay: ‘The argument against a stay would have greater weight if the stay to be granted under Article 34 (or by reference to its principles) were a once and for all decision, but it is clear that it should not be so confined. Under Article 34.2, these proceedings may be continued at any time when it is appropriate to do so, and so potential prejudice to the Bank in granting a stay is thereby limited. If the appeal in Ukraine is dismissed, or if though successful the claim is disposed of without a judgment on the merits, or if the First Defendant does not properly pursue the claim to judgment, the grounds for a continuing stay are likely to fall away’.
Fancourt J also adds obiter that had he accepted jurisdiction against the Switzerland-based defendants on the basis of the anchor mechanism, he would have granted a stay in those proceedings, too, applying the lis alibi pendens rule of Lugano reflexively, despite the absence of an Article 34 mechanism in Lugano. Consideration of this issue is at 114 ff, with of course reference to Ferrexpo. (Although even there this particular point may have been made obiter, as Justice Fancourt himself points out at 123). The suggestion is made that in accepting such reflexive, ex-Lugano effect of the Lugano lis alibi pendens rule, the courts should take instruction from the Article 34 Brussels I-Recast conditions. This is not a straightforward proposition by any means and the debate is far from settled.
Finally, jurisdiction against the BVI defendants is dismissed at this time on the basis of forum non conveniens: at 172 and necessarily entangled with the other findings: ‘So far as forum conveniens is concerned, the claim against the First and Second Defendants will not proceed in England. The natural forum for a trial of that claim is Ukraine though, as regards Lugano Convention States, the First and Second Defendants are entitled to be sued in Switzerland. The task of the court in exercising its discretion is to identify the forum in which the case can be suitably tried in the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice: see Altimo Holdings at . The natural forum is Ukraine, in that all the parties are Ukrainian, almost all the events occurred in Ukraine and Ukrainian law is the governing law. There is no suggestion by any party that they cannot have a fair trial in Ukraine. However, the Bank may not be willing to sue the First and Second Defendants in Ukraine: if it cannot sue them in England it may sue them in Switzerland.
With PrivatBank v Kolomoisky and Boholiubov we now have a much more reasoned application of Article 34 than the more concise considerations in B.win v Emerald Bay and also interesting additional analysis as compared to Zavarco.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law – 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 220.127.116.11
The Brussels Court of Appeal on joinders in the Lugano Convention (in Re Fifa /UEFA arbitration clause).
Thank you Quentin Declève and co-authors for reporting a short while back the Brussels Court of Appeal judgment in RFC Seraing and Doyen Sports v Belgian FA /FIFA /UEFA. (Judgment may be consulted here – I also have a copy). The case in substance concerns FIFA /UEFA’s TPO, Third Party Ownership rules.
Quentin first of all reports on the reasons for the Court to find the arbitration clause between the club and UEFA /FIFA not to be binding. The judgment does not contain copy of the clause (lest I have entirely missed it – but I don’t think so). The clause would not seem to have had a specific lex causae identified: the Court of Appeal uses a mix of Belgian law and New York Convention arguments to rule it invalid.
As we are on the subject of validity of arbitration clauses: please refer to Quentin’s reporting of the Belgian Court’s Supreme Court’s confirmation of validity of NATO’s arbitration clause.
For current blog however I would like to report the findings on the anchor defendant mechanism (19 ff): the Court of Appeal applies Article 6(1) Lugano (UEFA and FIFA are Swiss domiciled), which is the same anchor mechanism as Article 8(1) Brussels I Recast: the anchor defendant being the Belgian Football Association. Freeport and Reisch Montage as well as CDC feature heavily in the Court’s analysis. FIFA and UEFA’s claim is that the Belgian FA is abusively being used as an anchor defendant. The court disagrees: FIFA and the Belgian FA share regulatory powers; the FA is empowered by FIFA statute to impose additional regulations. The FA’s presence in the proceedings is entirely justified and not artificially constructed.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law. 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.12, Heading 18.104.22.168.
Anchor defendants in follow-up competition law cases. The High Court in Vattenfall et al v Prysmian et al.
A classic case of follow-up damages litigation in competition law, here in the high voltage power cables cartel, fines for which were confirmed by the CJEU early July. Core to the case is the application of Article 8(1)’s anchor defendants mechanism. Only two of the defendants are UK incorporated companies – UK subsidiaries of companies that have been found by the European Commission to have infringed EU competition law.
Authority cited includes of course CDC, Roche Nederland and Painer, and Cooper Tyre (sale of the cartelised products can amount to implementation of the cartel). Vattenfall confirms that for the English courts, ‘knowingly implementing’ the cartel has a low threshold.
At 89 ff the Court refers to the pending case of (what I now know to be) C-724/17 Skanska Industrial Solutions e.a.: Finnish Courts are considering the application for cartel damages against parent companies on acquiring cartelist subsidiaries, had dissolved them. Relevance for Vattenfall lies with the issue of knowledge: the Finnish courts wonder what Article 101 TFEU has to say on the degree of knowledge of the cartelist activities, relevant for the liability of the parent company. An application of fraus, or abuse in other words. Elleray DJ however, did not consider the outcome of that reference to be relevant for the case at hand, in its current stage of procedure.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 22.214.171.124
Towards the end of July, the Court at Amsterdam applied the recent CJEU judgment in CDC, on the application of (now) Article 8’s rule on anchor defendants. The case also involved CDC – busy bees on the competition enforcement front, this time pursuing inter alia Kemira, a Finnish company, using Akzo Nobel NV, domiciled in The Netherlands, as anchor defendants.
The court referred in extenso to the CJEU’s CDC case, noting inter alia that it is not up to CDC to show that the suit was not just introduced to remove Kemira from the Finnish judge: that Kemira suggests that introduction of the suit in The Netherlands is not very logical given the absence of factual links to that Member State, does not suffice. The court also adopted the CJEU’s finding on choice of court and liability in tort. In the absence of specific proviso in a standard contractual choice of court, the application of such choice of court to extracontactual liability [such as here, for infringement of competition law] cannot be assumed.
Finally, at 2.18, the Court also referred to argument made by Kemira that Finish and Swedish law ought to apply to the interpretation (not: the validity) of the choice of court agreement. That would have been an interesting discussion. However in light of the court’s earlier judgment on the irrelevance of the court of choice, the court did not entertain that issue.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law. 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.12, Heading 126.96.36.199.
Anchor defendants in follow-up competition law cases. The ECJ in CDC confirms AG’s view on joinders. Sticks to Article 5(3 /7(1). Locus damni for purely economic loss = registered office.
Update 29 May 2018 on economic loss: Bobek AG would seem to take a similar view (that the CJEU’s finding on registered office is at odds with its case-law on Article 7(2) in his Opinions in Barclays and flyLAL.
Update November 2017. For a contrary ruling on the scope of arbitration agreement, see Dortmund 13 September 2017, reviewed here.
In Case C-352/13 CDC, in which the ECJ held last week, at issue is among others the use of Article 6(1) of the Brussels I-Regulation (8(1) in the recast) when the claim against the anchor defendant has been settled before the trial is well and truly underway.
I reviewed JÄÄSKINEN AG’s opinion here. The ECJ’s overall approach to Article 6 is not to take into account the subjective intentions of plaintiff, who often identify a suitable anchor defendant even if is not the intended target of their action. Like its AG, the Court does make exception for one particular occasion, namely if it is found that, at the time the proceedings were instituted, the applicant and that defendant had colluded to artificially fulfil, or prolong the fulfilment of, Article 6’s applicability. I had expressed reservation vis-a-vis this suggestion, obviously in vain. In cases such as these, where tort is already clearly established (via the European Commission’s cartel finding), the intention of ECJ and AG seem noble. Collusion to defraud is disciplined by the non-applicability of Article 6. However this arguably serves the interests of the parties guilty of the other type of collusion involved: that of defrauding not procedural predictability, but rather consumers’ interest.
Next, the referring court enquired about the application of Article 5(3)’s special jurisdictional rule in the event of infringement of competition law, where that infringement concerns a complex horizontal agreement, spread over a long period of time, and with varying impact in various markets. The AG had suggested dropping application of Article 5(3) (now 7(1)) altogether, both with respect to locus delicti commissi and locus damni. Here the Court disagreed. Difficult as it may be, it is not to be excluded that locus delicti commissi can be established. At 50: one cannot rule out ‘the identification, in the jurisdiction of the court seised of the matter, of a specific event during which either that cartel was definitively concluded or one agreement in particular was made which was the sole causal event giving rise to the loss allegedly inflicted on a buyer.’
For locus damni, the Court again has no sympathy for either mozaik effect of Article 5(3), or indeed the often great difficulties in establishing locus damni, flagged by the AG. At 52: ‘As for loss consisting in additional costs incurred because of artificially high prices, such as the price of the hydrogen peroxide supplied by the cartel at issue in the main proceedings, that place is identifiable only for each alleged victim taken individually and is located, in general, at that victim’s registered office.‘
Registered office as the locus damni for purely economic loss, lest my memory fails me, has not been as such confirmed by the ECJ before. It is also currently pending in Universal. The Court is in my view a bit radical when it comes to justifying registered office as the Erfolgfort: at 53: ‘That place fully guarantees the efficacious conduct of potential proceedings, given that the assessment of a claim for damages for loss allegedly inflicted upon a specific undertaking as a result of an unlawful cartel, as already found by the Commission in a binding decision, essentially depends on factors specifically relating to the situation of that undertaking. In those circumstances, the courts in whose jurisdiction that undertaking has its registered office are manifestly best suited to adjudicate such a claim.‘ Update 29 May 2018 Bobek AG would seem to take a similar view (that the CJEU’s finding on registered office is at odds with its case-law on Article 7(2) in his Opinions in Barclays and flyLAL.
Finally, on the issue of choice of court in the agreements between the victims of the cartel, and those guilty of the cartel, the Court follows the AG’s lead. Such clauses are not generally applicable to liability in tort (the clause would have to refer verbatim to tortious liability). Neither do they in principle bind third parties, lest of course there be subrogration (Refcomp). (The referring national court has given very little detail on the clauses at issue and hence the ECJ notes that it could not reply to all questions referred).
In the end, it is the finding with respect to economic loss for which the judgment may be most remembered.
The scope of ‘civil and commercial’ in the Brussels I Regulation (compensation for expropriation under the Nazi regime), and application of joinder to non-EU based defendants: the ECJ in Sapir
The ECJ yesterday issued its ruling in Case C-645/11 Sapir. The issues under consideration were the application of the Brussels I Regulation to proceedings brought by a State (Berlin) against a group of defendants, some of whom were based outside the EU, some inside the EU but not in Germany, and only a limited number in Germany. The request for preliminary review has been made in proceedings between, on the one hand, Land Berlin and, on the other, Ms Sapir, Mr Busse, Ms Birgansky, Mr Rumney, Mr Ben-Zadok, Ms Brown and five other persons, concerning the repayment of an amount overpaid in error following an administrative procedure designed to provide compensation in respect of the loss of real property during persecution under the Nazi regime.
Jurisdiction against the non-German based defendants could only theoretically be established on the basis of Article 6(1) of the Regulation, which allows for plaintiff to identify an anchor defendant in one Member State, and drag other defendants not based there into those proceedings:
‘A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued:
1. where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings; (…)
The first issue under consideration was the nature of the proceedings. There was a whiff of ‘public law’ surrounding the procedure, given its core foundation in administrative law procedures and the involvement of a public authority. However the ECJ, and Trstenjak AG with it, considered these not to be material to the nature of the proceedings: the request for repayment of part of the sum was made on the basis of a provision in German law (unjust enrichment) which was generally available and in which neither the public nature of plaintiff nor the substantial grounds on the basis of which compensation was granted, played any role: the basis and the detailed rules governing the bringing of the action were unrelated to the authority acting ius imperii.
The second issue concerned the defendants’ substantial argument against the claim of unjust enrichment: they argued that they are entitled to an amount which exceeds a share of the proceeds of sale as the amount realised through that sale failed to reach the market value of the property and that those additional compensation claims preclude the applicant’s claim of unjust enrichment. The AG suggested a ‘close connection’ (and thus a possibility to invoke Article 6(1)), as the additional compensation claims lodged fit in perfectly with the identical situation of law and fact in the actions, which the ECJ requires for the application of Article 6(1). Identical legal basis is not required (in particular, one of the defendants, the lawyer representing a large part of the group, was being pursued on the basis of pure tort, rather than unjust enrichment). Only the German laws in question (the Vermögensgesetz and the Investitionsvorranggesetz) can provide the defendants with the legal basis to justify the excess amount they received, which also requires an assessment, for all of the defendants, in relation to the same factual and legal situation.
The third issue concerned the application of Article 6(1) to non-EU residents: this, the Court held, was not the case. Article 6(1) clearly refers expressly to defendants domiciled in the EU. In order to sue a co-defendant before the courts of a Member State on the basis of Article 6(1) , it is necessary that that person should be domiciled in another Member State.
In Case C-51/97 Réunion européenne, the ECJ had similarly (given the need to apply special jurisdictional rules restrictively) held that Article 6(1) cannot be applied to bring an action before the Court of a Member State against a defendant, domiciled in a different Member State, who could only be sued in that Member State by virtue of a joinder with a suit against a party not domiciled in any of the Member States.
The judgment in Sapic is not revolutionary, but useful.