Posts Tagged Anchor defendant

Elena Tsareva et al v Dimitri Ananyev et al. Cypriot passports, forum shopping and anchor defendants in England.

Parties’ names alone in Elena Tsareva et al v Dimitri Ananyev et al [2019] EWHC 2414 (Comm) clearly indicate the attraction of England in international forum shopping. As Baker J notes at 5:

‘I infer that the choice of this jurisdiction as a venue for the claimants’ claims has been led by the lawyers (Russian and English) who have engaged themselves in assisting the claimants as disappointed investors. Indeed, I think it unlikely it would have occurred to the claimants, unless so led, to try to sue here. The most natural targets for any claim are PSB and (possibly) the first defendant, so the most natural venues for any litigation (all things being equal) are Russia and (perhaps) Cyprus. But none of that means that this court does not have jurisdiction.’

One, as always, wonders where these cases might go should following Brexit (if any) the English courts will regain full authority to apply forum non conveniens.

The Ananyevs are Russian nationals who were domiciled and resident in Russia in 2017. One of them, when the Claims were commenced in 2018, was domiciled and resident in Cyprus, where he has had a dual citizenship since June 2017. They are, or at all events they were in 2017, well-known in Russia as successful and very wealthy businessmen. They were the ultimate beneficial owners together of a number of businesses and assets, including Promsvyaz Bank – PSB, of whom claimants were clients. The core allegation underlying the claimants’ claims is that they were induced to invest in Notes by mis-selling on the part of PSB employees to the effect that the Notes were personally guaranteed by the Ananyevs and/or that they were safe investments. It is alleged that PSB was in a parlous financial condition rendering it highly likely the Notes would default, as in due course they did; and that the misselling was directed by the Ananyevs in a conspiracy to enrich themselves and/or their businesses at the expense of the claimants.

Some of the corporate defendants are English companies, although ‘tax-resident’ in Ireland in 2017, in Cyprus from some time later (and still now). The English companies cannot and do not challenge jurisdiction (but the claims against them are struck out nevertheless given the absence of foundation to the claims). Promsvyaz is a Dutch company, the Issuer is a Cayman Islands company, and Peters International is a Dutch Antilles company. Other defendants are Cypriot companies.

There are a great many claimants with varying suggested gateways for jurisdiction, and one best read the judgment to get the full picture. In short, however, the gateways relevant to the Brussels regime (this blogpost does not focus on the English rules) are Article 4, 7(2), and 8(1). At 29, Baker J emphasises that for the anchor claim under Article 8(1), unlike in the English CPR rules, there cannot be a merits claim. But there can be abuse, per CJEU Reisch Montage, and CDC, as recently also applied in Privatbank v Kolomoisky. Unlike in the latter case, Article 34 is not engaged here. Baker J concludes after considerate yet concise analysis that there is no good arguable case against the English defendants, the claim against them is hopeless, and therefore the anchor mechanism is abused. As always in these cases, walking the rope between merits analysis and ‘good arguable case’ is not straightforward yet the judgment shows again how the English courts deploy creativity to ensure the anchor mechanism of Article 8(1) is not abused.

At 51, the tort gateway of Article 7(2) against the non-English EU defendants is dismissed with reference to Lober. Claimants suffered loss by parting with their funds deposited with PSB in Russia (or, perhaps, by contracting with PSB in Russia to do so); there is no indication of links to England, as required by Lober (applying Universal Music).

The above only narrates the essence of the Brussels Ia analysis. There is quite a bit more in the judgment of relevance to the CPR rules.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2.

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Office Depot v Holdham et al. Lis alibi pendens in follow-on cartel damages suit. Delay in the Swedish proceedings crucial factor in High Court’s rejection of a stay

in [2019] EWHC 2115 (Ch) Office Depot BV et al v Holdham SA et al, the High Court in August (I had promised posting soon after the Tweet. That did not quite happen) held on issues of lis alibi pendens (and, alternatively, a stay on case management grounds) in a follow-on cartel damages suit arising from the European Commission’s cartel finding in the envelopes market. That’s right: envelopes. Cartel cases do not always involve sexy markets. But I digress (and I also confess to finding stationary quite exciting).

Sir Geoffrey Vos’ judgment deals with the fate of the Office Depot claimants’ follow-on proceedings in England against certain Bong (of Sweden) corporate defendants, after the Bong parties had commenced Swedish proceedings for negative declarations as to their liability. In March 2019 the relevant Swedish court said in effect that Article 8 Brussel I a was not engaged so that the Swedish Bong proceedings for negative declarations could only proceed against the locally domiciled Office Depot company, which was Office Depot Svenska AB, but not the non-Swedish Office Depot entities. Parties at the time of Sir Geoffrey’s decision (Swedish followers may be able to enlighten us on whether there has been a decision in the meantime; at 23 the expected date is mentioned as ‘the autumn’) were awaiting a certiorari decision by the Swedish Supreme Court.

CJEU C–406/92 The Tatry of course is discussed, as is CDC. Sir Geoffrey also discussed C-129/92 Owens Bank, in particular Lenz AG’s Opinion (the CJEU did not get to the part of the Opinion relevant to current case). Discussion between the parties, at Sir Geoffrey’s request, focused on the issue of the judge’s discretion under lis alibi pendens for related actions, rather than on whether or not the actions are related (it was more or less accepted they are; see ia at 43 ff).

At 46 ff the Court then exercises its discretion and finds against a stay, on the basis in particular of the expected length of the Swedish proceedings: at 54: ‘the grant of a stay would be contrary to justice in that it would delay unreasonably the resolution of proceedings that can only be tried in England and already relate to events many years ago‘, and at 48: ‘The stage in the Swedish proceedings is a long way behind these. It will be between one and two and a half years before jurisdiction is resolved there, two courts already having refused jurisdiction. It will be perhaps between three and five years before the substantive litigation in Sweden is resolved, if it ever gets off the ground.

Swedish courts do not tend to get used for torpedo actions. Yet the swiftness of English court proceedings yet again comes in to save the day (or indeed, scupper the stay).

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.12.1

 

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The wealth in Paul Holgate v Addleshaw Goddard (Scotland). Intra-UK conflicts, the Gourdain insolvency exception; anchoring; forum contractus; and a stay on forum non conveniens grounds.

In [2019] EWHC 1793 (Ch) Paul Holgate v Addleshaw Goddard (Scotland) the claim is for damages for breach of contract, negligence and/or breach of fiduciary duty in connection with and arising out of the defendant’s acceptance and performance (and/or non-performance) of instructions to act as solicitor for and to advise Arthur Holgate & Son Limited (then in administration, now in liquidation) in relation to a dispute between the Company and Barclays Bank.

The application concerns the allocation of jurisdiction within the UK. The rival forums are England and Scotland. The claim is not time-barred in England, but may, at least in part, be time-barred in Scotland, where the relevant period of ‘prescription’ (the Scottish equivalent of ‘limitation’) is 5 years.

The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 allocates jurisdiction within the devolved regions of the UK and, for civil and commercial matters, has opted to apply the (now) Brussels I Recast Regulation mutatis mutandis. At issue is first of all the insolvency exception of Brussels Ia (extended here as noted to the UK Act) interpreted per CJEU C-133/78 Gourdain: at 4:””[I]t is necessary, if decisions relating to bankruptcy and winding-up are to be excluded from the scope of the [Brussels] Convention, that they must derive directly from the bankruptcy or winding-up, and be closely connected with the proceedings for the liquidation des biens or the règlement judiciaire .” (Reference to the French procedure given the French origins of the case). This provision of course in the meantime has a mirror image in the Insolvency Regulation known as the vis attractiva concursus: the forum concursus can hear not just the very insolvency action but also those closely connected to it. CJEU C-111/08 SCT Industri v Alpenblume also features heavily in the discussion.

(Note Clark M makes the oft-repeated mistake of suggesting Brussels Ia and Insolvency Regulation dovetail. I have emphasised on various occasions that they do not).

Following discussion, at 50 Clark M holds that the claim does not relate to the internal management, of the administration or the conduct of the Joint Administrators (JAs) of the insolvency: the defendant’s purely advisory role meant it was not responsible for either of these. This is insufficient for the claim to be “closely linked” to the administration.

Next is the application of the anchor proceedings: these, too, follow EU language and precedent entirely and at 79ff Clark M discusses the interesting question whether a claim providing the anchor, issued after the claim which anchors unto it, is capable of conferring jurisdiction. He held that it does, provided the other requirements of the anchor provisions are satisfied: in particular the desirability of avoiding irreconcilable judgments. The sequence of claims did lead to some procedural oddity which could however be rectified and there was no suggestion of abuse. 

At 89 ff follows discussion of the forum contractus: ‘place of performance of the obligation in question’. At 129 Master Clark concedes that the relevant statutory instrument deliberately did not instruct this part of the UK’s residual rules to be interpreted in line with EU rules, however given the exact same wording, there is no reason for not doing so. At 132 follows then the oddity of the consequences of CJEU De Bloos (and now the language of the Regulation) with respect to ‘the obligation in question’: the determination of the principal obligation is carried out by analysing the particulars of claim. He finds at 136 that the Company’s complaints flow essentially from the primary complaint that the defendant was in breach of its fiduciary duty by continuing to advise and act for the Company (and not advising it that it could not properly do so), thereby putting the Bank’s interests (and its interests) before those of the Company. At 139: the place of performance of that obligation, is held to be in England.

Finally, forum non conveniens is briefly discussed and the right forum held to be England.

Quite a jurisdictional goodie bag.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, much of Chapter 2.

 

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New Look: Application of the good old rules for schemes of arrangements, with some doubt over the substantial effects test.

In [2019] EWHC 960 (Ch) New Look Secured Issuer and New Look Ltd, Smith J at H applies the standing rules on jurisdiction over the scheme and other companies which I also signalled in Algeco and Apcoa (with further reference in the latter post). Against the scheme companies jurisdiction is straightforward: they are England incorporated.  Against the scheme creditors, English courts apply the jurisdictional test viz the Brussels I Recast (‘a’) Regulation arguendo: if it were to apply (which the English Courts have taken no definitive stance on), would an English court have jurisdiction? Yes, it is held: under Article 8 (anchor defendants). (Often Article 25 is used as argument, too).

At 48 Smith J signals the ‘intensity’ issue: ‘In some cases it has been suggested that it may not be enough to identify a single creditor domiciled in the United Kingdom, and that the court should consider whether the number and size of creditors in the UK are sufficiently large: see Re Van Gansewinkel Groep[2015] EWHC 2151 (Ch) at [51]); Global Garden Products at [25]; Re Noble Group Ltd [2018] EWHC 3092 (Ch) at [114] to [116].’ Smith J is minded towards the first, more liberal approach: at 49. He refers to the liberal anchoring approach in competition cases, both stand-alone (think Media Saturn) and follow-on (think Posten /Bring v Volvo, with relevant links there).

At 51 he also discusses the ‘substantial effects’ test and classifies it under ‘jurisdiction’:

As well as showing a sufficient jurisdictional connection with England, it is also necessary to show that the Schemes, if approved, will be likely to have a substantial effect in any foreign jurisdictions involved in or engaged by the Schemes. This is because the court will generally not make any order which has no substantial effect and, before the court will sanction a scheme, it will need to be satisfied that the scheme will achieve its purpose: Sompo Japan Insurance Inc v Transfercom Ltd, [2007] EWHC 146 (Ch); Re Rodenstock GmbH[2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch) at [73]-[77]; Re Magyar Telecom BV[2013] EWHC 3800 (Ch) at [16].’ 

This is not quite kosher I believe. If, even arguendo, jurisdiction is established under Brussels Ia, then no ‘substantial effects’ test must apply at the jurisdictional stage. Certainly not vis-a-vis the scheme companies. Against the scheme creditors, one may perhaps classify it is a means to test the ‘abuse’ prohibition in Article 8(1)’s anchor mechanism.

A useful reminder of the principles. And some doubt re the substantial effects test.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 5.

 

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Modern Families. UK Supreme Court confirms CSR jurisdiction against mother and daughter in Lungowe v Vedanta and Konkola – yet with one or two important caveats.

Update 10 June 2019 for an update of Canadian case-law developments see here.

Update 30 April 2019 I cannot possibly keep up with all emerging scholarship on the issue yet this review by Penelope Bergkamp most complete and worthwhile.

Update 17 April 2019 Opinio Juris have relevant review here.

Update 16 April 2019 Nick Lees and Tim Pickworth have similar caution for overenthusiastic reaction to the UKSC judgment here.

The SC this morning held in [2019] UKSC 20 Vedanta and Konkola v Lungowe, confirming jurisdiction in England for a human rights /environmental claim against a Zambia-based defendant, Konkola Copper Mines or ‘KCM’, anchored unto an EU-based defendant, Vedanta resources, the ultimate parent company of KCM. Both High Court and Court of Appeal had upheld such jurisdiction (the links lead to my blog post on both).

Of note are:

1. First of all

Lord Briggs’ emphatic rebuke of parties (and courts, one assumes) having disproportionately engaged with the issue of jurisdiction. With reference to ia VTB Capital he underlines that jurisdictional dispute should be settled in summary judgment alone, and should not lead to a mini trial. Reference is made to the size of the bundles etc. A bit of an unfair comment perhaps given that clearly there was a need for SC intervention. At any rate, one imagines that current judgment settles a number of issues and that in future litigation therefore these at least will have to be met with less arguments; lest, as his lordship notes at 14, the Supreme Court’ will find itself in the unenviable position of beating its head against a brick wall.’

2. As noted by Coulson J at 57 in the High Court judgment, neither Vedanta nor KCM pursue an Article 34 Brussels Ia argument of lis alibi pendens with proceedings in Zambia. As I signalled in my succinct review of recent study for the EP yesterday, the A34 defence is likely to be important in future litigation.

3. Applicants’ arguments that pursuing the case against them is an abuse of EU law, were advanced and equally rejected at both the High Court and the Court of Appeal stage. They are pursued again with the SC (at the latter’s express instruction).

  • At 29 Lord Briggs agrees with the HC and the CA and decides that the point that there has been no such abuse of EU law, is acte clair – no reference to the CJEU therefore.
  • At 31 ff he discusses the limited authority (all of it discussed at the HC and the CA) on abuse of Brussels I (a), particularly abuse of the anchor defendant mechanism of (now) Article 8(1), including of course CDC and at 37 raises the interesting issue of remedy: if abuse is found, is it to be disciplined under a European remedy or rather using the common law instrument of forum non conveniens?
  • And at 39: appellants argue that in CSR cases like these, Owusu has the almost inevitable effect that, providing a minimum level of triable issue can be identified against an English incorporated parent, then litigation about environmental harm all around the world can be carried on in England, wherever the immediate cause of the damage arises from the operations of one of that group’s overseas subsidiaries. With the case against the England-based defendant going ahead at any rate, per Owusu, the risk or irreconcilable judgments should jurisdiction against the subsidiaries be vacated, simply becomes to great. Not so hands tied behind the back, appellants argue, but forum non paralysis.
  • At 40 Lord Briggs suggests an adjustment of the English forum non conveniens doctrine for cases like these: namely to instruct claimants of the need to avoid irreconcilable judgments, where the anchor defendant is prepared to submit to the jurisdiction of the domicile of the foreign defendant in a case where, as here, the foreign jurisdiction would plainly be the proper place, leaving aside the risk of irreconcilable judgments

 

4. Despite Owusu, the English courts are still within their rights to reject the case in summary judgment if there is no ‘real issue’ to be tried against the anchor defendant. Here, discussion turned at 42 ff as to whether one should merely apply Chandler v Cape [2012] EWCA Civ 525, or whether this case involves the assertion of a new category of common law negligence liability.

  • This was rejected, like it was by Sales LJ in AAA v Unilever plc [2018] EWCA Civ 1532, which I review here.
  • Lord Briggs 54 concludes that viz the common law of liability there is neither anything special nor conclusive about the parent /subsidiary relationship, and
  • at 53 flags what instantly has become a favourite among commentators on the case: ‘Even where group-wide policies do not of themselves give rise to such a duty of care to third parties, they may do so if the parent does not merely proclaim them, but takes active steps, by training, supervision and enforcement, to see that they are implemented by relevant subsidiaries. Similarly, it seems to me that the parent may incur the relevant responsibility to third parties if, in published materials, it holds itself out as exercising that degree of supervision and control of its subsidiaries, even if it does not in fact do so. In such circumstances its very omission may constitute the abdication of a responsibility which it has publicly undertaken.’

4bis This part of course inevitably may give parent companies a means to prevent such liability (do not proclaim group-wide policies, let alone train or enforce them – as Gabrielle Holly also immediately noted here). However a variety of mechanisms may prevent this becoming a cheap trick to avoid liability: such compliance programs are often required under competition law, financial law etc., too; are relevant for directors’ liability; and of course may already (such as in the French devoir de vigilance) or in future (as mooted ia by the EC and the EP) be statutorily prescribed.

At 60: in the case at issue, the SC finds that the High Court with sufficient care examined and upheld the essence of the claimants’ case against Vedanta, that it exercised a sufficiently high level of supervision and control of the activities at the Mine, with sufficient knowledge of the propensity of those activities to cause toxic escapes into surrounding watercourses, as to incur a duty of care to the claimants. At 61 Lord Briggs adds obiter that not all the material (particularly services agreements) would have persuaded him as much as they did the HC or the CA, however at 62 he emphasis again that the HC and CA’s judgment on same was not vitiated by any error of law.

5. At 66 ff then follows the final issue to be determined: forum non conveniens and the further advancement of the issue already signalled above: it troubles Lord Briggs at 75 that the trial judges did not focus upon the fact that, in this case, the anchor defendant, Vedanta, had by the time of the hearing offered to submit to the jurisdiction of the Zambian courts, so that the whole case could be tried there. (An argument which was considered by Leggatt J in VTB).

  • Evidently the A4 BruIa case would have had to continue per Owusu, yet the reason why the parallel pursuit of a claim in England against Vedanta and in Zambia against KCM would give rise to a risk of irreconcilable judgments is because the claimants have chosen to exercise that right to continue against Vedanta in England, rather than because Zambia is not an available forum for the pursuit of the claim against both defendants: claimant-inflicted forum non.
  • Why, at 75 in fine, (it may be asked) should the risk of irreconcilable judgments be a decisive factor in the identification of the proper place, when it is a factor which the claimants, having a choice, have brought upon themselves?
  • Lord Briggs’ argument here is complex and I need to cross-refer more to the various authorities cited however the conclusion seems to be that Lord Briggs rejects the argument of Leggatt J in VTB and he finds that ! provided the ex-EU forum is a suitable forum, under English private international law claimants do have to make a choice: either only sue the A4 defendant in the EU but not the ex-EU subsidiaries; or sue all in the forum where they may all be sued (if there is such a forum), here by virtue of submission to the non-EU forum. The alternative would allow claimant to profit from self-inflicted risks of irreconcilable judgments.
  • In the end the rule is of no impact in the case for Zambia was found not to be an appropriate forum, for reasons of ‘substantial justice’: among others because of the absence of Conditional Fee Agreements, and given the unavoidable scale and complexity of this case (wherever litigated), the trial judge was right that it could not be undertaken at all with the limited funding and legal resources which the evidence led him to conclude were available within Zambia.

 

6. By way of my conclusion so far: (update 11 April 2019: in the meantime echoed by Robert McCorquodale’s analysis here; and here; he was counsel for interveners in the case hence was able to refer to insight gained from having seen parties’ submissions)

The group policy direction, enforcement, compliance and communication of same -issue is an important take away from this case. Particularly as it may be expected that holding companies will not find it that straightforward simply to do away with such policies. Of great impact too will be the choice now put upon claimants in the forum non conveniens issue: suing nondom companies by virtue of anchoring unto the A4 mother company in England at least will be less straightforward (many usual suspects among the competing jurisdictions do have CFAs, allow for third party funding  etc.). Yet the two in my view dovetail: the reason for bringing in the ex-EU subsidiaries often is because the substantial case against them tends to serve the case against the mother. With a tighter common law neglicence liability the need to serve the daughter may be less urgent.

Geert.

European private international law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 8, Headings 8.3.1.1., 8.3.2

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Disciplining abuse of anchor defendants in follow-up competition law cases exceedingly difficult. Borgarting Court of Appeal (Norway) applies CDC in Posten /Bring v Volvo.

After the French Cour de Cassation in MJI v Apple Sales, the Brussels Court of Appeal in FIFA/UEFA, and the Court at Amsterdam in Kemira, (as well as other courts undoubtedly, too; and I have highlighted more cases on the blog), Ørjan Salvesen Haukaas has now reported an application of CDC in a decision of December 2018 by a Norwegian Court of appeal, LB-2018-136341 Posten /Bring v Volvo. The court evidently applies Lugano (Article 6), not Brussels Ia, yet the provision  is materially identical.

Norwegian and foreign companies in the Posten/Bring group (mail services) had sued companies in the Volvo group for alleged losses incurred when purchasing trucks from Volvo after certain companies in the Volvo group had been fined for participating in a price-fixing cartel. Posten/Bring also sued a Norwegian company in the Volvo group, which had not been fined for participating in the price-fixing cartel.

Borgarting Court of Appeal held that Norwegian courts have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6(1) Lugano even if the anchor defendant is sued merely to obtain Norwegian jurisdiction. The court solely had to determine whether the claims were so closely connected that there was a risk of irreconcilable judgments, in the absence of any suggested collusion between the anchor defendant and claimants per CDC.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law. 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.12, Heading 2.2.12.1.

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Petrobas securities class action firmly anchored in The Netherlands. Rotterdam court applying i.a. forum non conveniens under Brussels Ia.

Many thanks to Jeffrey Kleywegt and Robert Van Vugt for re-reporting Stichting Petrobas Compensation Foundation v PetrÓleo Brasilieiro SA – PETROBRAS et al. The case, held in September (judgment in NL and in EN) relates to a Brazilian criminal investigation into alleged bribery schemes within Petrobras, which took place between 2004 and 2014. the Court had to review the jurisdictional issue only at this stage, and confirmed same for much, but not all of the claims.

The Dutch internal bank for Petrobas, Petrobas Global Finance BV and the Dutch subsidiary of Petrobas, Petrobas Oil and Gas BV are the anchor defendants. Jurisdiction against them was easily established of course under Article 4 Brussels Ia.

Issues under discussion, were

Firstly, against the Dutch defendants: Application of the new Article 34 ‘forum non conveniens’ mechanism which I have reported on before re English and Gibraltar courts. At 5.45: defendants request a stay of the proceedings on account of lis pendens, until a final decision has been given in the United States, alternatively Brazil, about claims that are virtually identical to those brought by the Foundation. They additionally argue a stay on case management grounds. However the court finds

with respect to a stay in favour of the US, that

the US courts will not judge on the merits, since there is a class settlement; and that

for the proceedings in which these courts might eventually hold on the merits (particularly in the case of claimants having opted out of the settlement), it is unclear what the further course of these proceedings will be and how long they will continue. For that reason it is also unclear if a judgment in these actions is to be expected at ‘reasonably short notice’: delay of the proceedings is a crucial factor in the Article 34 mechanism.

with respect to a stay in favour of Brasil, that Brazilian courts unlike the Dutch (see below) have ruled and will continue to rule in favour of the case having to go to arbitration, and that such awards might not even be recognisable in The Netherlands (mutatis mutandis, the Anerkennungsprognose of Article 34).

Further, against the non-EU based defendants, this of course takes place under residual Dutch rules, particularly

Firstly (Dutch CPR) Article 7(1)’s anchor defendants mechanism such as it does in Shell. The court here found that exercise of jurisdiction would not be exorbitant, as claimed by Petrobas: most of the claims against the Dutch and non-Dutch defendants are so closely connected as to justify a joint hearing for reasons of efficiency, in order to prevent irreconcilable judgments from being given in the event that the cases were heard and determined separately: a clear echo of course of CJEU authority on Article 8(1). The court also rejects the suggestion that application of the anchor mechanism is abusive.

It considers these issues at 5.11 ff: relevant is inter alia that the Dutch defendants have published incorrect, incomplete, and/or misleading financial information, have on the basis of same during the fraud period issued shares, bonds or securities and in that period have deliberately and wrongly raised expectations among investors. Moreover, at 5:15: Petrobras has itself stated on its website that it has a strategic presence in the Netherlands.

Against two claims ‘involvement’ of the NL-based defendants was not upheld, and jurisdiction denied.

Further, a subsidiary jurisdictional claim for these two rejected claims on the basis of forum necessitatis (article 9 of the Duch CPR) was not upheld: Brazilian authorities are clearly cracking down on fraud and corruption (At 5.25 ff).

Finally  and again for these two remaining claims, are the Netherlands the place where the harmful event occurred (Handlungsort) and /or the place where the damage occurred (Erfolgsort)? Not so, the court held: at 5.22: the Foundation has not stated enough with regard to the involvement of the Dutch defendants in those claims, for the harmful event to be localised in the Netherlands with some sufficient force. As for locus damni and with echos of Universal Music: at 5.24: that the place where the damage has occurred is situated in the Netherlands, cannot be drawn from the mere circumstance that purely financial damage has directly occurred in the Dutch bank accounts of the (allegedly) affected investors – other arguments (see at 5.24) made by the Foundation did not convince.

Finally, an argument was made that the Petrobas arbitration clause contained in its articles of association, rule out recourse to the courts in ordinary. Here, an interesting discussion took place on the relevant language version to be consulted: the Court went for the English one, seeing as this is a text which is intended to be consulted by persons all over the world (at 5.33). The English version of article 58 of the articles of association however is insufficiently clear and specific: there is no designated forum to rule on any disputes covered by the clause. Both under Dutch and Brazilian law, the Court held, giving up the constitutional right of gaining access to the independent national court requires that the clause clearly states that arbitration has been agreed. That clarity is absent: the version consulted by the court read

“Art. 58 -It shall be resolved by means of arbitration [italics added, district court], obeying the rules provided by the Market Arbitration Chamber, the disputes or controversies that involve the Company, its shareholders, the administrators and members of the Fiscal Council, for the purposes of the application of the provision contained in Law n° 6.404, of 1976, in this Articles of Association, in the rules issued by the National Monetary Council, by the Central Bank of Brazil and by the Brazilian
Securities and Exchange Commission, as well as in the other rules applicable to the functioning of the capital market in general, besides the ones contained in the agreements eventually executed by Petrobras with the stock exchange or over-the-counter market entity, accredited by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission, aiming at the adoption of standards of corporate governance established by these entities, and of the respective rules of differentiated practices of corporate governance, as the case may be.”

A very relevant and well argued case – no doubt subject to appeal.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed.2016, Chapter 2, almost in its entirety.

 

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