Posts Tagged AI
Proposition Walhalla. ‘The algorithms of the law must keep pace with new and emerging technologies.’
Update 17 January 2020 the European Commission reportedly has a different view and is preparing a proposal to ban this use temporarily.
‘The algorithms of the law must keep pace with new and emerging technologies’ is the opening sentence of Hadon-Cave LJ and Swift J in R v The Chief Constable of South Wales Police and others  EWHC 2341.
The central issue is whether the current legal regime in the United Kingdom is adequate to ensure the appropriate and non-arbitrary use of AFR (automated face recognition) in a free and civilized society. The High Court finds it is. No doubt appeal will follow. I leave the assessment of the findings (discussing in particular Article 8 ECHR: right to respect for one’s private and family life, one’s home and one’s correspondence) of the Court to others. It is the opening sentence which drew my attention as, inevitably, it did others’. It is a sentence upon which one can hinge en entire regulatory /new technologies course. Must the algorithms of the law (whatever these may be) keep pace with technology? Or rather, guard against the challenges of same?
Bitcoin online resolution award refused recognition and enforcement at Amsterdam (ordre public exception of New York Convention).
I tweeted it earlier yet was asked to put a review up on the blog (which also suits my archiving purposes) of ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2019:192 X v Y (I know that does not help much) at the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, 29 January 2019. The case came to me courtesy of Freshields who have review here.
The case illustrates some of the issues involving online alternative dispute resolution, including those manned by artificial intelligence (albeit the latter was not directly at stake here).
Using an online trading platform, X provided three loans to Y, all in bitcoins at an interest rate of 5% per month. To borrow these bitcoins, Y had to agree on the conditions of the online bitcoin-trading platform applicable to the loans. These conditions included the following dispute resolution mechanism clause:
If you fail to pay principal and/or interest on the date on which the loan falls due, you will be considered in default of the Registration Agreement… Should your loan become 90 days past due (“Defaulted”) the loan will be sent to Dhami Law Firm (“Arbitrator”), an independent, international arbitration firm whose awards are recognized internationally under The United Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
I understand that in the event that I want to appear in the arbitration by email to contest the potential issuance of an award in favor of the lenders, I must send a written request to firstname.lastname@example.org and pay a $ 99.00 fee. Such request must be within 7 calendar days from the date of the Notice of Default. The Arbitrator’s decision shall be final and legally binding. In the event that the Arbitrator issues an award in favor of the investor, an investor may enforce that judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction.
The conditions further contained the following arbitration clause:
All claims and disputes arising under or relating to this agreement are to be settled by binding arbitration in the state of California or another location mutually agreeable to the parties. An award of arbitration may be confirmed in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Default ensued, as did ADR, and Y sought enforcement in The Netherlands. The Courts have now refused proprio motu (Y had signalled he had no objection), for the following reasons summarised by Freshfields: First, the court took issue with the circumstance that – in its view – online arbitral proceedings automatically become pending after 90 days. Second, a defendant wishing to defend itself in these arbitral proceedings had been required to write an email within seven days from receiving a notice of default. Third, the arbitral tribunal had failed to inform Y that a dispute was pending against him or of the legal grounds of the action.
At 3.5 is it is clear that the principle of audi alteram partem is the main stumbling block for the Dutch Courts. Ordre public violated. A clear flashpoint for ADR, including of the algorithmic variety.
Update 8 April 2019 for the final guidelines following review, see here.
An ethics-related posting seems apprioprate as last before ‘the’ season.
The relevant European expert group seeks feedback on draft ethics guidelines for trustworthy artificial intelligence.
Chapter I deals with ensuring AI’s ethical purpose, by setting out the fundamental rights, principles and values that it should comply with.
From those principles, Chapter II derives guidance on the realisation of Trustworthy AI, tackling both ethical purpose and technical robustness. This is done by listing the requirements for Trustworthy AI and offering an overview of technical and non-technical methods that can be used for its implementation.
Chapter III subsequently operationalises the requirements by providing a concrete but nonexhaustive assessment list for Trustworthy AI. This list is then adapted to specific use cases.
Of particular note at p.12-13 are the implications for the long term use of AI, on which the expert group did not reach consensus. Given that autonomous AI systems in particular have raised popular concern, most of which predicted in the longer term, it is clear that this section could prove particularly sticky as well as interesting.
For me the draft is a neat warm-up for when the group’s co-ordinator, Nathalie Smuha, returns to Leuven in spring to focus on her PhD research with me on the very topic.