Posts Tagged Arbitration

Bitcoin online resolution award refused recognition and enforcement at Amsterdam (ordre public exception of New York Convention).

I tweeted it earlier yet was asked to put a review up on the blog (which also suits my archiving purposes) of ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2019:192 X v Y (I know that does not help much) at the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, 29 January 2019. The case came to me courtesy of Freshields who have review here.

The case illustrates some of the issues involving online alternative dispute resolution, including those manned by artificial intelligence (albeit the latter was not directly at stake here).

Using an online trading platform, X provided three loans to Y, all in bitcoins at an interest rate of 5% per month. To borrow these bitcoins, Y had to agree on the conditions of the online bitcoin-trading platform applicable to the loans. These conditions included the following dispute resolution mechanism clause:

If you fail to pay principal and/or interest on the date on which the loan falls due, you will be considered in default of the Registration Agreement… Should your loan become 90 days past due (“Defaulted”) the loan will be sent to Dhami Law Firm (“Arbitrator”), an independent, international arbitration firm whose awards are recognized internationally under The United Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

I understand that in the event that I want to appear in the arbitration by email to contest the potential issuance of an award in favor of the lenders, I must send a written request to support@btcjam.com and pay a $ 99.00 fee. Such request must be within 7 calendar days from the date of the Notice of Default. The Arbitrator’s decision shall be final and legally binding. In the event that the Arbitrator issues an award in favor of the investor, an investor may enforce that judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction.

The conditions further contained the following arbitration clause:

All claims and disputes arising under or relating to this agreement are to be settled by binding arbitration in the state of California or another location mutually agreeable to the parties. An award of arbitration may be confirmed in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Default ensued, as did ADR, and Y sought enforcement in The Netherlands. The Courts have now refused proprio motu (Y had signalled he had no objection), for the following reasons summarised by Freshfields: First, the court took issue with the circumstance that – in its view – online arbitral proceedings automatically become pending after 90 days. Second, a defendant wishing to defend itself in these arbitral proceedings had been required to write an email within seven days from receiving a notice of default. Third, the arbitral tribunal had failed to inform Y that a dispute was pending against him or of the legal grounds of the action.

At 3.5 is it is clear that the principle of audi alteram partem is the main stumbling block for the Dutch Courts. Ordre public violated. A clear flashpoint for ADR, including of the algorithmic variety.

Geert.

 

 

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Leave a comment

Arcelor Mittal v Essar. The High Court races ahead in its support for arbitration. On comity, fraud, and worldwide freezing orders.

 

[2019] EWHC 724 (Comm) ArcelorMittal USA LLC v Essar Steel Limited and others is quite the highlight in worldwide regulatory competition for championing arbitration.

As 20 Essex Street note, Jacobs J refused to vary an earlier worldwide freezing order (WFO), despite the award being foreign, Claimant and Defendant companies being foreign, there being no significant assets within the jurisdiction, and the courts at Mauritius (defendant is Mauritius-incorporated, defendant to the Arbitration Claim, and the debtor under the ICC award) potentially feeling gazumped by their English colleagues.

Of note over and above Essex Street’s analysis is

  • the defendants urging the Court on the grounds of comity (no need for the English courts to act at policeman for assets located abroad: at 72, referring to Popplewell J. in Conocophillips China Inc v Greka Energy (International) BV. [2013] EWHC 2733) to resist the call for a WFO. This was rejected (at 81) with the argument ‘I consider that I am entitled to proceed on the basis of the evidence that the Mauritian courts would not regard the WFO as offensive in some way.’; and ‘The WFO does not presently conflict with any order of the Mauritian courts, and this is not a case where the Mauritian courts have refused equivalent relief or where there is evidence that those courts would be likely to do so.’ Jacobs J therefore does consider comity quite carefully.

 

  • the Court’s sense of urgency in what it sees as a case of fraus: At 45:

‘There is no precise definition of what is meant by the phrase “international fraud” found in the case-law, but I do not consider that it is confined to cases where the underlying cause of action is a claim in deceit or a proprietary claim relating to the theft of assets. If there is a strong case of serious wrongdoing comprising conduct on a large or repeated scale whereby a company, or the group of which it is a member, is acting in a manner prejudicial to its creditors, and in bad faith, then I see no reason why the English court should not be willing to intervene rather than to stand by and allow the conduct to continue and, to put the matter colloquially, to let the wrongdoer get away with it. In the present case, I would regard the attempted dissipation of Essar Steel’s US$ 1.5 billion asset, in the face of the commencement of arbitration proceedings, as sufficient in itself potentially to warrant intervention under the “international fraud” exception, or as constituting “exceptional circumstances”.’

 

  • and the rejection at 73 of a CJEU C-391/95 Van Uden type of restraint, requiring a real connecting link between the subject matter of the measures sought and the territorial jurisdiction of the English court.

 

Geert.

 

, , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Leave a comment

OHADA law and arbitration at the Paris Court of appeal. A tale of overriding mandatory laws /lois de police and ordres publics.

Thank you Thomas Kendra and Thibaud Roujou de Boubée for signalling 16/25484 Cameroon v Projet Pilote Garoubé at the Paris Court of Appeal end of December 2018. The essence of the case is the Court confirming an arbitral award applying OHADA law. OHADA stands for ‘Organisation pour l’harmonisation en Afrique du droit des affaires’ – ie the Organisation for the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa.

Thomas and Thibaud analyse excellently – of note for this blog are the issue of non-State law as lex contractus (compare with Rome I), the recognition of same as trumping Cameronese law essentially as overriding mandatory law, and the rejection of the Cameronese argument that its wildlife laws qualify themselves as lois de police /overriding mandatory law and that the lack of recognition of same violates ordre public.

Interesting arbitration /conflicts material.

Geert.

 

, , , , , , , , , , , ,

Leave a comment

Menon CJ of Singapore’s Supreme Court on cross-border insolvency.

Many thanks to Filbert Lam for alerting me to Menon CJ’s most exquisite 2018 speech on cross-border insolvency law. His honour’s talk addresses forum shopping (including for cram down reasons), the Model Law, a most enlightening comparison between international commercial arbitration (particularly: the New York Convention’s role) and insolvency, and of course modified universalism (on which see also this recent post by Bob Wessels, with ia analysis of the EU position). A delightfully sharp observation of key elements of international insolvency practice and policy.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 5.

, , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Leave a comment

Heller v Uber at the Ontario Court of Appeal: arbitration clause requiring arbitration in the Netherlands of disputes between drivers and Uber invalid.

Thank you Christopher Burkett for alerting me to Heller v. Uber Technologies Inc., 2019 ONCA 1.  The case is reminiscent of California’s Senate Bill 1241 (review here) and of an article that I co-authored with Jutta Gangsted [‘Protected parties in European and American conflict of laws: a comparative analysis of individual employment contracts]. The starting point of the California, the EU rules, and the Canadian judgment is the same: employees cannot be considered to really consent to either choice of law or choice of court /dispute resolution hence any clause doing same will be subject to mandatory limitations.

Here, an arbitration clause requiring arbitration in the Netherlands of disputes between drivers and Uber was held to be invalid and unenforceable, because it deprives an employee of the benefit of making a complaint to the Ministry of Labour under relevant Ontarian law.

Of note is that the judgment applies assuming the contract is one of employment – which remains to be determined under Ontarian law. Of note is also that the Court of appeal rejected Uber’s position that the validity is an issue for the arbitrator to determine because it is an issue going to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. Uber invoked the “competence-competence” /kompetenz kompetenz principle (recently illustrated e.g. by the Brisilian Supreme Court in Petrobas) in support of its position.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016. Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.8.3, Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.5.

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Leave a comment

The Hague Judgments project rolls on. And a quick note on [2018] FCA 549 Kraft Foods v Bega Cheese.

Update 22 February 2019 for a most excellent and critical paper by Ronald Brand calling for the  2019 Judgments Project Conference to be aware of all options for international harmonisation in the area see here.

Kraft Foods v Bega Cheese [2018] FCA 549 was signalled to me by Michael Mitchell back in early May – now seems a good opportunity briefly to report on it. The Federal Court of Australia issued an anti-arbitration injunction to restrain a multinational food conglomerate from pursuing arbitration in New York. Kraft had pursued litigation in Australia which not only sought to restrain the respondent from certain radio and television advertising, but also sought final relief including damages.

Parties had agreed to mediate and arbitrate under the dispute resolution provisions of a Master Agreement for licensing of IP. Bega had acquired certain rights from Mondelez (a company in the Kraft group), including certain trademark rights that Kraft had licensed to Mondelez pursuant to the Master Agreement.

Of interest to the blog is the myriad number of issues that led the Court to issue the injunction, among others the fact that what was sought included interim relief, the position of which when it comes to enforcement is not entirely clear in the New York Convention. Throw intellectual property, mediation as well as arbitration, common law doctrine principles such as the Aldi rule in the mix, and the jurisdictional soup becomes quite attractive as well as complex. Precisely why intellectual property is hotly debated in the Hague Judgments project and likely to be excluded from it.

That latter brings me to the second part of the blog title: the HCCH have issued a Revised Draft Explanatory Report, and a document on the possible exclusion of anti-trust matters from the Convention as reflected in Article 2(1)(p) of the 2018 draft Convention. Both signal the continuing difficulty of the roll-out of the Hague Process, as well as continued intent to let the train roll into its end destination; although one wonders how many wagons will have been left behind en route.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016. Chapter 2.

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Leave a comment

The Brussels Court of Appeal on joinders in the Lugano Convention (in Re Fifa /UEFA arbitration clause).

Thank you Quentin Declève and co-authors for reporting a short while back the Brussels Court of Appeal judgment in RFC Seraing and Doyen Sports v Belgian FA /FIFA /UEFA. (Judgment may be consulted here – I also have a copy). The case in substance concerns FIFA /UEFA’s TPO, Third Party Ownership rules.

Quentin first of all reports on the reasons for the Court to find the arbitration clause between the club and UEFA /FIFA not to be binding. The judgment does not contain copy of the clause (lest I have entirely missed it – but I don’t think so). The clause would not seem to have had a specific lex causae identified: the Court of Appeal uses a mix of Belgian law and New York Convention arguments to rule it invalid.

As we are on the subject of validity of arbitration clauses: please refer to Quentin’s reporting of the Belgian Court’s Supreme Court’s confirmation of validity of NATO’s arbitration clause.

For current blog however I would like to report the findings on the anchor defendant mechanism (19 ff): the Court of Appeal applies Article 6(1) Lugano (UEFA and FIFA are Swiss domiciled), which is the same anchor mechanism as Article 8(1) Brussels I Recast: the anchor defendant being the Belgian Football Association. Freeport and Reisch Montage as well as CDC feature heavily in the Court’s analysis. FIFA and UEFA’s claim is that the Belgian FA is abusively being used as an anchor defendant. The court disagrees: FIFA and the Belgian FA share regulatory powers; the FA is empowered by FIFA statute to impose additional regulations.  The FA’s presence in the proceedings is entirely justified and not artificially constructed.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law. 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.12, Heading 2.2.12.1.

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Leave a comment

%d bloggers like this: