Greenaway & Rocks v Covea Insurance. On applying the EU’s multilinguistic laws post Brexit.

In Greenaway v Parrish & Ors [2021] EWHC 1506 (QB) ( I signaled it a while ago but the case has only recently appeared on BAILII), Spencer J had to consider the practical implications of the impossibility of referrals to the Court of Justice of the EU, by UK judges. Plenty of pending cases were introduced before Brexit day. Moreover, an even larger number of cases will be subject to retained EU law.

In a specific conflict of laws sense, this raises the particular (procedural and substantive) issue of foreign law being fact and hence needing to be proven. Retained and /or previously applicable EU law, will not be foreign law as such, yet clearly it is law of a different nature than UK statutory and common law across the isles.

The practical implications of all this have now surfaced in Greenaway. Following CJEU CILFIT, EU law is (usually) equally authentic in 22 languages. In the case at hand, this centres upon the meaning of the word ‘stolen’, in the motor insurance Directive 2009/103. How should a judge inform her /himself of the meaning of the word in the 22 languages, and potentially also of the implementation of the Directive across the Member States. 12 King’s Bench Walk have analysis of the case here. As they note, Mr Justice Spencer granted permission to each party to adduce four foreign law experts reports in EU jurisdictions of their choosing, so that the relevant foreign language versions of the Directive could be understood. He also gave permission for those experts to give evidence as to the implementation of the Directive in those member states, that material being part of the context in which the point at issue had to be decided.

This is an important procedural point which no doubt will surface in a variety of shapes in years to come.

Geert.

Applicable law (Article 4 and 7 Rome II) in the Dutch Shell climate ruling. Not quite as momentous as the core message.

I have an article forthcoming on the application of Rome II’s Article 7, ‘environmental damage’ rule. Last week’s widely reported first instance ruling in the Dutch Shell climate case will of course now feature.

I reported on application of A7 in Begum v Maran. There I submit, the Court of Appeal engaged without sufficient depth with the Article. It held against its application. Xandra Kramer and Ekaterina Pannebakker then alerted us to the use of Article 7 in last week’s momentous Milieudefensie v Shell (umpteen) ruling [Dutch version here, English version here], in which Shell by a first instance judge has been ordered to reduce its CO2 emissions. In that ruling, too, the judges leave a lot of issues on Rome II underanalysed. The conclusion  however goes in the opposite direction: the court held A7 is engaged and leads to Dutch law as the lex loci delicti commissi (Handlungsort or ldc).

I have taken the Dutch version of the judgment as the basis for the analysis for the English version is a touch under par when it comes to the finer detail. The Dutch version it has to be said is not entirely clear either on the conflict of laws analysis.

Firstly, Milieudefensie argue that A7 is engaged, and it suggests it opts for Dutch law given the choice left to it by that Article. Whether it does so as lex loci damni (Erfolgort or ld) or lex loci delicti commissi is not specified. It is reported by the courts that in subsidiary fashion Milieudefensie argue that per A4(1)’s general rule, Dutch law is the lex causae: that has to be Erfolgort.  (Lest the court inaccurately reported parties’ submissions here and the argument made under A4 focused on Article 4(3)’s displacement rule) [4.3.1].

The judges further report [4.3.2] that parties were in agreement that climate change, whether dangerous or otherwise, due to CO2 emissions constitutes ‘environmental damage’ in the sense of A7 Rome II (and the judges agree) and that they were in disagreement on the locus delicti commissi. Milieudefensie argue that Shell’s holding policy viz climate change and emissions, dictated from its corporate home of The Netherlands, is that Handlungsort. Shell argue that the place of the actual emissions are the Handlungsorts (plural), hence a Mozaik of applicable laws. (This nota bene has interesting applications in competition law, as I suggest here).

Then follows a rather sloppy reference to Jan von Hein’s note bene excellent review of Article 7 in Calliess; distinguishing of the arguments made by Shell with reference to ia product liability cases; and eventually, with reference to ia the cluster effect of emissions (‘every contribution towards a reduction of CO2 emissions may be of importance’ [4.3.5]) and the exceptional, policy driven nature of A7, the conclusion [4.3.6] that the holding policy is an independent cause of the CO2 emissions and hence imminent climate damage and obiter [4.3.7] that A4(1) would have led to the same conclusion.

The ruling will of course be appealed. It would be good to get the application of Article 7 right, seeing as environmental law is a core part of strategic and public interest litigation.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd. ed. 2021, Chapter 4, Heading 4.6.3 (4.54 ff).

LugaNON. My brief thoughts on the European Commission’s refusal to support the UK’s accession to Lugano 2007, and a clarification of the procedure and required majorities.

Update 9 July 2021 Thank you Ekaterina Pannebakker for flagging the momentarily definitive ‘no’: the EU’s official confirmation of non-consent.

Update 8 June 2021 for the Dutch regret of the EC’s approach yet de facto acceptance of the EC position, see  here – with thanks to Taco Van Der Valk for signalling. The Dutch Government also emphasises the fact that the issue is open-ended: it can be revisited in a later stage of EU-UK relations.

This post is my tuppenny worth on the European Commission’s Assessment on the application of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to accede to the 2007 Lugano Convention. These are my considered but of course not my exhaustive initial thoughts. For excellent review of the legal status quo, see Andrew Dickinson’s ‘Realignment of the Planets – Brexit and European Private International Law’ in IPRax 2021/3.

The background. 

In June 2020, Michel Barnier reportedly commented ‘Do we really want the UK to remain a centre for commercial litigation for the EU, when we could attract these services here?’. This illustrated what has been clear now for quite a while: legal services contribute directly to GPD, mostly as a result of law firms’ turnover and, more recently,  via the financial performance of third-party financing. More importantly, they have an impact on the reputation of a country. Courts’ know-how, speed and general performance are a particularly relevant factor here. Therefore the legal sector acts as one factor in attracting foreign direct investment, as the rise of  international commercial courts shows.

The quote also illustrates however that the European Commission and the Member States were keenly aware of the impact of Brexit on judicial co-operation. Throughout the process, this included early EU flags that, should judicial co-operation fail to be included in the EU-UK Trade and Co-operation Agreement – TCA, it should not be assumed that the EU would support UK Lugano membership. Scholarship, too, warned of the inferiority of Lugano viz Brussels IA, and the particular weakness of Lugano States only having to take  ‘due account’ (Article 1 Protocol 2 Lugano 2007) of CJEU case-law on Lugano.

As readers will be aware, the TCA as eventually negotiated includes precious little on judicial co-operation in civil and commercial matters. A Hard Brexit in this area, therefore. Amidst the many issues that needed to be discussed in the TCA, judicial co-operation did not make the grade. This was not a big surprise. As Peter Bert signalled from the start, judicial co-operation barely featured in the negotiation mandate on the EU side, and on the UK side the Government kept largely schtum about the issue.

The lack of provision in the TCA put back into the spotlights the UK’s April 2020 application to join Lugano. Of note is as I have signalled before, that the UK could accede to Lugano, bypassing EU approval , if it were to become a fully fledged EFTA Member State (A70(1)a Lugano). That of course is not the route the UK has followed in its disentanglement from the EU. Under A72 Lugano therefore accession requires consent from the current Lugano States, consent which they ‘endeavour to give’ at the latest within one year after the invitation to do so by the Depository (i.e., Switserland). 

The flip-flop? 

It is reporting in the Financial Times which subsequently put things into a bit of a spin, whether as a result of misinformation or lobbying, I cannot say. On the day of an important meeting of the relevant Working Party, the FT first reported the EC would support Lugano Membership – contrary to what the vast majority of observers had assumed. By the afternoon a U-turn in reporting was made, suggesting additionally that a split had emerged among the Member States. That split is simply not there, or not to a sufficient degree (see below re the voting procedure).

The morning’s reporting of white smoke made the lack of EC support look like a surprise or indeed a disappointment. Clearly it could not have been the former: most of us had assumed the EC would not support the application.

That leaves the feeling of disappointment. Quite aside from one’s view on Brexit as a whole, for legal practice clearly a continuing umbilical cord between the UK and the Brussels Regime in its widest form (BIa, Rome I and II etc etc) would have been most preferable. Lugano would have been a second best. I remind readers that Lugano not only lacks a unified solid judicial oversight. It also lags behind Brussels Ia in important aspects (Lugano 2007 instead mirrors Brussels I, Regulation 44/2001).

The reasoning.

In its Communication to the EP and the Member States, as Peter Bert reports, the EC’s core reasoning is

“For the European Union, the Lugano Convention is a flanking measure of the internal market and relates to the EU-EFTA/EEA context. In relation to all other third countries the consistent policy of the European Union is to promote cooperation within the framework of the multilateral Hague Conventions. The United Kingdom is a third country without a special link to the internal market. Therefore, there is no reason for the European Union to depart from its general approach in relation to the United Kingdom. Consequently, the Hague Conventions should provide the framework for future cooperation between the European Union and the United Kingdom in the field of civil judicial cooperation.”

The Commission specifically refers to the example of Poland as the direction of travel (closer integration with the EU), and to Lugano being a flanking measure of the Internal Market. The 1968 Brussels Convention quite clearly shows the DNA and the narrative of market integration. The development of the EU judicial area in the meantime has moved along in the direction of the EU citisen, rather than merely corporations, as consumers of EU judicial co-operation. Yet without Lugano States being part of the much wider judicial co-operation agenda of the EU proper, it is not absurd to suggest that Lugano 2007’s narrative is more closely aligned with market  integration than it is with ever deeper integration.

At the time of Poland‘s accession to Lugano, this was indeed clearly also linked to its impending membership of the EU, as also noted by David Lock QC, relevant UK Minister at the time. For current candidates, one could think e.g. of Georgia, and the Balkan countries, as stronger candidates for Lugano membership than the UK. Clearly, however, they may bump into opposition by the non-EU Lugano States.

The victims.

The general narrative, to which I subscribe, is that it is not Business to Business contracts, and the litigation by big business cases that will be much hit by this hard Brexit in judicial co-operation. They will turn to arbitration, they will agree exclusive choice of court (covered by the 2005 Hague Convention), and if need be they will simply absorb being litigated in, or having to litigate in the EU. Likewise, many UK judgments in standard business cases will find little difficulty, if some delay, in enforcement in the EU.

Rather: SMEs (lest they too enter into exclusive choice of court agreements per Hague 2005; and they will be less likely to be able to absorb the cost of parallel litigation), consumers and employees, travellers (including in direct action versus the insurer), and claimants in corporate due diligence cases will find it much harder to have a smooth judicial process between the UK and the EU. Consumers domiciled in the EU will still be able to sue UK corporations in the EU, provided they meet the Pammer Alpenhof criteria under the relevant Section of Brussels Ia; and employees carrying out their duties here, likewise will be able to sue a UK employer in the EU. Yet with the distinct possibility of parallel UK proceedings, and subsequent difficulties in having a European judgment enforced, there will be many a freezing effect on proactive judicial action by these protected groups. Clearly and mutatis mutandis, the same categories in the UK will see a major judicial protection avenue fall away, as non-EU cq non-Lugano domiciled consumers, employees and small insureds do not enjoy the protection of the relevant Sections in BIa cq Lugano.

A distinct category of claimants that will be hit, are those which recently have enjoyed the reigning in of forum non conveniens in business and human rights cases particularly under Lugano (where Owosu’s rejection of forum non rules) and even under Brussels Ia (where A33-34 does create some obstacles). Without Lugano, forum non in these cases will once again come to the fore, although recent Court of Appeal and Supreme Court authority on duty of care may alter that fear. 

The voting procedure and future options.

Greg Callus suggests a number of future options here. I have made the following admittedly lame football comparison: If BIa is the Champions League, then Lugano is the Premier League and the Hague Judgments Convention the Ruritanian Boy Scouts football conference. That is because the 2019 Convention does not impact on forum non theories of the signatory States; is a long, long way off entry into force (albeit as noted the EC signals it might speed up the accession process); has such a huge amount of exceptions, reservations and open questions, counsel will drive an entire tank company through it; and, like all Hague instruments, lacks a harmonising court with authority over interpretation.

The Lugano Convention encourages consent within a year of notification. Absence of an answer in other words simply continues a status of lack of consent.

An important final word on the voting procedure: it is NOT the case that the final word on the current initiative lies with the Member States under qualified majority – QMV voting. An EU yes to Switserland, the depository, requires a Council Decision with QMV. However that requires a COM proposal for such decision. This, the European Commission clearly is not willing to put forward. Article 241 TFEU enables Council to request the EC to put forward a proposal for decision. Yet to amend that proposal (which would have to be the case here, seeing as the EC will not propose consent), unanimity is required.

In conclusion

I return to my Barnier quote above: ‘Do we really want the UK to remain a centre for commercial litigation for the EU, when we could attract these services here?’ Free movement of judgments simply is too big a cherry to have the UK pick it in the absence of a more overall framework for judicial co-operation in civil and commercial matters. I fear the fall-out for the categories listed above, might not be enough to make the EC and indeed enough Member States deviate from the Brexit negotiation mandate, which continues to cast a long shadow over this particular initiative.

Geert.

EU private international law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 1.7.

Mutton dressed as lamb. The ‘new’ proposed proportionality angle to the innovation principle.

A quick post on an issue I actively published on last year, including with Kathleen Garnett: the innovation principle. My post here is a bit of a documentation gateway on same. I just wanted to draw readers’ attention to two developments.

First, the European Risk Forum which stood at the cradle of a proposed innovation ‘principle’ has been rebranded into the ‘European Regulation and Innovation Forum’ – ERIF. This of course even more than ‘Risk Forum’ is meant to conjure up positive feelings: who could possibly be against Regulation let alone innovation? It calls itself a think tank but it is in fact a trade association – interest group.

Further, the focus of the campaign has now changed. No longer it seems is the introduction of a new innovation principle the aim of the campaign. Rather, a restrictive take on regulation using cost benefit analysis and ‘proportionality’ – both existing principles of e.g. EU environmental law and at odds e.g. with the recently proposed essential use idea within the EU’s chemicals policy. It seems ERIF looks among others to the EU’s Regulatory Scrutiny Board to keep proposed laws in check.

Worth keeping an eye on, I suggest.

Geert.

Szpunar AG in All in one Star ltd. The corporate mobility jigsaw continues to be laid.

This post has been in my draft folder a long time for First Advocate General Szpunar opined Mid-October in C-469/19 All in One Star Ltd. Still worth a flag, with the CJEU presumably soon issuing judgment. The case concerns the refusal of German authorities to enter a branch of a UK-incorporated company, in the German commercial register.  C-106/16 Polbud is the most recent major case on the issue.

The Opinion follows the (slow) progress of positive harmonisation of EU company law, with Directive 2017/1132 core to the questions. The AG opined that that Directive does not preclude a national provision under which the managing director of the company has to provide an assurance that there is no barrier to his personal appointment under national law in the form of a prohibition, ordered by a court or public authority, on practising his profession or trade. However he suggests the Treaty provisions on free movement oppose the authorities of destination requesting the director provide assurances that a notary, a representative of a comparable legal advisory profession or a consular officer has confirmed such absence of obstacle to him.

The AG was asked by the CJEU not to discuss the other question: whether a Member State may insist upon indication of the amount of share capital or a comparable capital value, for a branch of a limited liability company with registered office in another Member State to be entered in the commercial register. Presumably because the answer is clearly ‘No’ in light of earlier case-law.

Clearly following Brexit (the TCA as far as I am aware has no straight free movement principles for corporations) the issue will be different for UK corporations however it will continue to present itself in light of the intra-EU competition in corporate law.

Geert.

EU Private international law, 3rd ed 2021, Chapter 6.

Servier Laboratories. The UK Supreme Court on the narrow window for res judicata authority of CJEU decisions.

Rather like I note in my report on Highbury Poultry Farm,  Secretary of State for Health & Ors v Servier Laboratories Ltd & Ors [2020] UKSC is another example of why the UK Supreme Court and counsel to it will be missed post Brexit.

The case in essence queries whether a CJEU annulment (in General Court: Case T-691/14, currently subject to appeal with the CJEU) of a finding by the European Commission that companies breached Article 101 and 102 TFEU’s ban on anti-competitive practices, is binding in national proceedings that determine issues of causation, remoteness and mitigation of loss. The answer, in short: no, it does not.

The case essentially revolves around the difficulty of applying common law concepts of authority and precedent to the CJEU’s more civil law approach to court decisions. For those with an interest in comparative litigation therefore, it is a case of note.

The essence in the national proceedings is whether Claimants [who argue that Servier’s breaches of EU and UK competition law led to a delay in generic Perindopril entering the UK market, resulting in higher prices of Perindopril and financial loss to the NHS) failed to mitigate the loss they claim to have suffered as a result of Servier’s (the manufacturer of the drug) infringement of the competition rules. The Court of Appeal’s judgment is best read for the facts.

In T-691/14 Servier SAS v European Commission, the General Court of the EU had annulled only part of the European Commission’s decision by which it was found that the Appellants had infringed Article 102 TFEU. In the present proceedings, Servier seek to rely on a number of factual findings made by the
GCEU in the course of its judgment and argue that the English courts are bound by those findings. The High Court and the Court of Appeal have held that the propositions on which the Appellants seek to rely are not res judicata.

Core CJEU authority discussed is Joined Cases C-442/03P and C-471/03P P&O European Ferries (Vizcaya) SA and Diputación Foral de Vizcaya v Commission.

Lord Lloyd-Jones reaches the crux of his reasoning, on the basis of CJEU authority, at 39:

The principle of absolute res judicata gives dispositive effect to the judgment itself. It is the usual practice of EU courts to express the outcome of the action in a brief final paragraph of the judgment referred to as the operative part. While this will have binding effect, it will be necessary to look within the judgment beyond the operative part in order to ascertain its basis, referred to as the ratio decidendi. (EU law has no system of stare decisis or binding precedent comparable to that in common law jurisdictions and this EU concept of ratio decidendi is, once again, distinct from the concept bearing the same name in the common law.) It will be essential to look beyond the operative part in this way in order to identify the reason for the decision and in order that the institution whose act has been annulled should know what steps it must take to remedy the situation. In a case where the principle of absolute res judicata applies, it will extend to findings that are the necessary support for the operative part of the annulling judgment.

The GC’s findings were based on a limited ground only, relating to too narrow a market definition under A102 TFEU. As presently constituted, the claim in the national proceedings is a claim for breach of statutory duty founded on alleged infringements of article 101 TFEU. No question arises in the proceedings before the national court as to the relevant product market for the purposes of A102 or the applicability of A102.

The national proceedings therefore concern causation, remoteness and mitigation of loss in the arena of article 101 TFEU. The narrow res judicata window, it was held, clearly does not apply to them and that is acte clair which needs no referral to Luxembourg.

Geert.

 

 

The UKSC in Highbury Poultry Farm. On mens rea and EU law.

I am a bit late with a post as a follow-up to my Tweet, below, re the Supreme Court’s judgment in Highbury Poultry Farm Produce Ltd, R (on the application of) v Crown Prosecution Service [2020] UKSC 39. Thankfully, the judgment is of more than fleeting relevance. It is also a good example of the structured approach to legal argument, its discussion in scholarship and its engagement with the parties’ legal arguments which will be missed post Brexit.

A poultry slaughterhouse was being accused of breaching Regulation 1099/2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing – the same Regulation at stake in the CJEU Shechita proceedings.

Core issue in the case is whether the EU law at issue implies a requirement for mens rea (criminal intent) in the ability for Member States to discipline its breach. If no means rea is required, the law is one of strict liability.

At 14 Lord Burrows makes the point that the Regulation at issue left it to the Member States to determine the sanctions rolled-out by national law to ensure compliance with the Regulation. Had a Member State decided to deploy civil sanctions only, that would have been fine: criminal law enforcement was not necessary. What follows is a good summary of the authority on means of UK and EU statutory interpretation, with in the case at issue particular emphasis on the impact of recitals: at 51: an unclear recital does not override a clear article.

Conclusion after consideration of the Regulation (the only stain on the analysis being the lack of linguistic input (a fleeting reference at 32 only), given the CILFIT authority on equal authenticity)): that all animals which have been stunned must be bled by incising at least one of the carotid arteries or the vessels from which they arise, is formulated by the Regulation as an obligation of strict liability under EU law. Hence its effet utile requires that Member States that opt for enforcing it via criminal law, employ strict liability in that enforcement.

Reference to the CJEU was neither sought nor seriously contemplated.

Geert.

 

French neonicotinoids measures and administrative compliance under EU law. The CJEU takes a view protective of Member States’ room for manoeuvre.

The ‘transparency’ or ‘notification’ Directive 2015/1535 (the successor to Directive 98/34) featured twice at the CJEU yesterday. In Case C‑711/19 Admiral Sportwetten, the Court held that a national tax rule that provides for taxation of the operation of betting terminals does not constitute a ‘technical regulation’ that needs to be notified under the Directive. In Case C-514/19 Union des industries de la protection des plantes it held more directly than Kokott AG had opined, that France had validly informed the Commission of the need to take measures intended, in particular, to protect bees by banning the use of 3 active substances of the neonicotinoid family which had been authorised for use under the relevant EU procedure. That procedure is regulated by Directive 1107/2009 on plant protection products.

The complication in the case in essence is a result of the dual procedure for national safeguard measures as a result of the existence of both the PPP and the notification Directive. May a communication of a Member State under the Notification Directive, double as notification of emergency measures under the PPP Directive? The CJEU held it can, provided the notification contains a clear presentation of the evidence showing, first, that those active substances are likely to constitute a serious risk to human or animal health or to the environment and, second, that that risk cannot be controlled without the adoption, as a matter of urgency, of the measures taken by the Member State concerned, and where the Commission failed to ask that Member State whether that communication must be treated as the official provision of information under the regulation.

The Court referred to its findings in C-116/16 Fidenato, that a Member State’s power, provided by an EU act, to adopt emergency measures requires compliance with both the substantive conditions and procedural conditions laid down by that act (a requirement, I would add, which conversely also applies to the European Commission), but adds that a notification to the Commission under Article 71(1) of Regulation 1107/2009 requires only that the Member State concerned ‘officially informs’ that institution, without having to do so in a particular manner.

More generally, the Court emphasises the principle of sound administration imposed upon the EC, which explains its insistence on the EC having proactively to ensure the Member State concerned be aware of its obligations under the EU law concerned or indeed adjacent law. A certain parallel here may be made with the rules of civil procedure which require from those soliciting the courts that they approach the court with clean hands.

The Court in essence, I submit, finds that, the consequences for the Member State concerned in failing to meet the requirements for it to be able to make use of a safeguard provision in secondary law being so great, the conditions imposed on them must be met by a strict due diligence on behalf of the European Commission.

Of note is that the judgment does not entail any finding on the substantive legality of the French ban.

Geert.

 

 

Free movement of capital and sustainable forest management. The CJEU in Huijbrechts.

Disclosure I represented the Flemish Region at the Court of Justice. I wrote this post on 11 December 2018. Given that the interpretation of the judgment has a bearing on the proceedings in the national court, I decided to hold back on posting  until those proceedings would have met their national end – which they still have not. Seeing as I thought the case might be of interest I decided to go ahead now anyway.

In C-679/17 Huijbrechts the European Court of Justice held in a fashion which is fairly typical of free movement of capital cases. The Court treads carefully. Positive harmonisation of tax law is difficult for the EU to achieve for this requires unanimity. Tax measures having a direct impact on free movement of capital, too strict an enforcement of the latter may be read as tax harmonisation via the back door.

The case at issue concerns a measure by the Flemish Region of Belgium to exempt sustainable managed forests from death duties (inheritance tax). The exemption is subject to there being a forest management plan, agreed with the relevant agency, and subject to a 30 year follow-up period (should in the interim the forest no longer be sustainably managed, the heirs pay the tax pro rata the remainder of the 30 year period). The heirs concerned did not enjoy the exemption for the forests are located outside the region and suggest this is an infringement of the free movement of capital.

Defence against suggestions of infringement of Article 63 TFEU’s free movement of capital rule typically follow the following sequence: free movement is not impacted; should this fail: the domestic and foreign situation are not objectively comparable; should this fail, per C‑256/06 Jäger, public interest requires an exemption (subject to a suitability and a proportionality test).

A crucial part of free movement judgments entails having to read the judgment with an eye on the factual circumstances: the Court typically employs a formula that reads something like ‘in circumstances such as those at issue in the national proceedings’ or ‘in circumstances such as those at issue in the national law’.

In Huijbrechts, the Court at 25-26 finds that Flemish and foreign forest are objectively comparable (only) where they are transboundary and concern woods that are part of one unit or landscape (lest my geographic knowledge fails me here, this limits the impact of the judgment to French and Dutch estates; Belgium has a land border with Luxembourg and Germany, too, but Flanders does not). Interestingly, at 22 the Court indicates that in making the like forest comparison (GATT, WTO and generally free movement scholars will know where I am heading here), the regulatory goal of sustainable forest management plays a role. (See the like product /service distinction in the WTO).

For that limited group of forest, the public interest exception imposes constraints: a blanket ban on considering sustainable management outside of Flanders fails the Treaty test, for it does not assist with the protection of the forests. Flanders will for that limited group have to allow the heirs (again: only where the forests are transboundary and concern woods that are part of one unit or landscape) to provide proof of sustainable management; should such proof be delivered, the burden of proof will revert to the Flemish tax authorities: they cannot blankly assume that they cannot get the necessary data from the foreign administration during the 30 year period: they have to request such data (typically: on a 30 year basis) and only should they fail to get them, can they still refuse to exempt.

The Court implicitly recognises the specific (dire) circumstances of forests in Flanders (at 31). It does not accept the heirs’ submission that the myriad of international and European policy documents on forest management somehow amount to positive harmonisation.

Geert.

 

Applicable law and statutes of limitation in CSR /business and human rights cases. The High Court, at least prima facie, on shipbreaking in Bangladesh in Begum v Maran.

Update 28 August 2020 permission to appeal and cross-appeal has been granted and is being additionally sought by both parties on various issues.

Hamida Begum v Maran UK [2020] EWHC 1846 (QB) engages exactly the kinds of issues that I have just posted about, in court rather than in concept. On 30th March 2018 Mr Mohammed Khalil Mollah fell to his death whilst working on the demolition of a defunct oil tanker in the Zuma Enterprise Shipyar in Chittagong (now Chattogram), Bangladesh. On 11th April 2019 the deceased’s widow issued proceedings claiming damages for negligence under the UK Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 and the Fatal Accidents Act 1976; alternatively, under Bangladeshi law. The scope of the proceedings has subsequently been broadened inasmuch as draft Amended Particulars of Claim advance a cause of action in restitution: more precisely, unjust enrichment.

Application in the current case is for strike-out and /or summary judgment (denying liability) hence the legal issues are dealt with at prima facie instead of full throttle level. One or two of the decisions deserve full assessment at trial. Trial will indeed follow for the application was dismissed.

The case engages with the exact issues in exchanges I had at the w-e.

Proceedings have not been brought against the owner of the yard and/or the deceased’s employer. Both are Bangladeshi entities. Maran (UK) Ltd,  defendant, is a company registered in the UK and, it is alleged, was both factually and legally responsible for the vessel ending up in Bangladesh where working conditions were known to be highly dangerous.

Focus of the oral argument has been whether claim discloses viable claims in English law on the basis of tort of negligence (answer: yes) and in unjust enrichment (answer: no).

The issue of liability in tort is discussed on the basis of English law, which is odd at first sight given Rome II might suggest as a starting point Bangladeshi law as the lex causae ; Justice Jay himself says so much, but only at 76 ff when he discusses Rome II viz the issue of limitation. In applications for summary judgment however, reasoning and order of argument may take odd form as a result of the prima facie nature of the proceedings and the conversations between bench and parties at case management stage.

On the tort of neglicence claimant argues under English law, with direct relevance to the current debate on environmental and human rights due diligence, that a duty of care required the defendant to take all reasonable steps to ensure that its negotiated and agreed end of life sale and the consequent disposal of the Vessel for demolition would not and did not endanger human health, damage the environment and/or breach international regulations for the protection of human health and the environment. The EU Ship Recycling Regulation 1257/2013 was suggested as playing a role, which is dismissed by Justice Jay at 24 for the Regulation was not applicable ratione temporis.

At 30, claimant’s case on negligence is summarised:

First, the vessel had reached the end of its operating life and a decision was taken (perforce) to dispose of it. Secondly, end-of-life vessels are difficult to dispose of safely. Aside from the evident difficulties inherent in dismantling a large metal structure, a process replete with potential danger, an oil tanker such as this contains numerous hazardous substances such as asbestos, mercury and radio-active components. Although these were listed for Basel Convention purposes and for the attention of the buyer, and the deceased was not injured as a result of exposure to any hazardous substance, the only reasonable inference is that waste such as asbestos is not disposed of safely in Chattogram. Thirdly, the defendant had a choice as to whether to entrust the vessel to a buyer who would convey it to a yard which was either safe or unsafe. Fourthly, the defendant had control and full autonomy over the sale. Fifthly, the defendant knew in all the circumstances that the vessel would end up on Chattogram beach. Sixthly, the defendant knew that the modus operandi at that location entailed scant regard for human life.

The gist of the argument under tort therefore is a classic Donoghue v Stevenson type case of liability arising from a known source of danger.

At 42 ff Justice Jay discusses what to my mind is of great relevance in particular under Article 7 Rome II, should it be engaged, giving claimant a choice between lex locus delicti commissi and lex locus damni for environmental damage, in particular, the issue of ‘control’. One may be aware from my earlier writings (for an overview see my chapter in the 2019 OUP Handbook of Comparative environmental law) that the determination of the lex causae for that issue of control has not been properly discussed by either the CJEU or national courts. This being a prima facie review, the issue is not settled definitively of course however Justice Jay ends by holding that there is no reason to dismiss the case on this issue first hand. This will therefore go to trial.

As noted Rome II is only discussed towards the end, when the issue of limitation surfaces (logically, it would have come first). Claimant does not convince the judge that the case is manifestly more closely connected with England than with Bangladesh under A4(3) Rome II. Then follows the discussion whether this might be ‘environmental damage’ under Article 7 Rome II, which Justice J at 83 ff holds preliminarily and prima facie, it is. Analysis of Article 7 is bound to be of great importance at trial and /or appeal.

At 85 a further issue for debate is trial is announced, namely whether the one-year statute of limitation under Bangladeshi law, should be extended under Article 26 Rome II’s allowance for ordre public (compare Roberts and CJEU C-149/18 Martins v DEKRA – that case concerning lois de police and statutes of limitation. 

Plenty of issues to be discussed thoroughly at trial.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 8, Heading 8.3.