Update 18 December 2020 the Decree saw the light but was annulled by the Constitutional Court yesterday for reasons of internal devolution in Belgium (infringement of the federal head of power for product standards).
Anyone short of exam essay Qs, consider the planned Flemish ban (with room for local, event-related exceptions) on fireworks displays. Akin to the issues in Ivory Ban or pet collars, at the core of the legal analysis is the legality of use restrictions on goods lawfully marketed in other Member States (see also my brief review of Amsterdam’s booze bikes here).
The exhaustive effect or not of EU secondary law will have to be discussed, as will Article 34 TFEU (including consultation and commissioned research issues and of course proportionality), and indeed A1P1 (Article 1, first Protocol) ECHR.
(For a recent more locally relevant issue, see the Supreme Court’s (Raad van State) December 2019 annulment of an Antwerp highway code rule banning the use of quads and introducing a strict exemption policy).
Update 18 May 2020 confirmed today by the Court of Appeal in  EWCA Civ 649.
Hot on the heels of yesterday’s post on e-collars, a short note on yet another trade and animal welfare /biodiversity case. In  EWHC 2951 (Admin) Friends of Antique Cultural Treasures v Secretary of State for the environment, food and rural affairs, Justice Jay (‘Jay J’ even though correct might sound a bit too intimate) upheld the UK’s planned ban on ivory trade, stricter than anything in place elsewhere. As a general rule, the Act interdicts the sale of antique worked ivory, that is to say pre-1947 artefacts, unless one of limited exemptions is applicable.
The discussion engages CITES, pre-emption /exhaustion by harmonised EU law, the environmental guarantee of Article 193 TFEU (albeit not, oddly, the issue of notification to the EC), Article 34 TFEU, and A1P1 ECHR.
On uncertainty, Justice Jay refers to the precautionary principle: at 155: ‘we are in the realm of scientific and evidentiary uncertainty, and the need for a high level of protection. §3.1 of the Commission’s 2017 Guidance makes that explicit. Although the evidence bearing on the issues of indirect causation and demand in Far Eastern markets may be uncertain, statistically questionable, impressionistic and often anecdotal, I consider that these factors do not preclude the taking of bold and robust action in the light of the precautionary principle.’
Rosalind English has analysis here and refers even to Edmund de Waal’s novel The Hare with the Amber Eyes which has been on my reading list after my wife recommended it – this is a good reminder.
EU environmental law (with Leonie Reins), Edward Elgar, 2018, p.28 ff., and Chapter 17 (p.308 ff).
Update 11 May 2021 the Court of Appeal has upheld the decision:  EWCA Civ 666, only succinctly engaging with the A1P1 issue and hardly with the A34 TFEU arguments.
Update 30 September 2020 for a similar judgment at the Belgian Constitutional Court, see here. This judgment engaged with A1P1 ECHR, as well as alleged discrimination, particularly viz dog therapists where use may be continued; and viz electric cattle prods. Re e-collars for dogs the point is made that the danger to the animal’s welfare lies with its inappropriate use by the owner, something which the drafters of the statute is not the case with farmers; I do not think that is a correct assumption). The legality of the device in other Member States was not discussed.
I tweeted the judgment the day it was issued, apologies for late succinct review. I wrote a few years back on the legality of use restrictions on goods lawfully marketed in other Member States, and see also my brief review of Amsterdam’s booze bikes here. In  EWHC 2813 (Admin) The Electronic Collar Manufacturers Association v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Morris J upheld the UK Government’s ban on e-collars (a hand-held remote-controlled (not automated: a distinction that matters as Rosalind English points out) e-collar device for cats and dogs, used particularly in dogs for training purposes).
His analysis engages all the right issues in discussing the lawfulness of a ban at 204 ff under Article 34 TFEU (including consultation and commissioned research issues and of course proportionality), less focused than I would have expected perhaps on the fact that these items are lawfully marketed elsewhere in the EU, and indeed A1P1 (Article 1, first Protocol) ECHR. The remainder of the judgment discusses internal UK judicial review. An excellent primer on trade and animal welfare under EU and ECHR law.
Update 12 april 2017: the UK Supreme Court refused permission to appeal [the decision should appear here in due course], hence the Court of Appeal’s ruling is now final.
Isn’t it just a perfect exam question for a graduate course, nay this question involves so many issues it could arguably serve as one single exam for a whole law degree: such is the intensity of legal areas at issue: constitutional law, international law, international trade, regulatory law and risk analysis, intellectual property law…
Discuss why the Court of Appeal for England and Wales denied Government wrongdoing in plain packaging, while the German Bundesverfassungsgericht rejected an argument of expropriation in Energiewende yet held that German Government must nevertheless pay compensation to the energy companies involved (E.ON, RWE and Vatenfall).
Source tip: you may want to consult my former student Dr Catherine Banet’s excellent analysis on the Vatenfall issue.
Issues tip: a good way to go about it would be to draft a table of issues that both cases have in common and those which they do not (eg the Court of Appeal’s review of intellectual property). A discussion of the precautionary principle would not go amiss (in the plain packaging case: specifically whether precaution applies to uncertainty as to efficiency of remedies rather than uncertainty as to a phenomenon). A point of discussion may also be why the CA refers profusely to European precedent while the Bundesverfassungsgericht does not. Finally, any consideration of the link between the latter proceedings and the concurrent ISDS procedure, will gain you brownie points.
To fellow faculty out there: if you do use this exam Q, please do share good student answer copies.
Just before the Christmas break, a WTO Panel ruled at the request of Japan and the EU that Ontario’s feed-in tariff program is illegal under the GATT and TRIMs agreement. Feed-in tariff programs are a popular means to boost renewable energy. Typically, they imply that producers of renewable energy are nurtured through preferential, long-term and advantageous electricity purchase contracts (either through obliging private electricity distributors to enter into such contracts, such as in the infamous European PreussenElektra case, or such as in the case of Ontario’s law, through employment of a Government Agency which enters into these contracts). Governments are often tempted to throw ‘local content requirements’ into the mix: in the case of Ontario, domestic content requirements must be complied with in the design and construction of the relevant electricity generation facilities utilizing solar photovoltaic and wind power technology in order to qualify for guaranteed electricity prices offered under the FIT Program.
The Panel rejected the EU’s claim with respect to Subsidies, however it did accept that the regime infringed GATT Article III, as well as the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures. The former to me was no great surprise. Infant industry arguments are often made with respect to renewable energy however these do not in my view carry much weight with respect to either solar, wind or hydropower. The finding on TRIMS is encouraging: it shows that the Agreement (I sometimes dub it a mini-MAI) does have some bite.
The EU has had internal issues with feed-in tariffs and the like (see e.g. my paper here on (di)similarities between EU and WTO law on the matter), and (update 5 May 2015) in the UK the Courts are considering the extent to which Article 1 of the first Protocol to the European Conention on Human rights (‘A1P1’), which protects property, shields investors in solar energy from changes in feed-in tariffs.