Posts Tagged 1215/2012
BVC v EWF. The High Court on personality rights, internet and centre of interests in echoes of Bolagsupplysningen and e-Date. Suggests court with full jurisdiction is required for orders restraining further publication.
In BVC v EWF  EWHC 2506 (QB) claimant applied for summary judgment in a claim for misuse of private information and harassment. The privacy claim arises from internet publication, on a website created by the defendant, of his account of his relationship with claimant. The harassment claim arises from a series of email communications from the defendant to claimant over a period of some two years, and from publication of the website itself.
An ex parte injunction had been granted earlier. The Defendant was restrained from contacting or harassing claimant, from publishing the website or any of its contents to the world at large, and from publishing any of the information set out in a confidential schedule, or any information which was liable to or might identify the claimant as a party to the proceedings or as the subject of the confidential information
In current proceedings defendant (a UK national) submits he is domiciled in Switserland. This triggers the Lugano Convention.
Parkes J clearly had to consider Article 5(3) Lugano’s special jurisdictional rule for tort (the BIa equivalent of course is now Article 7(2), hence also applying e-Date and Bolagsupplysningen. Steyn DJ had earlier rejected defendant’s arguments. At 33: ‘She held, in short, that the Claimant had a good arguable case that this jurisdiction was the state in which he had the centre of his interests, and that in any event a real and substantial tort (namely misuse of private information) had been committed within the jurisdiction. She also ordered that the steps already taken to bring the Claim Form and orders of 27 June and 4 July 2018 to the Defendant’s attention (namely, service by email) constituted good service on him, notwithstanding that he claimed he was domiciled in Switzerland at the date of receipt of the documents, not (as had been believed) in this jurisdiction.’
Defendant (praised nb by Parkes J for his ‘brief but enlightening written submissions’) however continues to challenge the jurisdiction, jumping at the chance to bring it up again when claimant referred to his centre of interests in his PoC (Particulars of Claim), and employing the distinction which the CPR makes between challenges to existence and exercise of jurisdiction (notwithstanding authority (see at 39) that despite the distinction claims viz the two need to be brought concurrently).
He essentially (at 43) posits the court reconsider
‘whether Article 7(2) RJR is ‘to be interpreted as meaning that a natural person who alleges that his personality rights have been infringed by the publication of information concerning him on the internet may have his centre of interests in a Member of State where he is not habitually resident, where he has no ongoing professional connections or employment, no home, no income and no immediate family’. In his letter to the court of 18 June 2019, the Defendant puts it this way: ‘… with no permission to appeal the judgment of Karen Steyn QC, if the court continues to accept the Claimant’s centre of interests is in England and Wales despite very clear evidence to the contrary then it is necessary to refer the question of interpretation to the ECJ pursuant to Article 267 of the TFEU’.
At 44 Parkes J dismisses the suggestion of preliminary review to Luxembourg. That route is ‘not designed to provide a route of appeal against judicial evaluation of evidence of fact.’ In conclusion, re-opening of the discussion on jurisdiction is rejected, referring finally to Lord Green in Kaefer:”it would not be right to adjourn the jurisdiction dispute to the full trial on the merits since this would defeat the purpose of jurisdiction being determined early and definitively to create legal certainty and to avoid the risk that the parties devote time and cost to preparing and fighting the merits only to be told that the court lacked jurisdiction“.
Arguments on submission to the jurisdiction where not entertained: whether service of a defence, and the making of an application to strike out qualify as ‘submission’ becomes otiose when that jurisdiction has already been unsuccessfully challenged.
Then follows extensive discussion of the factual substance of the matter, which is less relevant for the purposes of this blog. Hence fast forward to 150 ff where the issue of jurisdiction to issue an injunction prohibiting re-publication of the material is discussed (in case: re-offering of the website on WordPress or elsewhere). At 158 ff this leads to a re-discussion of Bolagsupplysningen where the Court held that where a claimant seeks an injunction to rectify or remove damaging material from the internet, he can only do so only in a State with full jurisdiction. Parkes J at 160 suggests this is only in the state where the defendant is domiciled (the general rule, as stated by Art 2(1) Lugano and Art 4(1) RJR), or (by virtue of the special jurisdiction: Art 5(3) Lugano and Art 7(2) RJR) in the state where he has his centre of interests, and not before the courts of each member state in which the information is accessible.
I believe Parkes J on that point omits locus delicti commissi. At the time of my review of Bolagsupplysningen I suggested the judgment was bound to create a need for further clarification: Shevill and e-Date confirm full jurisdiction for the courts of the domicile of the defendant, and of the locus delicti commissi, and of the centre of interests of the complainant. These evidently do not necessarily coincide. With more than one court having such full jurisdiction positive conflicts might arise.
Of more importance here is that Parkes J (obiter) at 163 suggests that the requirement of full jurisdiction, also applies to orders restraining any further publication and not just as the Grand Chamber held limited by the facts in Bolagsupplysningen, to orders for rectification and removal. In doing so he follows the in my view correct suggestion made by Dr Tobias Lutzi (‘Shevill is dead, long live Shevill!’, L.Q.R. 2018, 134 (Apr), 208-213) viz divisible cq indivisible remedies – update 28 September 2019 although the issue is not free of discussion. Graham Smith for instance suggests the potential for geo-blocking as a valid argument to grant jurisdiction for restraining further publication on an Article 7(2) locus damni basis.
Note also the cross-reference to Saïd v L’Express on the limitation of Bolagsupplysningen to injunctive relief: for damages, the full mosaic implications remain.
Conclusion: Claimant is entitled to summary judgment for a final injunction to restrain further misuse of his private information
(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 126.96.36.199.
Weco Projects ASP v Zea Marine Carier GmbH: provisional measures, court-appointed surveyor’s powers in the light of arbitration.
Genova’s court ruling in Weco Projects ASP v Zea MArine Carier GmbH is remarkably similar to the Belo Horizonte (Cefetra et al v Ms ‘IDA’ Oetker Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MbH & Co KG et al) ruling at the Court of Rotterdam, which I reviewed here. Transport is of a yacht is the issue, sinking the event, and London arbitration the agreed dispute resolution. What powers do the courts in ordinary still have to order interim measures?
The court could have discussed the arbitration /Brussels Ia interface, as well as Article 35’s provisional measures. Instead, it mentions neither and relies entirely on an Italian Supreme Court precedent as Maurizio Dardani and Luca di Marco review excellently here (many thanks to Maurizio for forwarding me the case). An exciting, and missed opportunity to bring these issues into focus.
(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.15.
Saïd v L’Express. The High Court finds no Bolagsupplysningen injunctive jurisdiction (upholds damages jurisdiction).
In Saïd v L’Express  EWHC 3593 (QB), held at the end of December, 1st Defendant is the publisher of the French language magazine L’Express. 2nd Defendant is described as the ‘directeur de la publiction, directeur de la redaction’ of the magazine and is said to have editorial responsibility for it. The claim was originally one in data protection under the GDPR and one in libel – currently only the libel claim has been continued. A pitty: for the GDPR issue see my prediction here.
214 copies of the magazine are sold to subscribers in the UK. There were 252 website visits to the article from within the UK. All the ingredients therefore of a classic C-68/93 Shevill action. Nicol J of course runs (with great clarity) through Shevill, eDate Advertising GmbH v X; Martinez v MGN Ltd Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10) and Bolagsupplysningen. At 23 he holds correctly that the e-Date route of full jurisdiction for the claimant’s centre of interests applies only to internet publications (‘I detect no suggestion that, in respect of print copies, a claimant has the option of suing for compensation for all of the loss in the member state where he has his centre of interests’).
At 31 he summarises his key takeaways from Bolagsupplysningen.:
i) So far as internet publications are concerned, a claimant who is seeking relief such as an injunction may do so only (a) in a Member State where the defendant is domiciled (so that the Courts of that Member State have jurisdiction under Article 4(1)); or (b) in the Member State where Claimant has his centre of interests.
ii) Although by the time of the reference the Supreme Court of Estonia was concerned only with the corporate claimant, there is nothing in the judgment to suggest that the outcome in relation to the third question would have been different in relation to the individual claimant.
iii) The Court was concerned exclusively with publications on the internet. So far as remedies for print publications are concerned, a claimant’s options as set out in Shevill remain the same.
iv) Likewise, the Court was concerned exclusively with remedies for the rectification or removal of information from the internet. So far as other remedies, such as damages are concerned (even damages for internet publications) the Court appears to have made no change to the previous position. The Court’s judgment appears to be in contrast with the opinion of the Advocate-General (Bobek) whose preferred course was to restrict a claimant complaining of an internet publication, to those fora which had full power to deal with all copies of the publication so that the mosaic option would not be available in such cases (see  of his opinion) whatever remedies were being sought. ….’
He is absolutely right re Bobek’s Opinion as I discuss here.
Then follows the factual discussion (suggestions for centre of interest in England are at 47 and at 56) leading to a finding at 61 of there not being centre of interest in England which could displace the Bolagsupplysningen presumption of habitual residence (here: Monaco) being that centre. The preceding paras include important discussion on the amendment of claims and the need to identify the jurisdictional gateway (Mosaic and /or Bolagsupplysningen) in the claims form.
Finding therefore is at 73-74 that ‘Claimant has not shown a good arguable case that his centre of interests is in England and Wales. As is agreed, the Defendants are not domiciled in the jurisdiction. Accordingly and in accordance with Bolagsupplysningen, this court does not have jurisdiction to grant an injunction to restrain publication of the article on the internet. To that extent, the Defendants’ application succeeds. Otherwise, the Claimant has shown a good arguable case for the cause of action and other relief which he seeks. The remainder of the Defendants’ application is therefore refused.’ (Meaning that the application for summary dismissal on that point fails and the case must proceed on the damages issue, in mosaic fashion).
A first thorough application of Bolagsupplysningen I believe.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 188.8.131.52.
Ergo, and Haras des Coudrettes. Provisional measures under Brussels I Recast and Lugano before the French Supreme Court.
Thank you Nicolas Contis and Leonardo Pinto for reporting judgments by the French Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation) 16-19-731 Ergo Versicherung v Volker and 16-27.913, Haras des Coudrettes v X, both held on 14 March 2018.
The judgments concern the interpretation of Article 35 Brussels I Recast c.q. Article 31 of the Lugano Convention (the second case concerned a defendant domiciled in Switzerland) on provisional measures.
Please refer to Nicolas and Leonardo for a summary of the facts the judicial proceedings in the case. In neither cases do the French courts have subject-matter jurisdiction: in Ergo, the German courts do by virtue of choice of court; in Haras des Coudrettes, the Swiss courts do by virtue of Article 5(3) Lugano (locus delicti commissi being there; and direct damage also having occurred there hence leaving only indirect, financial damage with the French owner of the horse at issue, even if the exact nature and size of those direct injuries could only be later established in France).
In Ergo, the Supreme Court held that ‘la juridiction française (est) compétente pour ordonner, avant tout procès, une mesure d’expertise devant être exécutée en France et destinée à conserver ou établir la preuve de faits dont pourrait dépendre la solution du litige. Appointing an expert to assess any damages caused to a solar plant, and to explore liabilities for such damage, falls within Article 35 Brussels I Recast. I would agree with such a wide reading as I have discussed before in my review of the Belo Horizonte case. The Supreme Court does not consider relevant to the outcome claimants’ argument, that under Article 2 Brussels I Recast, provisional measures only enjoy free movement under the Regulation when ordered by a court with subject-matter jurisdiction. Indeed in view of the Supreme Court the Court of Appeal need not even consider whether it has such jurisdiction. Given that the form Annexed to the Regulation includes a box requiring exactly that, this may seem odd. One assumes the Court held so given that the forensic measures ordered, can be rolled out entirely in France: no need for any travel at all.
In Haras des Coudrettes, the Supreme Court annulled because the Court of Appeal had established subject-matter jurisdiction for the Swiss courts, and had subsequently not entertained the possibility of provisional measures, even though the object at issue (the mare: ‘la jument’) is in France: ‘Qu’en statuant ainsi, alors qu’elle relevait que la mesure sollicitée avait pour objet notamment d’examiner la jument située en France, la cour d’appel, qui n’a pas tiré les conséquences légales de ses propres constatations, a violé les textes susvisés.‘
and ‘une mesure d’expertise destinée à conserver ou établir la preuve de faits dont pourrait dépendre la solution du litige, ordonnée en référé avant tout procès sur le fondement du second de ces textes, constitue une mesure provisoire au sens du premier, qui peut être demandée même si, en vertu de cette Convention, une juridiction d’un autre Etat lié par celle-ci est compétente pour connaître du fond’:
expert findings which aim at maintaining or establishing facts upon which the eventual solution of the litigation may depend, fall within the scope of provisional measures and may be ordered even before any entertainment of subject-matter jurisdiction. Again, the fact that for the effective roll-out of the provisional measures no other State need be engaged, must have relevance in this assessment.
(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.15.
I called Bobek AG’s Opinion in C-337/17 ‘solid’ – by which I also implied: convincing. Is the actio pauliana by a Polish company against a Spanish company, which had bought immovable property from the former’s contracting party, one relating to ‘contract’ within the meaning of Article 7(1) Brussels I Recast?
Bobek AG Opined it is not. The CJEU today held it is. I disagree.
Firstly, the second chamber, at 29 ff, repeats the inaccurate references in Valach and Tunkers, that (at 30) ‘actions which fall outside the scope of [the Insolvency Regulation] fall within the scope of [Brussels I Recast].’ This oft repeated quote suggest dovetailing between the two Regulations, a view which is patently incorrect: readers can use the tag ‘dovetail’ or ‘arrangement’ (for ‘scheme of arrangement’) for my view on same; see e.g. Agrokor.
Having held (this was not seriously in doubt) that Brussels I Recast is engaged, the Court then takes a much wider view of the Handte formula than advocated by Bobek AG. The Court at 37 refers to Granarolo, merely in fact to emphasise the requirement of strict interpretation of the jurisdictional rules which vary Article 4’s actor sequitur forum rei’s rule. At 43 follows the core of its reasoning: ‘By [the pauliana] the creditor seeks a declaration that the transfer of assets by the debtor to a third party has caused detriment to the creditor’s rights deriving from the binding nature of the contract and which correspond with the obligations freely consented to by the debtor. The cause of this action therefore lies essentially in the breach of these obligations towards the creditor to which the debtor agreed.’
The Court does not refer to Ergo, let alone to Sharpston AG’s ‘centre of gravity’ test in same, however it would seem that this may have influenced it. Yet in my view this is way too extensive a stretch of the Handte or Sharpston AG’s Ergo formula. Litigation in the pauliana pitches the creditor against the third party. It would take really quite specific circumstances for Handte to be met in the relation between these two. That a contractual relation features somewhere in the factual matrix is almost always true.
For a comparative benchmark, reference can be made to Refcomp where the Court took a very limiting view on subrogration of choice of court.
The Court’s formulation at 45 is entirely circular: were the creditor not able to sue in the forum contractus, ‘the creditor would be forced to bring proceedings before the court of the place where the defendant is domiciled, that forum, as prescribed by Article 4(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, possibly having no link to the place of performance of the obligations of the debtor with regard to his creditor.’ Indeed: because the pauliana does not mordicus have to links to that place; it is not because it might not, that a forum contractus has to be conjured up to secure these links.
The Court then quite forcefully and seemingly without much hesitation identifies a specific forum contractus (unlike the AG who had suggested that that very difficulty supports his view that there simply is no forum contractus to speak of): at 46: ‘the action brought by the creditor aims to preserve its interests in the performance of the obligations derived from the contract concerning construction works, it follows that ‘the place of performance of the obligation in question’ is, according to Article 7(1)(b) of this regulation, the place where, under the contract, the construction services were provided, namely Poland.’
The initial contractual obligation between creditor and debtor therefore creates crucial jurisdictional consequences vis-a-vis third parties whose appearance in the factual matrix presents itself only very downstream. That, I would suggest, does not at all serve the predictability which the Chamber (rightly) emphasises at the very outset of its judgment as being the driving principle behind its interpretation.
I am not convinced by this judgment. (And yes, I am being polite).
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 184.108.40.206
Feniks: Bobek AG rejects forum contractus for Actio Pauliana and defends predictability of the Brussels regime.
Is the actio pauliana by a Polish company against a Spanish company, which had bought immovable property from the former’s contracting party, one relating to ‘contract’ within the meaning of Article 7(1) Brussels I Recast?
Bobek AG Opined in C-337/17 Feniks v Azteca on 21 June. His Opinion features among others a legal history class on the action pauliana, and eventually a justifiable conclusion: the action is not one in contract. In C-115/88 Reichert I the Court held that the French civil law actio pauliana does not fall within exclusive jurisdiction concerning rights in rem in immovable property (Article 24(1). Soon afterwards, the Court added in C-261/90 Reichert II that the same actio pauliana was neither a provisional measure nor an action bringing proceedings concerned with the enforcement of a judgment. It was also not a matter relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict.
That left only the potential for a forum contractus to be decided.
The AG reviews a number of arguments to come to his decision. One of those I find particularly convincing: at 62: assuming that the applicability of the head of jurisdiction for matters relating to a contract were to be contemplated, the question that immediately arises is which of the two contracts potentially involved should be taken as relevant? To which of the two contracts would an actio pauliana in fact relate? Among others (at 69-70) Sharpston AG’s Opinion in Ergo is discussed in this respect and the AG in my view is right when he dismisses the contractual relations at issue as an anchor point.
At 69 the AG also adds a knock-out point which could logically have come at the very beginning of the Opinion:
‘it should also be added and underlined that both approaches outlined above fail to satisfy the requirement of ‘obligation freely assumed by one party towards another’, [the AG refers to Handte, GAVC] that is by the Defendant towards the Applicant. Even if the case-law of this Court does not require that there is identity between the parties to the proceeding and to the respective contract, it appears difficult to consider that the mere filing of an actio pauliana creates a substantive-law relationship between the Applicant and the Defendant resulting from, for example, some kind of legal subrogation founded by an act of COLISEUM (as the Applicant’s initial debtor).’
Readers further may want to take note of para 92: the AG’s view to treat the power of recitals with caution. The AG ends at 97-98 with a robust defence of the Brussels regime, with specific reference to the common law (footnotes omitted):
‘What has to be sought is a principled answer that applies largely independently of the factual elements in an individual case. While fully acknowledging and commending the attractive flexibility of rules such as forum(non) conveniens that allow for derogation in the light of the facts of a specific case, the fact remains that the structure and the logic of the Brussels Convention and Regulations is indeed built on different premises. What is understandably needed in a diverse legal space composed of 28 legal orders are ex ante reasonably foreseeable, and thus perhaps somewhat inflexible rules at times, and less of an ex post facto explanation (mostly as to why one declared oneself competent) heavily dependent on a range of factual elements.
All in all, in the current state of EU law, actio pauliana seems to be one of the rare examples that only allows for the applicability of the general rule and an equally rare confirmation of the fact that ‘… there is no obvious foundation for the idea that there should always or even often be an alternative to the courts of the defendant’s domicile’. ‘
A solid opinion with extra reading for the summer season (on the Pauliana).