Archive for category EU law – General
Wahl AG advised last week in Case C-497/17, Oeuvre d’assistance aux bêtes d’abattoirs. In this case an NGO requests a certification body to stop certifying as ‘organic’, products obtained from religious slaughter, even though neither Council Regulation 834/2007 nor the Commission implementing Regulation 889/2008 on organic production and labelling of organic products with regard to organic production, labelling and control, mention stunned or unstunned slaughter.
I suggested earlier that the case turns around scope of application, albeit that the shadow of the human rights implications hangs over it. The Advocate General agrees: at 33: ‘the Court is therefore not strictly speaking required to rule on a question of interference with the freedom to manifest one’s religion’. In essence, what is not forbidden is allowed: the legislation on organic farming is silent on the question of ritual slaughter; (at 91) this silence on the matter is not the result of oversight for the ‘slaughter’ of animals is mentioned on several occasions in the legislation – is it just simply not regulated.
I believe the AG is right. I also, on substance, believe that unstunned slaughter, properly carried out, meets with the ethos of organic farming.
Wahl AG in Workplace Relations Commission: Member States procedural autonomy in light of primacy of EU law.
Wahl AG’s Opinion in C-378/17 Workplace Relations Commission provides a great tutorial on the principles of primacy, and Member States’ duty to ensure equivalence and effectiveness in the implementation of EU law.
At issue is the compatibility with the principle of the primacy of EU law of a rule dividing jurisdiction in specific cases between the High Court and a statutory body, the Workplace Relations Commission (‘the WRC’). The latter has no jurisdiction and has to yield to the High Court, when the case requires disapplication of a provision of national (primary or secondary) legislation.
Wahl advises that the rule does not infringe the primacy of EU law, and in doing so runs us through the principles of primacy and its implications on national procedural autonomy.
Note the Advocate-General’s remark (at 87) that ‘It is increasingly common that the resolution of conflicts arising from day-to-day life, such as consumer disputes and conflicts in the workplace, are ‘out-sourced’ from courts to specialised bodies with (limited) powers to mediate and/or adjudicate expediently such disputes (FN omitted). It is equally commonplace that, as is the case of adjudication officers at the WRC, persons resolving conflicts in such bodies do not necessarily have a legal qualification. Arguably, such bodies are better placed than courts to provide low-cost, speedy and effective solutions to conflicts of that kind.‘
At 89: ‘jurisdiction in a specific field of EU law may be divided between different bodies, provided that the rights in question are adequately protected’: an important precondition of course is that the national system guarantees that cases where national or EU legislation needs to be disapplied where they would clash with citisens’ rights, are properly adjudicated by the courts who are empowered to set aside the law: and not just swept under the carpet under the guise of the assessment being ‘factual’ only.
Access to information ironically is subject to a myriad of rules and regulations at the EU level: some of a general nature (particularly: Regulation 1049/2001), some lex specialis (such as Directive 2003/35 and Regulation 1367/2006), but with a complex relationship between lex generalis and lex specialis. Add to the mix in the environmental field, public international law in the form of the Aarhus Convention and, well, what you get is an awful lot of regulatory intransparency. Leonie and I have made an attempt succinctly to summarise same in Chapter 5 of our Handbook on EU environmental law.
In C‑57/16 P Client Earth v EC, the CJEU’s Grand Chamber set aside a General Court judgment which had earlier sided largely with the EC viz two requests of information: the first of those requests sought access to the impact assessment report drawn up by the Commission on the implementation of the ‘access to justice’ pillar of the Aarhus Convention, while the second sought access to the impact assessment carried out by the Commission on the revision of the EU legal framework on environmental inspections and surveillance at national and EU level. Both were refused on the ground for exception provided in Regulation 1049/2001, that ‘access to a document, drawn up by an institution for internal use or received by an institution, which relates to a matter where the decision has not been taken by the institution, shall be refused if disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the institution’s decision-making process, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.’
The Grand Chamber essentially held that access should be granted: core of its reasoning is at para 92: ‘Although the submission of a legislative proposal by the Commission is, at the impact assessment stage, uncertain, the disclosure of those documents is likely to increase the transparency and openness of the legislative process as a whole, in particular the preparatory steps of that process, and, thus, to enhance the democratic nature of the European Union by enabling its citizens to scrutinise that information and to attempt to influence that process. As is asserted, in essence, by Client Earth, such a disclosure, at a time when the Commission’s decision-making process is still ongoing, enables citizens to understand the options envisaged and the choices made by that institution and, thus, to be aware of the considerations underlying the legislative action of the European Union. In addition, that disclosure puts those citizens in a position effectively to make their views known regarding those choices before those choices have been definitively adopted, so far as both the Commission’s decision to submit a legislative proposal and the content of that proposal, on which the legislative action of the European Union depends, are concerned.‘
Essentially: a true transparent policy process requires citisens to be able to impact the flow of the water before it disappears under the bridge.
EC Institutions continue to fight rearguard actions against transparency, which subsequently have to be addressed by the likes of Client Earth. The CJEU could not be clearer in highlighting the patch access to EU policy should continue to follow.
(Handbook of) EU Environmental Law, first ed.2017, Chapter 5. (With Leonie Reins).
One can say many things about climate change litigation by individuals. (See my earlier piece on the Dutch Urgenda case). Many argue that the separation of powers suggest that governments, not judges, should be making climate policy. Or that international environmental law lacks the type of direct effect potentially required for it to be validly invoked by citisens. Others point to the duty of care of Governments; to binding – even if fluffy – climate change obligations taken on since at least the 1990s, and to the utter lack of progress following more than 25 years of international climate change law.
It is therefore no surprise to see that this type of litigation has now also reached the European Court of Justice: the text of the application is here, see also brief legal (by Olivia Featherstone) and Guardian background.
Like cases before it, colleagues shy of preparation materials for an international environmental law course, with comparative EU law thrown in, can use the case to hinge an entire course on.
As Olivia reports, the legal principles involved are the following:
The claimants state that EU emissions leading to climate change are contrary to:
- The principle of equality (Articles 20 and 21, EU Charter)
- The principle of sustainable development (Article 3 TEU, Article 11 TFEU)
- Article 37 EU Charter
- Article 3 UNFCCC
- The no harm principle in international law
- Article 191 ff TFEU (the EU’s environmental policy
One to watch.
EU Environmental Law, with Leonie Reins, Edward Elgar, 1st ed. 2017, part I Chapter 2 in particular.
Anchor defendants in follow-up competition law cases. The High Court in Vattenfall et al v Prysmian et al.
A classic case of follow-up damages litigation in competition law, here in the high voltage power cables cartel, fines for which were confirmed by the CJEU early July. Core to the case is the application of Article 8(1)’s anchor defendants mechanism. Only two of the defendants are UK incorporated companies – UK subsidiaries of companies that have been found by the European Commission to have infringed EU competition law.
Authority cited includes of course CDC, Roche Nederland and Painer, and Cooper Tyre (sale of the cartelised products can amount to implementation of the cartel). Vattenfall confirms that for the English courts, ‘knowingly implementing’ the cartel has a low threshold.
At 89 ff the Court refers to the pending case of (what I now know to be) C-724/17 Skanska Industrial Solutions e.a.: Finnish Courts are considering the application for cartel damages against parent companies on acquiring cartelist subsidiaries, had dissolved them. Relevance for Vattenfall lies with the issue of knowledge: the Finnish courts wonder what Article 101 TFEU has to say on the degree of knowledge of the cartelist activities, relevant for the liability of the parent company. An application of fraus, or abuse in other words. Elleray DJ however, did not consider the outcome of that reference to be relevant for the case at hand, in its current stage of procedure.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 188.8.131.52